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This thesis is based on thirteen months of fieldwork carried out in the West Hunan
Tujia and Miao Minority People's Autonomous Prefecture in China, particularly
focusing on the city of Jishou and the surrounding area.
Official images of Jishou are loosely based on the way of life of the highland, Kho
Xiong speaking Miao people, giving the impression that Jishou itself is a 'minority'
(shao shu minzu) area. The nature of my fieldwork, however, brought me into
contact with lowland, Chinese speaking people, often of mixed descent, who, though
considered by outsiders to be 'minority,' describe themselves and their cultural
practices as 'local' (bendi).
After discussing the context of the social, political and economic change in which,
like other cities in China, Jishou is participating, I focus on the cultural activities
which are considered to be characteristic of this area. In doing so, I contrast
officially sponsored activities, which seek to promote a picture of West Hunan as a
place of distinct but happily co-existing ethnic groups, with the 'local' activities
recreated in recent years at local temples.
Officially sponsored representations of the Miao appear as staged performances,
appealing to non-locals as visually attractive images of an aboriginal 'Other', but
with limited relevance for West Hunan people. In contrast, unofficial cultural
practices, such as those at local temples, are participatory activities, through which
people can address the effects of the rapid economic and political changes which are
occurring in China today. Moreover, local stories and practices also provide a means
by which people express identities in terms of shared locality and memory,
suggesting that the official categorisation of ethnic difference fails to take account of
the complexities of local identities. Although they are officially discouraged, the
flexibility of local cultural practices allows them to evade attempts to control them.
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Chapter One - Introduction
Travelling by train to Jishou, capital of the West Hunan Autonomous Prefecture, one
is struck by the remoteness of the setting. Far from any major centres of population,
it shares a mountainous border with the eastern parts of Guizhou and Sichuan
provinces. In an effort to open the area to trade and tourism, a new, direct train-
service to the region from Beijing has been opened. This route takes forty hours,
working its way south on minor lines through the flat rural hinterland of Central
China before crossing the Yangtze and entering West Hunan. During the last few
hours of the journey, one passes through dramatic but barren mountain scenery,
punctuated with villages comprising mud and wooden houses. The train's
destination is Huaihua, a moderately important city situated at a railway junction two
hours south of Jishou.
The city of Jishou itself presents a contrast to the rest of the region. Only the
surrounding mountains make it look any different from any other small city in
Southern China. A mixture of work units, small shops, concrete department stores,
hotels and restaurants are crowded into a narrow valley and, as always in a Chinese
city, there are many building sites. In the shops, which are filled with electrical
goods and convenience foods, there is a variety of Chinese, foreign and multinational
brand names. There is a sharp difference between these post-1949 buildings and the
older section of the city, which consists of a few streets of wooden buildings by the
river. As Gaubatz suggests, with reference to other cities, this part of the city was
probably left untouched because the expense of rebuilding it would have been too
high (1995: 32). Today, some efforts are being made to restore this part of the city in
an attempt to attract tourism.
The Beijing train has a recorded announcement for each station. When you approach
Jishou, it tells you that the city is a government, education and business centre for the
area and that it is also a tourist centre. The main attractions are the local Miao and
Tujia minority peoples. According to the announcement, there are several Miao
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festivals each year, people speak a local version of the Miao language and there is a
museum housing Miao and Tujia artefacts. In fact these latter claims are pure
invention since minority festivals are not held in the city itself and the museums have
closed down through lack of money. Though more than two thirds of the population
of Jishou is officially registered as Miao or Tujia, minority languages are rarely
spoken. Visitors are usually only aware of minority people when they see women in
minority dress selling produce by the road or walking into town on rainy days or
when there is no work to be done in the fields.1
In Jishou itself, images of minority nationality culture are mainly seen in public
architecture. In a park on a hill overlooking the city a new pagoda has been built,
with reliefs showing the traditional customs of Miao and Tujia people. At a
roundabout in the centre of the city there is a socialist-realist style statue of heroic
figures in Miao dress performing a drum dance. Until recently, similar statues stood
in front of the main hotel, but these have been removed to enlarge the car park.
Tapestry hangings on sale at the department stores repeat these themes, depicting
colourful minority dances and craggy landscapes.
Jishou's main street continues as the road south to the town of Qianzhou, which was
founded during the latter part of the Ming dynasty2 and became the Imperial centre
for the region. Mini-buses run down this street, passing the new campus of Jishou
University on the outskirts of town. The university is where most of the very few
foreigners who come to Jishou are based. Though uncompleted, it boasts some of the
most impressive buildings in Jishou and an elaborate gateway to the campus is being
constructed. Inside, an artificial lake doubles as a fish-pond, and is spanned by a
newly built bridge in traditional Chinese architectural style. It was at Jishou
University that I was based during my field-work, whilst working there as an English
teacher.
A walk of less than two miles from anywhere in the city takes one to cultivated fields
or steep hillsides. The countryside around Jishou consists of small areas of flat land,
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inhabited for the most part by peasants who are classified as 'Han', and steeper more
barren land inhabited mostly, but again not solely, by those classified 'Miao'. Of the
latter, it is those who live further from Jishou who are more likely to speak the non-
Chinese language Kho Xiong and, where women are concerned, to wear distinctive
embroidered tunics.
At the time when I arrived in Jishou, I already had two distinct images of West
Hunan. One was of the Miao, a people with an ancient and separate culture, an
image which had been reinforced by the official promotion of the area described
above. The other image was of the mysterious West Hunan of the early twentieth
century as described by Shen Congwen, who presents a 'romantic vision of the
region as a cauldron of different ethnic groups' in which lowland Miao and Han live
side by side, sharing a common culture (Kinkley 1987: 9). The juxtaposition of these
two images continued to preoccupy me throughout most of my field-work.
In the rest of this chapter I provide a brief introduction to the minority nationalities in
China. This is followed by an overview of the results of recent Western ethnographic
field research in China and a consideration how restrictions placed on field-workers
influence the definition of a field-work site. Finally, I describe in outline the
ethnographic questions raised by this research and the approach which I took to
address them.
National Minorities in China
The differentiation among China's national minorities is of course the outcome of
complex social and historical processes. Throughout history the area which makes
up China today has been culturally heterogeneous. But out of this has emerged a
majority group, the Han who, as I shall describe, perceive themselves as peculiarly
different from and superior to other peoples in China. Strictly speaking, the Han
came into existence with the Han dynasty (206 BC - 221 AD)3, but the word is also
used to define a culture which emerged before this time. Dreyer suggests that in this
looser sense the Han can be traced back to
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BC 722, when a silk-wearing, rice-eating, and city building people who considered
themselves descendants of the Yellow emperor began to create a civilisation that gradually
overwhelmed that of their neighbours (Dreyer 1976: 7 n.4).
The word Han is used in this way by Chinese people today.
The Han, and in particular the educated Han, have long regarded themselves as
different from, and superior to, other peoples. Fundamental to this perceived
difference is the practice of agriculture. Historical records from the Han dynasty
stress agriculture as 'the great foundation of the world' and state that official rites
and ceremonies for agriculture had been established by this time (Meserve 198: 56 -
7). Hunter-gatherers and nomads were therefore regarded as barbaric. They were
considered to live on the fringes of civilisation and were classified as 'the Di (north),
the Yi (east), the Rong (west), and the Man barbarians (south) (Heberer 1989: 17 -
18). Over the years, the expansion of the area inhabited by the Han has resulted in
the assimilation of those people perceived as non-Han, a process made easier by the
fact that there were only minor differences in physical appearance amongst the
peoples of South and Central China. This process of assimilation was supported by
the Confucian notion that exposure to Chinese ways could transform barbarians into
civilised people (Harrell 1994a: 21).
Han expansion south of the Yangtze took place later than in the north. The south of
China was regarded by the incoming Han as a place both mysterious and frightening.
In comparison to people in the north, who were 'more serious and worshipped
terrestrial and celestial gods', it was reputed that the people of the south were 'gayer
and had freer ways. They worshipped nature spirits and the crocodile-dragon'
(Wiens 1967: 131). Their worship of spirits and dragon deities disconcerted the
incoming Han (von Glahn 1983: 26). However, the early expansion of the Han into
South China was not simply a matter of overwhelming these local practices, it also
involved the incorporation of local practices as Han. Wiens (1967: 45) suggests that
this incorporation contributed to the 'impact power and inner energy' of Han culture
in the south.
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Early settlers arrived in what is now Hunan during the Han dynasty, fleeing
rebellions in East China (Perdue 1987: 94). During the Song dynasty there was
increased immigration into Hunan, driven by the need for land and raw materials.
Military colonists also arrived in Hunan during the Song dynasty, to protect the
frontier with the non-Han peoples (Perdue 1987: 94) but, in most of Hunan itself the
indigenous people were gradually assimilated and brought under the administration
of the state (von Glahn 1983).
However, the Han-Chinese military and civil administrative system was instituted
only in areas where numbers of Han were large, or the local population thoroughly
Sinicised. The most westerly part of Hunan, which is the area I am concerned with,
was mountainous and malarial, making it an unattractive and dangerous prospect for
the Han. The inhabitants of inhospitable or remote areas such as this remained
unassimilated and were classified as tu (lit. earth), meaning aboriginal or indigenous
in contrast to wen, which 'is characterised by such qualities as refinement,
civilisation and literariness' (Yokoyama 1990: 12). In situations such as this, a
system of indirect rule called the tu si system was employed by which local, non-Han
leaders where made responsible to the Han Chinese state while continuing to have
power in their own area.4 This was to avoid the alternative possibility whereby,
according to Wiens, a Han Chinese leader and a group of soldiers would be set in
place of a defeated local leader. This usually resulted in the locally outnumbered
Han becoming assimilated with local, non-Han, indigenous people (Wiens 1967:
208-9). Though the administrative system for these non-Han people changed over
the succeeding dynasties, they were still administered as different categories within
the Chinese state, and a considerable degree of cultural heterogeneity was retained in
Southwest China.
On paper, the position of the non-Han people changed dramatically during the
Republican period (1919 - 1949), when Chiang Kai-shek declared that 'the non-Han
peoples were only 'branch-clans' of the Han who were to be deliberately assimilated'
(Heberer 1989: 18). In practice this made little difference and, in Hunan at least, was
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accompanied by the removal of what education provision there had been specially
provided for Miao speaking people (Shi 1986: 218).
The Communist Party came to power in 1949 and, in the early 1950s, the new
government had a policy of giving limited autonomy to minority peoples and also
allowing some freedom for religious and cultural practices. Minority nationalities,
some of the poorest people in China, were deemed to have been particularly
oppressed before the 'liberation' of 1949. In 1951, following the All China
Nationality Conferences on Health and Education, it was decided to send large
numbers of Han and minority cadres to the minority areas, to raise standards in these
fields. Areas such as West Hunan, where there were a high proportion of minority
people, were made Autonomous Prefectures during the 1950s.
Under a policy loosely based on that of Stalin's concept of nationality as comprising
common language, territory, economic life and culture (Heberer 1989: 30 f. Hsieh
1986: 4) a rigorous, China-wide classification project was also set up (Dreyer 1976:
141, Harrell 1991). It is as a result of this project that the national categories which
are used in China today were established. However, policy towards minority people
always kept open the possibility that, as well as being politically integrated with the
rest of China, minority people would eventually be integrated socially and culturally
too. It was clearly stated that the Autonomous Prefectures were still part of the
motherland (Dreyer 1976: 105). Although it was decided to develop or use written
forms of the minority languages for educational texts, Chinese was also taught
(Dreyer 1976: 116-7).
There were reactions against this minority policy during the anti-Rightist campaigns
of the late 1950s (Dreyer 1976: 150, Tapp 1995: 215) and, with the advent of the
Cultural Revolution in 1966, these policies in favour of minorities were termed a
'bourgeois, revisionist line' and were reversed. Heberer writes that religious and
cultural practices all over China were characterised as 'backward' but nationality
identity in particular was targeted. Agricultural production techniques which differed
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from those of the Han were discouraged and arable farming imposed even on
inappropriate terrain (1989: 23-6). By the early 1980s, these attitudes had been
largely modified. The Nationalities Institute in Beijing, which had been closed
during the Cultural Revolution, was reopened in 1972, minority rights were
reinstated in 1975 and the 1982 Constitution confirmed in more detail rights of
limited self government, religious freedom, and 'protection and preservation of
cultural heritage' (Hsieh 1986: 8 fi). Since this time, legislation has ensured that the
head of local government in Autonomous Prefectures, and a proportion of other posts
holders, are minority people, according to the official classification system (Tapp
1995 205). Minorities have also been advantaged in education and birth control
policies (Heberer 1989, McKahnn 1994: 42f.) However, as Tapp writes, praise today
for the 'rich and unique cultural traditions' of minority peoples is still offset by
criticism of economic backwardness and perceptions that they are at a lower stage in
the 'five-stage theory of modes of production associated with Stalin' (1995: 195).
The position I take in this thesis is that terms such as 'the Miao' and 'the Tujia',
though they are ones which have in many cases been taken up by Western scholars,
are primarily official designations, and that promotion of them as categories is found
largely in government, government influenced publications and in other mass media.
The descriptions of Miao and Tujia people below is not therefore intended to be
taken as an indigenous point of view. From the official perspective, the Miao are
considered to be a national minority of between seven and eight million people living
in Southwest China. They are often characterised by scholars as fiercely independent
aboriginal inhabitants of the area, quite different in origin and culture from the Han
Chinese (Geddes 1976: 3 Lemoine 1978: 801-2). Scholars also regard them as
different from other minority populations because, unlike surrounding populations,
they did not live in permanent settlements for long periods of time but, instead,
practised shifting agriculture in the uplands, moving from time to time and relocating
their villages. In the past hundred years Miao people have also extended into
Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Burma. Writers also note that they are divided into
three language groups, one of which, the Kho Xiong, is centred on West Hunan
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(Lemoine 1978: 797, Ma 1989: 339). The best known cultural practices of the West
Hunan Miao are drum dancing and the sacrifice of water buffaloes. The latter is
performed if an earlier prayer for relief from sickness or for the granting of a son has
been answered (Ling & Ruey 1963: 207).
The other main group in West Hunan, according to official classification, is the
Tujia. In West Hunan, most Tujia people lived to the north, in what is now
Zhangjiajie Prefecture, thus most of those who live in the Jishou area are people who
have migrated from further north to live in the cities and towns. They are said to
have had early contact with the Han (Ma 1989: 403). The Tujia language is officially
classified as a branch of the Sino-Tibetan group. In the 1950s they were classified as
Miao and it was only after repeated requests that they were reclassified as Tujia.
Today, the Tujia are considered to be relatively Sinicised, with few people able to
speak the Tujia language (Zhang & Zeng 1993: 306, Ma 1989: 401) and one of their
best know distinctive cultural practices is the practice of prolonged crying by the
bride and her family at the bride's departure (Zhang & Zeng 1993: 309).5
The Western Ethnographer in China
As is widely realised, ethnographic accounts cannot now be considered to be
objective descriptions. Since the eventual form they take is influenced by the
conditions under which the research is carried out and the nature of the researcher's
relationship with those among whom she or he lives, it is relevant to discuss the
particular conditions which influence the practice of ethnographic research in China.
In the first part of this century there was considerable contact between Chinese and
Western anthropologists. During the 1930s, describes, teachers from the United
States introduced functionalism into China and several Chinese anthropologists
studied overseas. Among the best know of these are Fei Xiaotong, who went to
study with Malinowski in LSE, and Lin Yueh-hua, who studied in Harvard (Guldin
1994). The French tradition of sociology was also influential, particularly on Ling
Shun-sheng, who later wrote on West Hunan (Lemoine 1989). Several full length
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ethnographic works about China were produced as a result of field-work during this
period.6
After 1949, scholars such as Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yueh-hua participated the project
to classify minority nationalities, which had replaced ethnographic research in
mainland China. Between 1949 and 1979, almost all Westerners doing research on
Chinese society worked in Taiwan or Hong Kong (see for example Wolf 1978,
Diamond 1969) or by interviewing refugees from China (Parish and Whyte 1984,
Whyte 1974). The few Westerners who were allowed to visit China were those most
sympathetic to China's political programme, such as Rewi Alley, whose reportage on
West Hunan I refer to in Chapter Two.
However, with the liberalisation which followed Deng Xiaoping's ascent to power in
1978, and recommencement of relationships with other countries, in particular the
United States, China once again became a possible site for ethnographic field-work.
Much of what has been done is by scholars from the United States, (e.g. Schein 1993,
Gladney 1991, Jankowiak 1993), but research has also been undertaken by scholars
from other countries such as Britain (e.g. Gamble 1996), Holland (e.g. Pieke 1996)
and Hong Kong (e.g. Cheung 1996b). In recent years, Chinese scholars who have
studied overseas have reintroduced ethnographic field-work to Chinese scholarship
and, by 1997, at least one European anthropology research student was having her
field work supervised at Beijing University.
Although it has been made possible for foreigners to do field-work in China, the
process is highly regulated. In the early 1980s the non-Chinese field-worker was
expected to be officially registered (Thurston 1983: 24) and this still applies today.
Furthermore, permission to do field work in China is often dependant on good
relations with powerful officials (Bullock 1993: 292, Madsen 1987: 196 Pieke 1996:
4) and when permission is granted, official support takes the form of elaborate and
protective hospitality, making it difficult for the researcher to be in any way
unobtrusive (Thurston 1983: 25 - 6). Underlying these relationships is a certain
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amount of distrust of the researcher's purposes, as Pieke indicates when he writes
that,
suspicions of the fieldworker's intentions and a refusal to co-operate are found in all
fieldwork situations. In the case of the Peoples' Republic however, their magnitude is
increased because these apprehensions are shared and often sanctioned by the state
(Pieke 1996: 4).
Many writers have described the restrictions they met with during field-work. For
example, Pieke writes that he was denied access to a particular neighbourhood, a site
that most Westerners would consider public (Pieke 1996: 7). Gamble, Pieke and
Jankowiak lived , like myself, in university accommodation, making the classic
ethnographic starting point of a family or community study much more difficult.
Gamble and Gladney found their interviewees aware of the dangers for Chinese
citizens in talking too freely to foreigners (Gamble 1996: 25, Gladney 1991: 110-11).
In all these cases, restrictions on the researchers' activities have directed them away
from pursuing intensive, small scale community studies. For example, Gladney
(1991) writes that while doing fieldwork in China in the mid-1980s, he came across a
series of difficulties, including 'government employees looking over one's shoulder,
residence in state owned institutions or hotels, restricted access to one's informants,
and the need for multiple bureaucratic procedures' all of which were hard to combine
with the ideal of 'classic-style ethnography in one location' (106-7). Since he was
not permitted to stay in villages for more than two weeks at a time, his study was, of
necessity, multi-sited. Other writers have attempted to embrace large populations,
such as Shanghai (Gamble 1996) or Huhhot (Jankowiak 1993). A result of the multi-
sited and often interview based approach of these writers is that they emphasise the
complexity and fluidity of their field-work site and describe their approach as
'dialogic' (Pieke 1996: 10, Gamble 1996: 10). Gamble describes his work as 'an
innovative and original approach which presents a broad brush ethnographic account
of a metropolis' (1996: 4). Jankowiak takes a symbolic interactionist approach
which considers the whole city and takes culture as a 'dynamic process' (1993: 1).
Similarly, Pieke writes of how the interview based nature of his fieldwork led him to
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consider how people 'continually renegotiated their social roles and culture
knowledge' (1996: 16-17), and Gladney's multi-sited approach allowed him to
consider 'a polyphony of voices ... each contradicting the other, sharing different
visions of Hui-ness' (1991: 103)
Western field-workers in rural areas also describe the means by which researchers'
activities are restricted. Most rural areas are still officially 'closed' to non-Chinese,
who are therefore not allowed to stay overnight in these places. Foreign scholars
who have permission to live and study in these closed areas are closely guarded,
usually on the pretext of their safety. For example, Schein (1993), who did fieldwork
in Guizhou Province in the late 1980s, describes how she was required to be
accompanied by a male guide from Guiyang University, who was unwilling to let her
leave the village alone. She also describes how it took several months for her to gain
permission from local authorities to walk across a mountain range to the
neighbouring village (1993: 315). Though these interventions were couched in terms
of concern for her safety, they must have restricted the types of information she was
able to obtain (1993: 309, 317).
My situation, in a small city and its rural surroundings, had something in common
with those of the writers discussed above. Unlike them, however, though I made an
informal arrangement with Jishou University that I would teach at do research during
my stay there, I had no official post-graduate affiliation, having been warned by a
Western scholar that this would not be granted. Since I already had three years
experience of working in China, I wrote instead to Jishou University applying to
work there as an English teacher and stating that I intended to combine this with a
study of the local Miao people. As a result of this approach, I was offered a post at
the university for the year 1995-6. Later, in the spring of 1997,1 applied for a three
month tourist visa and was granted permission by the local Public Security Bureau
(■Gongan Ju) to stay in the area to Took at New Year customs', provided that I did
not conduct interviews or take photographs which were of political or economic
significance.7
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In practical terms there were advantages to this arrangement, since I was able to
present myself as a teacher who was interested in local customs rather than as a
scholar accompanied by the guide or translator which official channels might have
provided. This contrasts with the case of a Japanese researcher with official
permission for his research who, I was told by an employee of Jishou University was,
unlike myself, a 'real scholar', but was not permitted to go out unaccompanied.
However, I too met with restrictions and surveillance, some of which may have been,
as Schein found, nominally for my own safety. For example, I was instructed by a
member of the university's Foreign Affairs Department (Waishi Ban) that I was not
to go out after dark. I was also restricted in the places where I could do my research,
since I did not have permission to stay in rural areas. As a result of this, my visits to
villages were limited mostly to day trips and only occasional longer stay.
Other restrictions on my actions appeared to be motivated by a wish to limit contact
between Chinese and Western people. Academics were cautious about contacting me
since, on a previous occasion, a local scholar had been punished for giving a book to
a Japanese researcher. A Chinese researcher who did contact me had first to check
with the local Public Security Bureau that it was permissible to do so. Any books he
wanted to show me, although available in bookshops, were given to me through a
third party. In this instance the Public Security Bureau gave him permission without
question. On another occasion, teachers at a Jishou secondary school were
discouraged from helping me after a member of the Secret Public Security Bureau
(.Anquan Ju) visited the school to tell them about the dangers of foreign spies
collecting information about the area. It was only some time after I left Jishou that I
learned that someone from the local government had been assigned the task of
keeping me under surveillance during my stay.
Other difficulties arose from the fact that I was employed as a teacher. It quickly
became clear that Jishou University's interpretation of my research interest was that I
would go to markets and take photographs of rural Miao people but that they
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expected me to spend most of my leisure time socialising in English with young
teachers and students. The pursuit of my research interests was not helped by the
fact that the cadre whom I had originally approached, and who accepted me as a
teacher there, was sent to Changsha, the provincial capital, for political re-education
shortly after I arrived.8 Combining my roles as researcher and teacher proved
problematic since restrictions on students' activities, and their sometimes dismissive
attitude to aspects of local culture, meant that they rarely accompanied me out of the
university, except on organised excursions.
Many of the people with whom I had contact were educated people whom I met
through my work as an English teacher both during the period of my research (1995-
6) and earlier in Changsha (1988-90). At Jishou University I had contact with
students, and to some extent I shared their social lives since I went with them on
excursions and attended the performances which they organised. In addition to this,
like Gamble (1996: 27), I built upon contacts I had formed during two years teaching
in Changsha. In particular, Liang Zhaohui, who had been my student at Changsha,
proved an invaluable source of information. He also introduced me to his family
who, between them, had a wide knowledge of the area and contributed
immeasurably to my understanding. His father, Old Liang, was born in a highland
area and kept in close contact with his Kho Xiong speaking relatives. Liang
Zhaohui's mother, Gu, was from a former gentry family in Qianzhou. During the
Cultural Revolution, the whole family had been sent to live for several years in a Kho
Xiong speaking village just outside Jishou. Today, as teachers and retired teachers,
the family participates in the urban life of Jishou. People such as the Liangs and
others whom I had taught as students were often happy to take part in long informal
interviews about present and past events in Jishou. It was through these contacts that
I was informed of the existence of certain aspects of life in Jishou, such as the
prevalence of corruption and the presence of a number of spirit mediums. People
whom I had got to know more recently did not volunteer such information, partly
because it would be considered a loss of face to reveal such a 'backward' (luohou)
aspect of people's way of life.9
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Like Pieke and Gamble, I found that a few well established relationships allowed me
to gain entrance to networks of educated and state employed people. These were in
both Jishou and the surrounding area. It was through my contacts with former
students that I had access to a small number of government officials whom they
knew socially. This was particularly useful since I would have found it difficult to
gain access to them without such contacts. When talking to these officials about
government policies towards culture (wenhua) and religion I used relatively formal
interviewing techniques. This was partly because their time and the information they
imparted was perceived as valuable, both by themselves and by the people who put
me in touch with them. It would be disrespectful to appear ill-prepared or casual. It
was also because such officials are used to addressing the kinds of questions I was
asking since I was looking for nothing more personal than an account of official
policies. I also knew that these interviews were unlikely to develop into informal or
social relationships.
Through these networks I was also able to build up a picture of the day to day
concerns of young educated urban people through visiting them in their homes and
going out with them on social occasions. As my fieldwork went on, however, I
found that I was decreasingly welcome among this section of society and eventually I
drew the conclusion that my behaviour was considered too strange and, perhaps, too
politically suspect to make me socially acceptable. As a result of this I found myself
more and more in the company of the retired, the less educated and the people who
lived on the rural outskirts of Jishou. In particular I associated with the people who
gathered around temples.
What follows then is a result of a particular fieldwork experience concerning the
people who chose to speak to me as much as vice-versa. It is perhaps unnecessary to
state that it does not claim to be an objective study, but that it springs from one
person's experience. Nonetheless, I would like to stress that the research is based on
a particular encounter with West Hunan life, which was influenced by the fact that I
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am both a Westerner and an unmarried woman. If I seem to concentrate on the
marginal and the 'superstitious' this is not, I hope, out of a misplaced search for the
'Other' but because this is where I, in the anomalous position of an unofficial
researcher, found people willing to spend time talking and explaining things to me.
As I came to understand the situation better I realised that the temples I visited were
not as marginal as they first appeared.
At first, language was a problem since, in contrast to educated people who spoke
putonghua (Mandarin) and English, the people I met at temples spoke the local
dialect which, though a form of Mandarin, was not immediately intelligible to me.
This was particularly the case with rural women who were less likely to have
travelled out of the area or to have spoken with people from outside West Hunan
before. However, after several months of fieldwork I found that I had become
accustomed to the different pronunciation and tones and, unwittingly, was employing
them myself. Strangers told me, with amazement and pleasure, that I was speaking
their dialect. This, of course, greatly increased the opportunities for further contact
with people met by chance at markets, in shops and on buses.
I also found increasingly that I was gathering information through conversation and
participant observation rather than through interviews. Through making offerings at
temples and attending festivals I was also able to experience, as well as observe, the
practices which took place. Since relationships in China are built up over time and
through the exchange of favours, the direction of the exchange of information was
often contrary to what I had envisaged and long sessions were spent answering
questions about life in Britain. It was through this and gifts of photographs (from
me) and meals (from them) that relationships were built up.
It is apparent then that, like other researchers on China, I found that the restrictions
which were imposed on me had a hand in determining the nature of the fieldwork
which I undertook. They also influenced the recording methods which I used. I
never taped conversations and interviews, nor made notes, since the few times I
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suggested this I found my interlocutors to be very reluctant. Field-notes were
therefore written up at the end of every day on the basis of memory. I did, however,
make occasional tape recordings of chants and singing. In addition to this I recorded
events through photographs and, on occasions when performances took the nature of
a public spectacle, I made videos. I also collected a range of other materials. These
included promotional material intended for visitors to the area, in the form of written
material, still photographs and videos taken from West Hunan television. I also
collected a number of Chinese language historical source-materials which provided
useful information, difficult to access from outside China. I was, however, unable to
gain access to certain documents, as I describe in Chapter Eight.10
Overview of the Thesis
In this thesis I contrast two kinds of cultural activity which take place in and around
Jishou and use this to consider broader issues of local identities. Firstly, I look at
those which are promoted by the local government. These include the nearby
Dehang scenic park (fengjing qu) and local television programmes. The emphasis
here is almost entirely on images of the Miao minority people, which usually
incorporate dance, bright costumes and themes of romance and love. Often, though
not always, these images are intended for consumption by educated visitors from
outside the area.
This emphasis on images of the Miao implies that the Jishou area is inhabited by
people who are very different from the Han. I suggest that this is part of an attempt
to represent the Han as a people with civilised and homogenous culture, in contrast to
the primitive, disparate and formerly rebellious minority peoples. Similar
distinctions between Han and Minority have played an important part in the
administration and control of West Hunan in Tate Imperial times. The notion of a
civilised and homogeneous Han culture has also been diffused through Chinese
society. In Imperial times this was by means of formal education and the 'ortho¬
praxy' of ritual and etiquette (Rowe 1994: 419, Watson 1988: 3, M. Cohen 1991:
117). Today, the education system continues a similar process (Lewin & Tittle 1993:
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12). In so far as this has been influential in shaping people's views and attitudes it
has constituted a 'relationship of hegemony' which pervades most of China (cf
Gramsci 1971:350).
I contrast this by looking at cultural activities which are considered to be 'local.' In
doing so I look mainly, but not exclusively, at the temples and temple festivals which
have recently been recreated by West Hunan people, drawing on the resources of
collective memory. These activities contrast in a number of ways with the officially
promoted images of the Miao. They are not rigidly defined or organised and often
they are not officially sanctioned. They are not associated with a particular ethnic
identity but are often characterised as 'local'. For example, people explain that these
temples have not been provided by the state (guojia) but are bendi (local, of this
place). They are also events in which people participate rather than spectacles to be
watched. Moreover, they are highly relevant to people's concerns. In visiting
temples, people attempt to comprehend and articulate their experiences of the new
uncertainties introduced into their lives as a result of China's recent economic and
social changes. I suggest therefore that the official images of the Miao can be seen as
part of an 'invented tradition' (Hobsbawm 1983) to be viewed by outsiders and in a
particular landscape. The stories and activities associated with the temples are, by
contrast, shifting and changeable and highly relevant to the everyday life of the
people of West Hunan.
The recreation of temples and the activities on temple sites are closely linked to a
sense of locality, indicated by the indigenous use of the term bendi (local). Recent
work has underlined the danger of essentialising or reifying locality as an area of
study. It has become widely accepted that the 'local' cannot be discussed as if it
exists beyond the influences of migration and of the state and is often in fact a form
of interaction with, or response to, these influences (Appadurai 1995, Knight 1994,
Fardon 1995). It is appropriate to study locality therefore, not as something which
refers unproblematically to a particular territory but as an idea which people employ
to express an identity. Thus we find reference to 'the production of locality'
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(Appadurai 1995) and to a symbolism of locality which may be shifting and multi-
vocal (A P Cohen 1985: 14, Mitchell 1998: 82). Indeed, recent work suggests that a
sense of locality may be detached from an actual territory to the degree that it refers
to the memory of a place which no longer exists (Mitchell 1998: 83 f.).
The suggestion that 'locality' refers to an idea as well as to a territory fits well with
the situation I am describing. When people employ the term 'local' (bendi) to
describe certain activities in West Hunan this does not imply that a bounded territory
exists which is inhabited by a group of people who are united by a common practice.
While some people in West Hunan are drawn to temples and deities which are
described as 'local,' many are looking to the urban pleasures of television and
fashion and have no interest in these 'local' sites. Conversely, many people from
outside of West Hunan take an interest in Jishou's temples on the basis that they are
'local' despite the fact that the locality is not their own. The appeal of the 'local'
derives in part from the fact that it is an alternative to, a means of dealing with, and
sometimes an implied criticism of the current situation of rapid change. In Jishou,
activities at temples are often a response to the situation of economic change initiated
by the reform programme of the early 1980s. It is notable that the initiative for
recreating them is found among the people who are most marginalised, in particular
among older women and single women. For them, temples provide an alternative or
even a livelihood. The temples also appeal to a wider group, old, young urban, rural,
people who stay in West Hunan and people who leave the area to find work, but
many of them visit in order to address problems brought about by social and
economic changes.
Like Siu, I am not suggesting that these activities represent an 'anti-state and anti-
hegemonic' resurgence of past forms of popular culture (1989: 122). They are not
indicative of the return of pre-1949 symbolic forms (Potter & Potter 1990: 336) or a
form of 'counter-modernism' in the face of the rapid loss of tradition (Yang 1996:
110). Instead, the forms of worship are employed flexibly. They 'acquire new
meanings and speak to new experiences in changing arenas of social relationships'
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(Ong 1988: 32). Furthermore, although activities at temples are not sanctioned by
the state and may imply a criticism of its actions, it would be an over simplification
to represent them in terms of theories of cultures of resistance (Scott 1985: 28f.).
Where conflict arises between official and local meanings of these cultural forms, the
response among visitors to the temple is one of elusiveness or reinterpretation rather
than resistance.
I am also reluctant to discuss the recreation of temples as a response to social change
as if this is a new development in response to modernity or globalisation which has
no precedents in the past. To do so would be to risk a form of 'chrono-centrisnf
implying that'all contemporary phenomena are unique' (Gamble 1996: 353) and that
West Hunan is a place 'without history' (cf Wolf 1982). The production of locality
through forms of interaction with the state has been taking place in West Hunan for
centuries. What I attempt to show is that, in the past and today, there has been an
interaction between an apparently fixed and enduring official culture and a more
flexible local one.
In the following I situate my discussion of these cultural forms in the wider context
of political and economic change in Jishou. I look at the influence of the economic
liberalisation of the past twenty years, with the resultant flows of people and images
in and out of the area. I also consider the effects of the continuing presence of the
socialist state. I show that new economic and leisure activities represent an
alternative to the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s, when the Chinese state had
almost total control over people's day to day lives. Nonetheless, these new activities
are carried out within the structures still imposed by the state today rather than in
opposition to them.
In Chapters Three and Four I discuss the images of Miao people which are promoted
by local government, for consumption both by visitors and by inhabitants of West
Hunan. This is exemplified in the scenic park of Dehang where visitors can attend
dance performances in the evenings or view a Miao village and the surrounding
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mountains by day. Through visits to such places, West Hunan becomes, in the eyes
of visitors, a place which is contrasted to modernity and progress and associated with
the natural and the 'Other'. As officially promoted images these do not, of course,
represent the views of those who take part. But my approach is not so much to look
at the effects of these forms of representation on the relatively small number of
actors, performers and villagers who are involved in their creation but to contrast
these images with the activities which take place in temples.
In Chapter Five, I consider the ways in which the Chinese administration has
organised West Hunan in terms of separate Miao and Han groups, a distinction which
has not always been borne out in practice. This is followed by a discussion of the
term 'local' (bendi), commonly used to describe people and practices.
Chapter Six is based largely on accounts of Buddhist temples. I suggest that these
temples are created on the basis of people's memories of the past and that they have
an important role to play in their efforts to adjust to the rapid change and social
insecurity resulting from the government of China's policies of economic
liberalisation. I take this argument further in Chapter Seven when I consider the
temple of the Celestial Kings (Tian Wang), based on three legendary military figures.
I look in detail at how, in its present form, it is a place where people address their
individual concerns and contrast this with the more community based activities
which took place in the recent past. I also consider the most commonly heard story
of the Celestial Kings, that they were protectors of the locality. I consider the
significance of locality in this story and contrast it with official versions, in which the
theme of ethnic difference is stressed. I also suggest that the significance of the
Celestial Kings as figures protective of the locality is underlined by the popularity of
another set of stories, about bandits and/or local heroes.
In Chapter Eight I return to the subject of Miao and Han but here I look at it from the
point of view of West Hunan people rather than as official classifications. I discuss
the area, not in terms of separable ethnic groups, but as a cultural heterogeneity in
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which highland and lowland people can be seen as coming from two different, but
related and interpenetrating broad cultural traditions. This cultural heterogeneity, I
suggest, informs the sense of locality which I have been discussing, without
necessarily cross cutting it or leading to conflict.
In Chapter Nine, by illustrating the theme I have been developing throughout the
thesis, that of an interaction between a flexible, heterogeneous local culture and a less
negotiable, fixed official culture. I do this through a description of the local
government's attempt to take control of the site of the temple of the Celestial Kings
and the resulting appeal by local people to the authority of spirit mediums and
followed by the creation of a different temple site.
In Chapter Ten, I consider more generally the implications of the interaction between
official and unofficial views of local culture.
1 The 1990 statistics (Xiangxi Minzu Renkou Fenbu Biao n.d.), the most recent available to me, give
the population of Jishou City as 230,614, of which 67,138 are Han, 90,874 are Miao and 70,491 are
Tujia. The remainder is made up of other, nationalities, of which the Bai, with a population of 745,
are the largest.
The area officially classified as Jishou City also includes a number of surrounding villages, such as
Yaxi and Pingshanpo. In my own work, for simplicity's sake, when I write of Jishou I do not include
these, when I refer to the 'Jishou area' I do.
2 1368 - 1644
3 Also, the word was not used in the sense of Han nationality (Hanzu) until the end of nineteenth
century (Chow 1997: 36).
4 See Dreyer (1976) for a discussion of the tu si system.
51 witnessed this myself at the wedding of two teachers from Jishou University, where the bride was a
Tujia woman.
6 These include Fei (1936), Osgood (1963), Hsu (1948) and Fitzgerald (1941).
71 am of course aware that there are ethical issues which arise from this. In this case there was great
sensitivity as a result of the outcome of the 1994 Miao/Hmong conference as I describe in Chapter
Eight.
8 This was a form of punishment, possibly prompted by the fact that he had not been carrying out his
duties adequately due to his heavy drinking.
91 refer to the importance of building up guanxi, (personal connections, networks) in passing in this
chapter. For a fuller discussion see Chapter Two.
10 See Chapter Eight, note 7.
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Chapter Two - Jishou and the Context of Reform
Introduction
In the later part of my thesis I focus on the revival of local cultural practices. In
Chapter Four, for example, I discuss rural 'Miao' festivals, and New Year festivals
in particular. In other chapters, I discuss the activities which take place in temples,
many of which have been rebuilt without official sanction. However, too close a
focus on festivals and temple activities, to the exclusion of other aspects of life,
would misrepresent my material and my argument since participation in these
activities is often closely linked to experiences in other spheres of life. In this
chapter, therefore, I consider the wider context of everyday life in the Jishou area,
drawing parallels, and pointing out some differences, between Jishou and other parts
of China. Rather than being an in depth description of urban China, of which there
have been many in recent years, this is intended as an introduction, providing some
of the background to the subject of the revival of local cultural practices described
later in the thesis.
West Hunan - a Remote Area?
West Hunan is often regarded by people from other parts of China as a mysterious
place. Kinkley (1987: 15-16) writes that in the early part of this century '[s]ome,
mostly outsiders, even called it Shiwai Taoyuan, the Chinese Shangri-La'. On
several occasions educated and metropolitan Chinese people have told me how much
they would like to visit the area, which they consider remote and mysterious. The
area has all the qualifications to be perceived 'remote' since, as Ardener writes,
mountains conventionally add to 'remoteness', and remote areas are perceived to be
homes to 'smugglers and spies', which is also West Hunan's reputation (1987: 41-3).
Jishou, however, like the rest of China, has experienced rapid change since 1978
when Deng Xiaoping came to power and instituted a process of economic reform.
People talk of how as recently as the 1970s the buildings were made of wood, the
nearby hills were forested, and wolves would come into the city at night. The streets,
which in 1990 were filled with pedestrians and street markets, are now busy with
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minibuses, connecting the city with outlying towns and villages. One's first
impression of the city is that it is still relatively economically under-developed. The
pavements are poorly maintained and some of the buildings dilapidated. But, despite
the apparent remoteness of the setting, and the city's promotion as a centre of
minority culture, Jishou today, like any other Chinese city, is a consumer of goods
and images from the rest of China and beyond. Streets are lined with small
restaurants, karaoke bars and shops. As in the rest of China, the shops sell Chinese
and imported electrical and electronic goods, multinational and joint venture
household products, convenience foods and high prestige imported goods such as
European whisky and brandy. Western fashions are popular, and a row of street
stalls known as 'Hong Kong Street' sells cheap versions of recent western styles in
jeans and other clothes. There are also video shops renting American films and
music shops selling tapes and CDs of Taiwanese pop music.
In fact, despite its reputation as a 'Shangri-La', the cities of West Hunan, such as
Jishou and Qianzhou, have been in close contact with the central Chinese state since
the Qing dynasty,1 when the area was closely supervised by a strong administrative
and military presence including high ranking military officials. Today, Jishou is still
a centre of local government administration, and includes administrative work units
such as The Prefectural Forestry Council (Zhou Linye Wei) and The District Grain
Procurement Department (Zhou Liangshi Ju) to name but two. A large proportion of
the work available is still in the state sector. In the remainder of this section I discuss
the recent history of the cities of Jishou and Qianzhou.
Jishou, formerly called Suoli was, until the early part of the twentieth century, a
minor town. During the Qing dynasty, the Imperial administration was based in
Qianzhou, about twenty kilometres away. Some Jishou people say that the name
Suoli {suo = place/office) referred to the township offices which governed the
surrounding area. People who remember pre-1949 times tell me that, though this
may have been its official meaning, to them the name Suoli referred to the place
where boats had to be pulled through rapids in the river {suo = rope/cableway). This
is because Jishou was also the place where rapids began, and from where people took
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river transport. Later, when the first motor road to the area was built in the 1930s,
Jishou, still called Suoli, became an intersection of road and river transport.
During the Qing dynasty, Qianzhou, like other Chinese cities at this period, was
'fully integrated with [central] political and bureaucratic power' (Johnson 1992:
189). Until recently, older inhabitants told me, Qianzhou had the features of a classic
walled Imperial Chinese city, with four gates and two straight roads intersecting the
city, and several temples including a City God temple (Chenghnang Miao), a Fire
God temple (Huoshen Miao) and a Confucian temple (Wen Miao). Most of these
have since been destroyed, but Qianzhou still holds the biggest country market in the
region. This, and the territorial cult, based on the temple of the Celestial Kings,
draws large numbers of visitors, both rural and urban.
During the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45), Suoli (Jishou) was temporarily swelled
with refugees and traders. In what must have been one of the most dramatic events in
its history, its inhabitants witnessed the retreat of a section of the Guomindang army
through West Hunan on their way to Sichuan following a new road which had
recently been specially built for this purpose. A few months later the defeated
Guomindang forces returned, according to local sources, followed by the Communist
forces2 three days later. This highway is still an important link between Hunan and
Sichuan Provinces, and the section up the Aizhai slope outside Dehang scenic park
(see Chapter Three) is an impressive piece of civil engineering.
The remnants of the tun system which had persisted into the Republican period,
were superseded in 1949 when a new structure of local government was established.
The capital of the newly formed West Hunan Miao and Tujia Autonomous
Prefecture was moved from Qianzhou to Jishou to dissociate it from Qianzhou's
Imperial past. According to Liang Zhaohui, the name 'Jishou' was taken, because it
is similar to the Miao language version of the old name of Suoli in its sense as
'offices', part of a process of changing Chinese names for minority ones which took
place in other parts of China (Dreyer 1976: 105). Jishou University was built and
there was an influx of cadres, sent to develop the area, many of whom have settled in
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the city. In the early 1950s, land reform was effected and collectives were formed.
Efforts were also made to develop the rural areas and Alley (1974: 25) writes of new
irrigation projects and workshops which he observed in the Jishou area on his
journey there in 1962.
West Hunan was also affected by the negative results of central policy during the
early years of the Communist Government. In 1958, the Great Leap Forward was
initiated in an attempt to make China self sufficient through mass mobilisation of the
people. All over China, rural collectives were merged into larger communes, a
process which was intended to bring about the industrialisation and development of
the countryside, thus hastening the advent of Communism. Millions of small
furnaces were built in a drive to produce steel and to enable China's economic
development to catch up with that of other major powers. In the event, most of the
steel proved to be unusable, and all over China the neglect of agriculture resulted in
famine. In West Hunan there were thousands of deaths, particularly among highland
people, and I was told that the roads into Jishou were lined with the corpses of people
who had come down from the mountains to look for food.
In 1966, Mao Zedong, fearing that bourgeois revisionism had crept into post-
revolution society, urged young people to criticise their teachers and cadres. They
were asked to overthrow 'capitalist roaders' and to eliminate the 'four olds', i.e. old
ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits. These young people were to become
the Red Guards and this movement became known as the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution. During this time, old buildings were destroyed, religious cultural
practices forbidden and many intellectuals publicly humiliated or even attacked and
killed. The movement also led to fighting in towns and cities between different
groups of Red Guards. This phase of the Cultural Revolution was followed by a
mass programme of sending people from intellectual or otherwise privileged
backgrounds to the countryside to learn from the peasants.
The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution were less intense in Jishou than in the
larger cities, such as the provincial capital Changsha. Nonetheless different factions
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of Red Guards did fight on the streets of Jishou and educated people, both from the
minority and Han, were sent to the countryside for re-education. As in other parts of
China, minority dress and cultural practices were not permitted (Heberer 1989: 23).
Often, to the great regret of older people, historic and religious buildings, such as
temples, were destroyed, as were the graves of local heroes. Mrs Gu told me of a
beautiful tower outside Qianzhou which had been built by a Qing dynasty scholar in
memory of his wife. When it was destroyed by Red Guards, the older people all said
in secret to each other that it was a terrible pity (ke xiu, ke xiu), but there was nothing
they could do. However, some projects of lasting benefit were also undertaken
during this period. A railway line was built connecting Jishou with larger centres,
and young people were mobilised to build local irrigation systems. A native of Yaxi
village recalled carrying rocks up the hillsides as a teenager, to make a small
reservoir.
As intellectuals, the Liang family suffered during this period. Though Old Liang was
from a highland, Kho Xiong speaking village, his status as a member of the village's
wealthiest family and his education in West Hunan and Wuhan led to him being
recognised as 'landlord'. Since Mrs Gu, his wife, was also educated, and the
daughter of a famous scholar and member of the gentry class, she was directed to
spend many years living and teaching in a village outside Jishou. Old Liang,
however, was not permitted to teach, but was forced to do manual work and undergo
repeated criticism sessions to the point where he once ran away and took refuge in a
cave, and at another time attempted suicide.
In many ways however, Jishou benefited materially from the first thirty years of the
Peoples' Republic, when smaller cities were favoured over larger ones, as part of an
'anti-urban model of development' (Naughton 1995: 67), and the interior was
favoured over coastal cities (Panned 1992: 21). It received money and personnel, in
the form of cadres sent to develop the infrastructure and education system, and it
remains a big recipient of government money from both provincial and national
sources.
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State Control and Liberalisation
In 1979 'the party reaffirmed the legitimacy of private business' with the result that
people could, if they wished, avoid the supervision of work and lifestyle that had
previously been such a feature of Chinese life (Gold 1989: 187). The reforms
resulted in a relaxing of the considerable degree of control which had been effected
over individual behaviour until the 1970s. Even for those still working in the state
sector, time spent in political activities was reduced and unsupervised leisure time
increased. As a means of stimulating the economy, contact with the rest of the world
was once again permitted, through the Open Door Policy (White 1993a: 48-9).
From the work of Parish and Whyte, we learn that during the period between the
1950s and the late 1970s, there were 'rigid taboos on all forms of dress, expression,
ritual life, and communication that did not conform to the official ideology' (1984:
358). Those who diverged from the officially sanctioned norms could be corrected
through 'criticism and self criticism among a group of peers' (Parish and Whyte
1984: 279, see also Whyte 1974)4.
Between 1949 and the 1980s, the vast majority of urban people lived in work units
(danwei), which became one of the most 'fundamental and characteristic features of
the Peoples' Republic of China' (Southall 1993: 341). Work units are self-contained,
enclosed compounds built around a factory, an educational institution or a
government department and, as well as being a place of work, they meet
accommodation and other needs. The work unit can be seen as the 'micro-level' of
the Communist Party's system of organisation (White 1993a: 200, Li 1993: 346),
since they have been and to some extent still are concerned with observation and
control of the population (Lull 1991, Davis 1995: 3, Parish and Whyte 1984: 358).
However, it also should be born in mind that this system contributed to the stability
of city life (Parish and Whyte 1984: 248) and today many people prefer the security
of life in the work unit to the freedom of working for a private company.
Despite the reforms, work units continue to be major employers today, especially in
small inland cities such as Jishou. Usually they consist of a series of buildings,
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between two and five stories high, in self contained compounds, surrounded by a
wall and locked at night. The work unit with which I am most familiar, Jishou
University, is a typically self contained unit. As well as teaching buildings and
dormitories for students, the work-unit also provides housing, a medical clinic and a
cafeteria, mainly used by students, single teachers and other workers. The university
also provides for staff and students' non-working life. It arranges dances and films
and there are small restaurants and karaoke bars on the premises. Retired teachers
and workers draw a small salary and can continue to live in their work unit
accommodation. The unit also provides an old people's centre where retired
employees can play mah-jong, cards, croquet or practise calligraphy. Though they
do not exercise the degree of control that they did in the past, the Party hierarchy still
has an influence at all levels of the unit.
At Jishou University, today as in the past, almost all the people with management
responsibilities are Party members and such people are usually referred to as leaders
or cadres. It is important for employees of the unit to maintain good relations with
party cadres who are making decisions about transfers and promotions. One of the
most commonly made comments about work units is that to be happy and get on in
one's job one needs to 'get on well with the leaders.' Relationships with cadres
could be formed by drinking with them at banquets, joking together, doing favours or
giving gifts. This hierarchy reached all levels of the unit, for example, there were
also students who were attending meetings as preparation to become Party members.
Usually the class monitors were from this group and they were responsible for
reporting back on the behaviour of other students.
In discussing these issues I am introducing material which is relevant to the debate
on civil society. While not intending to engage with this debate in any detailed way,
I briefly introduce the main points here. It has been suggested that the reforms have
allowed for a gradual detachment from the state and formation of organisations
which have become 'nascent civil society' which in its turn contributed to the
political events of 1989 (Whyte 1992: 94, Strand 1990). Indications of the formation
of 'horizontal integration between economic actors' challenging 'primordial ties to
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the family and to the ruler' (Flower & Leonard 1996: 199 - 200) have been seen in
the formation of 'non-state economic groups' (Wakeman 1993: 110), in the
emergence of a public opinion 'not created or controlled by elites' (Whyte 1992: 93)
and, by widespread agreement, in the formation of non-governmental organisations
(see for example, White 1993, Chamberlain 1993: 202, Whyte 1992: 91 f.).
The notion of an emerging civil society in China has since been challenged by Gu
(1994) and Ding (1998) who criticise this work for under-emphasising the
interpenetration of state and society. More fundamentally, they call into question the
relevance of the Western notion of civil society to Chinese society. This point has
been taken up by Flower and Leonard, who, in their work on rural Sichuan, argue for
a 'more nuanced grass-roots view of the relations between state and society.' Rather
than separation and conflict they argue that we should see the 'interpenetration of
state and society' in terms of'co-optation [and] negotiation' (1997: 200-1). My
material on Jishou suggests that state and society are indeed interpenetrating, and this
may be a particular feature of small cities, since, in her study of the small city of
Xinji, Shue (1995) states that bureaucracy, which she describes as 'state sprawl', is
as prevalent as ever. However, it is a relationship which has seen a considerable
amount of change. In the following sections I consider the changes that have taken
place in political activities, in working life and in leisure activities.
Making a Living
In comparison with coastal China, where privately owned companies are expanding
rapidly in both urban and rural areas (Guldin 1997b, Shi 1997), private enterprise in
Jishou is small-scale, evident mainly in the shops, restaurants and places of
entertainment which service the city itself. A large proportion of employment is still
to be found in schools and government departments and it would be difficult to argue
for the existence of 'non-state economic groups' (Wakeman 1993: 110).
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The most successful private businesses were factories producing baijiu (rice-spirits)
and, during the period of my stay in Jishou (1995-97), Jishou's baijiu was becoming
increasingly well known. In general however, there is, as Solinger suggests, a
'symbiotic' relationship between state and private enterprises (1992: 123). As in
other parts of China (Gamble 1996: 189, Davis 1995: 3) work units have begun to
charge for accommodation and schooling and many units have built factories and
shops, often on land which was previously used for recreation. At Jishou University
for example, a small business was set up to develop and sell kiwi fruit. In addition to
this, many individuals combined the lucrative but unpredictable benefits of private
business with the security of belonging to a work unit. For example, I knew teachers
at one of the middle schools who were involved in a pyramid selling scheme, and
workers at the Grain Procurement Unit who were selling-on old grain sacks. Some
work units tried to stop such practices, insisting that employees must be in their place
of work during working hours. At Jishou University there was no problem with this
since many cadres were also involved, and a popular move was to open a karaoke
restaurant or bar on the university premises. People who did this described it as a
temporary measure to get them through times when they needed more money.
To be successful in private business also often requires good informal connections
with local cadres, creating what Solinger describes as 'a stratum of people
exclusively pursuing business, who are inextricably entangled with cadredom' (1992:
123-4). For instance, the only people I met who had become wealthy through private
enterprise were a couple who dealt in timber. The husband worked for a work unit in
Jishou and through this had made contacts in the Jishou Public Security Department
(Gongan Ju), which allowed them to circumvent the red tape involved in cutting
down and exporting the trees. At a higher level, the popularity of Jishou's baijiu
reflected the area's situation as a place both 'remote' and well connected to central
government. The quality of its baijiu had been brought to the notice of national
government leaders by a local politician who had supplied it at a banquet in Beijing.
It was promoted in part as a product drunk by the highest government leaders and in
part through an image (and perhaps the reality) of pure, natural country ingredients.
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These examples underline the importance of guanxi, 'personal connections', which
are often built up through gift giving and doing favours. Since the reforms, as in the
rest of China (Gamble 1996: 218, Yang 1994), people in Jishou claim that having
good guanxi has become more important for one's advancement than previously.
Good guanxi with cadres were particularly important. For example, one individual
who was adept at advancing himself through guanxi had been transferred from
working as a Middle School teacher to a post at the Jishou City Tourist Department.
It was said, by people who knew him that he had originally secured this position as a
quidpro quo for passing on information to the authorities about the student
demonstrations while he was studying in Changsha. He always made a point of
dressing more smartly than most people in Jishou, his hair was often slicked back, he
wore waistcoats and ties, and he had many social contacts with whom he could
exchange favours. Since his work in the Tourism Department was not demanding,
he had recently gone into business setting up a small lakeside resort.
Yang suggests that the formation ofguanxi constitutes an important part of the
emergence of a public sphere, or mianjian (people's realm) which is separate from
the state (1994: 174). However, it is notable that Yang's study of the use ofguanxi is
based almost exclusively on urban relations. Guanxi is regarded by many West
Hunan people as something which excludes them. One student who was from a rural
family talked about how she had been unable to get a job in business because her
family did not have guanxi with the right people, she herself was not good at
flattering people, nor did she have money to buy them presents. She said that one
employer rejected her because she was not beautiful enough, and they wanted
someone who would dress up and could drink a lot when taking people out for
banquets, that is to further the company's guanxi with others. Many people I spoke
to complained about the prevalence ofguanxi, saying that they were not able to get
work or school places for their children because they did not have the wealth to
cultivate guanxi, the implication being that they might well be able to get them if
they were given on merit. Furthermore, as I have shown, many of the relationships
cultivated by guanxi are with cadres. They are, in Yang's terms, vertical ties as well
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as horizontal ones, a point also made by Leonard and Flower (1997) with reference
to rural Sichuan.
Some people spoke of their frustrations with the penetration of the party into their
lives. Some young people I spoke to said that they wanted to leave Jishou for South
China (Guangxi and Guangzhou) because there is more scope there to work in
privately owned companies. One woman, a pharmacist, had been taking private
lessons in English as preparation towards doing this because, she said, the cadres in
her factory in Jishou were too interested in criticising people's small shortcomings
and they did not care about the important things. Students, too, were looking for
work in Guangzhou, either in business or in teaching, with hopes of transferring into
business. The wish for a change of work situation was, of course, connected with the
desire for a change in lifestyle. For example, one teacher told me he wanted to leave
Jishou University and work in a university in Shenzhen, on the border with Hong
Kong, because there would be many opportunities for other work, such as
interpreting and translating for joint venture companies and also because living
conditions were better and life would be more exciting.
Political Life
Another of the changes which has taken place in China since 1978 is what
Rosenbaum describes as 'the diminished appeal of ideology and official norms'
(1992: 27). In the period between the 1950s and 1978 people had very limited access
to information other than that disseminated by the Party and they were expected to
take part in long periods of political study, the language of which was based on set
formulations which were passed down through the party hierarchy (Parish and Whyte
1984: 290, Barnett 1967: 30f.). These are intended to produce 'a certain effect upon
the feelings, thoughts, or actions of a target audience' and the most successful are
those which 'the state can use as a powerful tool of political manipulation'
(Schoenhals 1992: 11).
Since 1978, access to information through books, television programmes and film
has greatly increased, though censorship is still applied, and non-Chinese satellite
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television is not permitted. Despite this, socialist rhetoric and imagery have not
entirely disappeared. Slogans and posters about birth-control or, in 1997, welcoming
home Hong Kong were found on the streets and in the work units, where notice-
boards with photographs of model workers are also to be found. People who live in
work units are still expected to participate in political study sessions. For example,
after the death of Deng Xiaoping in the spring of 1997, adult work unit members
were required to attend meetings where television programmes on his life were
watched and discussed. They were also expected to encourage their children to
express appropriate sentiments, since school children were required to write essays
on the subject, and they needed help from their parents in choosing the appropriate
phrases about 'beloved Grandfather Deng'.
Most people however did not appear to be very engaged with this political discourse.
Deng Xiaoping's death was followed by saturation media coverage of his
revolutionary past and his political reforms but, in Jishou, a few days later, the most
common response to the event was the comment that television had become very
boring, since one could not switch on the television without seeing programmes
about Deng Xiaoping. Some people were more concerned by the alarming dip in the
stock exchange which preceded the public announcement of his death, than with the
death itself, and one teacher reportedly cursed Deng because the news of his death
distracted him and caused him to lose the money he was gambling on a game of
mah-jong which he was playing at the time.
Students at Jishou University were also unwilling to engage with political rhetoric.
In the spring of 1996, a public-speaking competition was arranged between the
English Departments of Jishou University and Huaihua Teacher's College on the
subject of the return of Hong Kong to rule by the mainland. Though this was
intended to encourage their study of English, there was also, clearly, a political
motivation. However, while some students made use of the now familiar images of
Hong Kong, the orphan child snatched away by the British Colonialists to be
returned at last to its mother's bosom, many students interpreted the occasion as a
chance to describe their dreams of a journey to Hong Kong and all the things they
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would see there, thus subverting, or at least avoiding, the political agenda of the
contest and turning it towards dreams of consumerism. These latter were not, of
course, the students who won the competition.
Sometimes uncertainty was expressed about the future of the Communist Party.
Even cadres were heard to say that though people would not have criticised the
system a few years ago, now nobody cares, no-one is interested in politics, everyone
just wants to make money. Many people I spoke to were openly critical of the cadres
and government employees who got rich through corruption and spent their money
on holding banquets and visiting prostitutes. The only exception, I was told, were
students, who don't know much about the outside world.
Leisure Activities
Another major change which has taken place since 1978 is the increase in leisure
time and in opportunities for fdling it (Davis 1995: 3, Whyte 1992: 88). Shue (1995:
93) suggests that it is in the individual's increased choice concerning their personal
life, choices of dress, home decoration and other private activities, that we see 'the
most unambiguous "retreat of the state'".
As Wang (1995) notes, in the 1950s people worked almost to the exclusion of leisure
and the Chinese government attempted 'to restrain all leisure activities except those
harmonious with the state ideology'. Later 'it became an unwritten rule that leisure
activities should take the form of group action' which were dictated 'regardless of
personal preferences' (153). Today, though members of work units are still expected
to attend organised leisure activities promoted by their units, such as sports
competitions and day-trips, many people now spend an increasing amount of time in
private spaces.
A popular activity, in Jishou as in other cities, is to spend time and money on
decorating one's home, making it into a place for the display of consumer goods and
enjoyment of leisure time. Homes are often adorned with large ornaments and
colourful artificial flowers. Beds are covered in bright shiny bedspreads decorated
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with applique and sequins. Wealthy people buy large television sets or home
karaoke equipment. Dreams of a luxurious life may be depicted in large colour
calendars which may depict scenes of Hong Kong, beautiful women, or the interiors
of lavishly decorated homes or fast cars.
In contrast to the recent past, there is now an emphasis on romance and feelings and
this is particularly evident among young women. As in other parts of China (Lull
1991, Gamble 1996: 154-5), a large proportion of leisure time is spent in the home
watching television. Particularly popular are Taiwanese and Hong Kong soap
operas, which are preferred to those of mainland China, because they are about deep
feelings and are considered to be more true to the lives of the audience. In contrast
to the past, when expressions of romantic love were discouraged (Parish and Whyte
1984: 119f.) love stories are particularly popular, particularly among young women,
and these include American and British films such as 'Casablanca' and 'Waterloo
Bridge.' Young women in Jishou like to present a romantic and feminine image of
themselves in the way they dress5 and it is not unusual to hear female students protest
that they are too weak to carry things because they are girls and the boys must help
them. One young woman, a Party member and teacher at Jishou University, showed
me a set of photographs of herself wearing a flowery hat and posing, fully dressed of
course, on her bed. In another she was sitting on the bed, lifting her skirt up to
expose her knees. The pictures were intended not just to show her as alluring, but
also to show off the decor of the bedroom. Here, consumerism and femininity are
inter-linked, a point made by Croll who contrasts the advertising image, currently
prevalent, of the sophisticated and feminine young Chinese woman as consumer,
with the heroic revolutionary rhetoric attached to women in the 1960s and 70s (1995:
109, 117)
Many leisure pursuits indicate a fascination with the West (cf Wang 1995) but by no
means all do. In Jishou, playing mah-jong (majiang) for money is also popular,
despite the fact that gambling is illegal. This game is played by people from all
backgrounds for increasingly high stakes. During the 1997 New Year holiday I met
two young children who spent most of their time playing out on the streets or staying
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at the homes of their friends, because their parents and their parents' friends, most of
them school-teachers, were busy playing mah-jong and did not have time to look
after them properly.
Davis suggests that leisure activities, specifically the decoration of Chinese homes,
are a form of 'resistance to state intervention.' Homes, she writes, 'offer a venue for
exploring subjective but potent loyalties.' In contrast to the past, these are not
loyalties to the Communist Party since, while memories of family history are
preserved in photographs, there is rarely any reference to the political among pictures
in the urban home (1989: 89-90, 95). Lull makes a stronger case for the connection
between leisure activity and resistance, suggesting that exposure to images from the
rest of the world, through television, has been 'a central agent of popular resistance'
and was, in part, responsible for the political upheavals of 1989 (1991: 85).
I never heard views of this kind expressed in the Jishou area, though they may be
implied in the frequent indications that such leisure activities and life-styles are a
response to other aspects of people's lives. For example, teachers told me that they
only played mah-jong because their lives were boring, and because they didn't like
their jobs and they felt there was nothing else to do. The popularity of mah-jong was
also described, even by a regular player, as an indication that the general social
situation in China was getting worse. It seems that, rather than being forms of
resistance, activities such as these are apolitical, 'anti-political' (Whyte 1992: 88) or
'depoliticised' (Wang 1995: 165). They are a means of escaping the politicisation of
other aspects of society, and a break with the extensive politicisation of the past.
This was a break which could perhaps be made more successfully in this sphere than
in the economic one.
Rural - urban interactions
My research is not concerned solely with Jishou, the urban area, but also with the
surrounding rural area. Guldin writes of the need for a 'vision of the greater rural-
urban area' and suggested that 'urbanisation' should refer to the process of
'increasing contact and interconnection between the urban and non-urban areas of
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society' (1992: 5), the importance of which was demonstrated by Skinner (1977a,
1977b). Rural - urban distinctions, never very distinct pre-1949 were reinforced
when the previously 'permeable' boundary was replaced by one which was 'very
sharp with little back and forth movement' (Parish and Whyte 1984: 26). As I have
mentioned, the population was registered in work units or communes and these,
'largely overlapped with and reinforced the urban-rural distinction' (White 1993:
199).
The rural areas, too, have experienced major changes since Deng Xiaoping took
power. In 1980 rural communes were replaced by the 'responsibility system', in
which land was allocated to individual households who then became responsible for
its cultivation.6 Relaxation of laws concerning residency meant that many people
were freed to work in rural industries (Guldin 1992: 4) or, in poorer areas such as
West Hunan, to migrate to cities in search of temporary work.
It is obvious that there remains a great division between urban and rural people.
Rural people, distinguishable by their dialect and by their less sophisticated dress
sense, are disdained by urban people in Jishou. For example, friends of mine, a
head-teacher from a remote school and her husband, were openly laughed at by
students at Jishou University because their dress and manner betrayed their rural
background. I also found that Jishou people showed great reluctance to visit rural
villages and were almost incredulous that I was able to do so. Schein (1993), who
describes similar experiences in Guizhou Province (311 -2) suggests that urban rural
difference 'order[s] much of Chinese experience' (254). The attitudes of rural people
to city life are more diverse. Some, especially those who have secondary or tertiary
education, prefer to live in the city, but others, including migrant workers, return to
their villages after some time without regret.
Despite rural - urban distinctions, there is also a considerable amount of interaction
between the two. In part, this is a result of permanent and temporary migration.
There are some work opportunities for rural people in the Jishou area, although
relative to larger cities, these are limited. Organised markets provide opportunities
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for rural people to sell their own produce, such as vegetables, meat and eggs, and
others sell charcoal by the roadside. A small ice-cream factory takes on temporary
workers in summer. However, construction work, which in cities such as Shanghai
and Beijing, employs a large number of migrant workers, is undertaken in Jishou by
several 'education through labour' units (.Laogai), which are prison camps housing
prisoners from other parts of Hunan. There is a demand for waitresses, but most of
these are expected also to offer sex to male clients, so women undertaking this work
often travel some distance from their home village, usually from east Guizhou and
Sichuan. As a result of the limited availability of work in Jishou, most temporary
migrants from the Jishou area go further afield, to the coastal cities of South and East
China. As in other parts of China (Guldin 1997a: 4, Shi 1997: 123-4), this too
contributes to the urbanisation of rural areas, with televisions and urban fashions in
dress and music being brought back to the villages.
Many rural people who find work in Jishou do so through relatives who can find
them positions in work units, often as kitchen staff, or as child-minders and shop-
assistants. Rural people are more likely to achieve long term residence in Jishou
through educational achievement, but this has become increasingly costly with the
result that many of the poorer families do not send their children to school at all. The
preferred choice for rural families who can afford to keep their children in school is
to send children to Vocational or Technical Schools (Zhong Zhuari), which provide
them with employable skills such as banking or car repair. To send a student to
Teacher's College is considered a high risk strategy since this requires two years
study at Senior Middle School. If after this the student fails to gain college entrance,
they are disadvantaged, since the academic study at Senior Middle School has no
practical application. On the other hand, if they do succeed, the family has to meet
several more years of costs before they can graduate from college. Some families
would have to sell land to do this and, during the period of my fieldwork, I heard
several stories of suicides in the West Hunan area when a member of the family was
accepted to a prestigious university but was unable to go because of the expense.
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I heard about the stresses which rural parents face from Mrs Luo, a single parent who
lived in the village of Yaxi. She had already sent her two sons to Vocational Middle
School, and was considered by other villagers to be taking a big risk in letting her
daughter go to Senior Middle School to prepare for the college entrance exam. She
used to talk to me about how much money she has to pay the school, and the tens of
hundreds ofyuan it would cost to send her daughter to college or university. She
was also concerned about whether her daughter could pass the exam. Like other
rural people, she complained that people with money could use their guanxi to get
people into college, but that the ordinary people (laobaixing) did not have this
option. These pressures on her became evident when I visited her house and she
asked her daughter to speak English with me. Her daughter said that she was too
tired. Mrs Luo, who had been working all day, found this hard to understand and
started criticising her, saying that, if she didn't work now she would fail her college
entrance exam and would then have no opportunities (mei banfa). She wouldn't get
help with any money then and she'd have to look after herself. Her daughter didn't
reply. She sat outside the house in silence for a while and then went into the back
room to do her homework, which was how she spent every evening. In other cases
the burden for financing their education falls on the students themselves. For
example, one of my students at Jishou University came from a poor family in the
northern part of West Hunan. She had spent the previous term working in a toy
factory in Guangzhou to earn the money for her studies.
A person with a secure job in Jishou, is often of great use to his or her relatives in the
countryside. As well as finding work, they may help them in situations requiring
litigation and with dealing with bureaucracies or by providing a place for them to
stay when they visit town. In return, rural people may offer home-smoked bacon or
other rural produce. However, the connections between rural and urban people do
not always involve rural people asking favours from their urban relatives. City
people also seek out the expertise of rural people, who may also be relatives, usually
in religious or ritual matters. Geomancers, spirit mediums and daoshi7 are, in my
experience, almost always rural people and often, though sometimes furtively,
consulted by urban people, even Party members.
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Urban people also maintain contact with their ancestral villages ilaojia) because this
is where the ancestral graves are. Urban people may visit their villages on Qing
Ming, the day for cleaning the graves and making offerings to one's ancestors. In the
following section, I describe one such visit which was made by members of the
Liang family, and suggest that such visits indicate both the important connections
between urban and rural family members and, at the same time, the extent of the
urban rural difference (Schein 1993:254) which exists in China.
During my association with the Liang family I heard a great deal about Old Liang's
grandfather's grave which was situated in a village in Baojing county, which was
about fifty kilometres from Jishou. Old Liang had been adopted into another branch
of the family after the death of his father and had left his village as a young child, but
the graves of his father and grandfather were, of course, in his native village. In the
spring of 1995 a female cousin of his, who lived in his adoptive village, dreamed that
someone had ploughed too close to his grandfather's grave and made a hole in the
grave mound, and that his grandfather was struggling to hold onto a dragon which
was trying to escape from inside the grave. In the dream his grandfather was also
angry because no-one from the family had been to visit the grave recently. This
dream caused Old Liang particular concern because it was generally believed that
there was a dragon in his family's grave and this was linked to the relative prosperity
of this branch of the Liang family who had left rural life and were living in Jishou.
Although Liang Zhaohui was sceptical, he said that his father and the other villagers
believed that if the dragon was allowed to escape from the grave then it could have
disastrous consequences for the family and their descendants. Moreover, the fact
that the hole had been allowed to appear implied neglect on the part of the family
who had rarely returned to their ancestral village, and possible wrong-doing by
relatives, jealous of the success of this branch of the family.
Following this dream, Old Liang's cousin consulted a spirit medium (.xian niang)
who said that Old Liang and Liang Zhaohui, as the eldest son (laoda), must return.
o
Old Liang visited the grave at night with two religious practitioners (laoshi) since by
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doing this he was able to escape the notice of anyone who might mean the family
harm. They found that, several metres from the grave, there was indeed a hole. It
appeared that rocks at the mouth of a limestone pot-hole had been dislodged,
revealing a shaft-like cave. The laoshi recited some chants at the grave and they left
at dawn.
In the spring of 1997 Old Liang spent several weeks in his native village and
arranged for new grave stones to be put up for his grandfather and his other relatives,
carved with their names and those of their direct descendants. These were to be the
only grave stones of this kind in the village and it was an appropriate sign of respect
from him as a member of the richest family branch in the village.
Since a singing festival was being held nearby, on the day of Qing Ming, I arranged
to hire a mini-bus and to attend with Liang Zhaohui, Wang Kaiying and their two
sons and to visit Old Liang's village from there. Transport to this area was poor and
this was the only way we could go and return on the same day, which I was obliged
to do because the whole of Baojing county, unlike Jishou and Fenghuang counties, is
closed to foreigners.
Liang Zhaohui and his wife and sons did not seem particularly keen to visit the
village, but when some friends of the family invited them to lunch at the nearby
small town which housed the local government offices and the primary school for the
region, they accepted gratefully. Although the township was poor, the work units,
piped water, electricity and dirt road made it more comfortable and familiar than a
village. When we finally reached the village, Liang Zhaohui and his family were
welcomed and many people recalled the last time he had visited as a small boy.
After an hour they said that they did not need supper and had to get back because the
driver I had hired was waiting for us.
Liang Zhaohui's family were not the only urban people to visit the village at Qing
Ming, and I talked for a while to some other members of the family, a woman and
her daughter, from the town of Baojing. The mother could speak Kho Xiong but told
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me that she didn't like it there. It was a mountain village, it was bu hao wan (no fun,
not interesting) and there was nothing to do. Her daughter, who could not speak Kho
Xiong, also said she did not like it there. Many of the men in the village could speak
Chinese, perhaps because the Kho Xiong dialect spoken in this area is
incomprehensible to people outside the immediate vicinity9 and, while I was there, I
heard several adverse comments in Chinese about young people returning to the
village who could not speak Kho Xiong. However, all these people were involved in
visiting the graves together.
When we learned that the new gravestone had not yet been erected10 and because I
was much more keen to see this event than were Liang Zhaohui and his family, I
suggested that they go back without me and that I take my chance with the public
transport. The following morning we went to the graves. Old Liang and his relatives
prepared incense, fire-crackers, offerings of biscuits and red paper decorations.
There was much laughter when, soon after we had set out from the village, they
found that they had forgotten the offering of alcohol, and it was explained to me that
Old Liang could only make this offering once this year so he couldn't come back
with the alcohol at a later date. When we arrived at the grave, the grave mound was
still being built up by some men whom Old Liang had employed for this purpose.
After this was finished, the carved stone was put in, aligned with a mountain
opposite which could just be seen through a col, and cemented in. They had to be
careful to get it exactly right, to conform with the best fengshui. 11 In the house the
evening before, Old Liang had been explaining to his second son, Liang Zhaohui's
younger brother, the genealogy relationships among his ancestors and at the
graveside. He talked over the names of the lineage, which were carved on the
gravestone and explained the fengshui properties of the grave. When the grave stone
had been cemented in, Old Liang and his son made an offering.
In comparison to the period after 1949 when, as Parish and Whyte record, ritual
activity at graves was discouraged (1984: 310,313) such activities have become more
commonplace with liberalisation and the greater openness of the government to non-
socialist points of view. This irony was not lost on the villagers who were
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participating, one of whom joked 'we have reform and opening to the outside world
(gaige kaifang) so now we do this'. These events demonstrated the reluctance of
urban people to spend time in their ancestral villages and their discomfort with the
conditions and what they saw as the boredom or rural life. They also indicated the
connections which bind, not just rural people to their urban relatives, but urban
people to their ancestral villages through the belief that the prosperity of an urban
family requires the goodwill of one's ancestors in the village.
Religious and Ritual Practices
As is apparent from the previous section, ritual and religious activities are another
aspect of life in China which has recently been revived. These include the
consultation of ritual specialists, such as fengshui specialists or spirit mediums and
visits to temples. The revival of ritual and religious activities may be closely
connected to the forms of leisure activities described above. For example, qigong is
a practice which is said to balance the energy flow of the body. It may be employed
as a programme of physical exercise, or as a form of healing, and both these forms
are practised in work units. However, it may also be the basis of a form of religious
belief12 taught by qigong masters, some of whom have emigrated to the West. These
use audio and video tapes to disseminate teachings based on Buddhist and Daoist
doctrines. Activities at temples, too, may take the form of a secular sightseeing trip
and picnic but they may also involve worship of the deities.
Ritual and religious activities are more closely monitored by local government than
are other leisure activities. Some are quite accepted, particularly those activities
which fall under the category of religion. This is taken to refer to the widespread,
text-based traditions such as Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism and Islam. However,
official policy makes a strong contrast between 'institutionalised religions which are
normally recognised officially as systematised (xitonghua) and well-organised' and
the more negative category of'superstition' (mixin) which is perceived as consisting
mainly in 'various forms of divination, popular magical practices, local ritual
observances, and local forms of festivity' (Feuchtwang & Wang 1991: 260-2). The
latter are perceived as both local and 'chaotic.'13
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In view of this, it is not surprising that, like other leisure activities, they have been
described as constituting a separate sphere from that of the state. For example, Chen
writes of qigong societies in urban China, that they 'imply alternative mentalities
outside the prescribed order of the state.' She suggests that activities such as these
on the streets and in the common areas form a kind of civil society (1995: 348).
Anagnost sees an opposition between local culture and the state when she writes that
popular ritual resurgence 'reinvents the local traditions that have been suspended in
totalising symbolic order' i.e. the totalising order of the Communist party (1994:
222-3). However, once again, the extent to which this constitutes a separation
between society and state is doubtful. Chen herself writes that 'rather than think of
civil society as 'subaltern' or independent associations in opposition to the state one
should regard it as a more ambiguous relationship' pointing out that in some forms
qigong is welcomed in work units and practised by some cadres (1995: 359-60).
Conclusions
To generalise about Jishou and the aspirations of its inhabitants is impossible.
Among the people I have observed, there are a variety of backgrounds and
perspectives, including urban and rural, local and non-local, young and old.
Furthermore, far from being a remote and isolated place, the Jishou area is influenced
by the flows of urban and global culture and by the policies of the socialist state. I
have also tried to avoid giving an impression of discrete groups within Jishou. Urban
and rural, rich and poor are often linked through family relationships.
Despite the continuing presence of the socialist state, all areas of society have
experienced increased opportunities for non-state regulated activities, be they in
work, consumerism or ritual activities. In this chapter I have sought to give an
impression of some of the different ways in which people have been influenced by
and taken advantage of these changes. For example, while many have benefited
from increased opportunities for acquiring wealth and participating in urban leisure
activities, others feel alienated from the social changes which are taking place. They
say that through lack of gnanxi or lack of educational attainment they cannot take
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advantage of them. The variety of experience is illustrated by the different attitudes
to place and migration. Educated urban people may seek to leave the work units of
Jishou and move south in order to find a more exciting life. Rural people aspire to an
education for their children so that they can achieve a secure status in the city by
joining a work unit. Uneducated people deplore the poverty of the land in West
Hunan and work in the cities on low wages as temporary migrants, but eventually
most return to their villages and families. In describing this variety of experiences, I
avoid suggesting that the new work and leisure activities I have described represent a
separate sphere, or an outright challenge to the state. The situation calls for a more




According to Alley this road was also used in the early 1960s for 'bands of "Long March" youth
who hike down from Chungking into Hunan on their way to Shaoshan' (1974: 25).
3 Under the Qing dynasty, the tun system was instituted in West Hunan as a means of controlling the
population and protecting the area against possible attack by rebels. See Chapter Five for a full
account.
4
Although a useful source of information, this work should be approached with some caution since
much of it was gathered as result of interviews with people who had left the Peoples' Republic of
China, often because of dissatisfaction with the political situation there.
5 Here again, Jishou lagged behind the more sophisticated east coast, where more casual fashions for
women had become popular.
6
Strictly speaking, the land continues to be owned by the state, but many rural people refer to the land
as theirs. See for example Chapter Nine.
7
For a discussion of spirit mediums and daoshi see below.
8 See Chapter Nine for a discussion ofxian niang. Laoshi is the Chinese word used to describe men,
usually based in Kho Xiong speaking villages, who undertake a variety of ritual activities, some of
them similar to those of daoshi, who are the independent Daoist practitioners often called to officiate
at funerals (cf Dean 1993: 26). I discuss laoshi and daoshi in Chapter Nine.
9
As I discuss in Chapter Eight, there are two major dialects in Kho Xiong, the Miao language found
in West Hunan. However, the dialect spoken in this village corresponded to neither of them and 1 was
able to learn of no explanation for this.
10
According to an almanac, the day on which Qing Ming fell that year was inauspicious.
11 For a fuller discussion of fengshui and the siting of graves as a source of tension between family
members, see Feuchtwang (1974: 218f.), Tapp (1989: 151-2).
12 For a discussion of qigong in China, see English-Lueck (1994).
13 The term superstition (mixin) like the term religion (zongjiao) became current in China in the early




Chapter Three - Images of West Hunan: the Miao and Landscape
Most people who visit Jishou, especially those on organised visits, are met with
images of Miao people. These, as I have mentioned, are official images of the place,
as seen in the introduction on the train and in the public architecture. Such images
are closely associated with the Chinese state. They are usually created and promoted
by local government departments and educational institutes, such as Jishou
University, and the Tourism Department (JLuyou Ban) of Jishou City. They are found
among promotional materials, dance performances and tourist activities, and they are
of course a quite artificial, commodified use of the image of the Miao. As I shall
discuss, these images appeal, in the main, to educated people from outside West
Hunan. They are part of a constructed other against which Han Chinese identity is
defined (cf Gladney 1994: 94).
Although it is the capital of the Autonomous Prefecture, Jishou attracts only a small
number of tourists each year. Most of these are from other parts of China, but there
are also a small number of overseas Chinese visitors from countries such as
Singapore and Malaysia. Visitors are taken on tours organised by the Tourism
Department to see the local landscape and performances of 'minority' dancing at the
scenic park at Dehang (fengjing qu, lit. scenic area), a few kilometres outside Jishou.
They may also be taken to see a market in the highland village of Shanjiang. In
addition, a small number of businessmen, who are either thinking of investing in the
area or regard the area as a possible market, may also be taken to Dehang or
entertained by local festivals, as I will describe in Chapter Four. Conferences on
minority affairs are sometimes organised by the local government or by Jishou
University, and delegates to these are often attended by female guides dressed in a
colourful version of the West Hunan Miao costume.
In the rest of this section I will show that, appealing though these images are, they
are carefully constructed and rarely reflect the wider situation in Jishou, or even that
of the Kho Xiong speaking people of the highland areas. I consider a number of
images of Miao people in more detail and I shall attempt, by analysing them, to
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understand better their purpose in (mis)representing minority people in China today.
I look at images found in promotional materials for the university, at the scenic park
at Dehang, in television programmes on the West Hunan Miao and in the 'minority
dancing' taught by the music department at Jishou University. 1 These cover a
variety of different media and reach a number of different audiences. Before doing
this, however, I consider my use of the terms Miao, Kho Xiong, Han and Chinese.
The Terms Used
As I have mentioned, 'Miao' is a Chinese term used to define a group of people who
stretch from West Hunan across Southwest China to northern Thailand, Burma and
Laos. The Miao can be divided into three main language groups, Hmong (spoken in
the far south west of China and in Thailand, Vietnam, Burma and Laos), Hmou
(spoken in south west and south central China) and Kho Xiong. Kho Xiong is the
least extensively spoken, and is found in East Guizhou, East Sichuan and West
Hunan. However, in West Hunan, the terms Kho Xiong and Xiong are only used in
the Kho Xiong language itself, that is, the word is not used in Chinese.
The term 'Miao' has in the past been associated with a derogatory meaning. Today,
however, it is used as the official name of the minority and in this sense Miao people
today include Chinese speaking people of Kho Xiong descent. When used in West
Hunan, the word often refers only to the Kho Xiong and their Chinese speaking
descendants, since little knowledge is shown of the other Miao groups, the Hmong
and Hmou further to the West. Most people in the lowland areas of West Hunan
speak Chinese and those of Kho Xiong descent who do not speak the Kho Xiong
language would never be described as Kho Xiong, though they might be described as
Miao or as people who used to be Miao.
In this thesis, therefore, I use the term Kho Xiong to describe people from highland
villages who speak Kho Xiong since this is the indigenous term. However, if I am
reporting what someone told me in Chinese about Kho Xiong speakers, I use the
word Miao since, as I have said, this was the term used. The words Kho Xiong are
never used in Chinese. 1 also use the term Miao to describe a wider group of people,
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those who either speak Klio Xiong or are descended from people who speak Kho
Xiong and have the classification Miao on their identity cards.
The terms Chinese and Han also need careful consideration. Although writers on the
Hmong in Thailand (e.g. Tapp 1989) make a distinction between Hmong and
Chinese, everyone I write about in my thesis lives in China and is therefore of
Chinese citizenship. Though one can be Miao and Chinese, one cannot be Miao and
Han since the two terms are descriptions of mutually exclusive nationalities.
However, the distinction between Han and minority implies that the Han themselves
are a homogeneous group, which is not the case.3 When writing of Han people in
West Hunan, therefore, I distinguish them as such, to make it clear that I am writing
of a particular group of Han. The use of Chinese to denote a language is, however,
more straightforward and I distinguish between Kho Xiong speakers and Chinese
speakers.
Staging and Viewing the Miao
I begin by describing images of Miao people at Jishou University, since this is where
I was based. Students, like tourists, come mostly from outside West Hunan and are
one group to which these images appeal. Jishou University was founded in the
1950s, soon after the Communist Party came to power. In effect, it is a teacher
training college, of which there are a number scattered throughout Hunan, but it
offers a four year degree course as well as the more usual three year course. The
provincial capital, Changsha, is a centre of learning, but until recently Jishou's was
one of only two universities built outside Changsha. The other is near Chairman
Mao's birthplace at Xiangtan. Jishou University was built in the 1950s, with the
intention of raising the educational level of the Autonomous Prefecture and was
intended as a centre for the study of Kho Xiong. Today, there is still serious
scholarship on the people classified as Miao and Tujia at the university. However,
most students and teachers have little to do with minority language or culture. The
university now takes applicants from all over Hunan and minority languages are
rarely spoken there.
The poverty and minority status of the Autonomous Prefecture ensures that the
university is a big recipient of government money and it is often promoted with
reference to images of minorities. During the period when I was in Jishou (1995-7),
the university was expanding rapidly and was in the process of moving to a bigger
campus on the outskirts of the city. Here, impressive new buildings were being built,
including a music department with auditorium, decorated with pictures of people in
minority dress. As a result, apologies by university officials to the effect that they
were only a poor minority area caused raised eyebrows among visitors from less well
appointed teachers' colleges in other parts of Hunan.
At the time I was there, the campus was not yet finished and was by no means cut off
from the surrounding countryside. Part of the old road to Qianzhou (the old
administrative centre, about 10 kilometres from Jishou) still crossed the site and open
sewers ran alongside it. A new road bypassing the university was being built, as was
a surrounding wall and an elaborate gate, but these were not yet finished, and
sometimes people from the surrounding countryside would come into the campus
and look around at the buildings, the displays of photographs, and at the foreigners. It
was not for some time that I realised that the campus and the new road had taken
some of the most fertile land from the nearby village of Yaxi.
Apart from those staff and students who came from Jishou, contacts between the
university and the city were not extensive and contacts with Kho Xiong speaking
people even less so. Once, when walking through Qianzhou with some second year
students from the university, I was surprised to learn that most of them had never
been there before. Although students would go shopping in Jishou during the day
and class trips were sometimes arranged to the surrounding countryside, few students
or non-local teachers ventured off the campus in the evenings, saying that they were
afraid of being attacked. Instead, the university provided its own social life,
arranging dances and films and there was a street of small restaurants and karaoke
bars on the campus. This division was probably a result of perceptions of the area
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among non-locals as overwhelmingly inhabited by minority people and therefore
dangerous.4
Despite this lack of contact with indigenous people, images of Miao people,
particularly of Miao women, are prevalent at the university and, as one student said,
the Miao are the university's special feature. Thus the notice boards often carried
pictures of performances at the scenic park at Dehang, which has close links with the
university. Graduation parties and many other student performances featured
'minority' dancing in which the Miao theme was demonstrated through semi-realistic
ethnic costume, and themes of romance and simple country pleasures. Students also
decorated their classrooms with images of minority people.
This emphasis on the Miao is often a means of bringing in money in addition to the
government grants mentioned above. The music department, which is well known
for teaching minority dancing, is financially the most successful department. Foreign
NGOs such as Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO) would be told that the standard of
spoken English was low because the students are from the mountains and speak Miao
at home. This, though manifestly inaccurate, was well calculated to appeal to
Western sensibilities.
I was personally involved in the creation of images of Miao people to promote the
university and it was as a result of this that I first visited Jishou's major tourist
attraction, Dehang. Soon after I began working at the university, I and the other
foreign teacher, a British man recruited through VSO, were told that the Hunan
Provincial Government was preparing a book which would include pictures of all the
foreign teachers in Hunan. Photographs were taken of myself and the VSO teacher
talking to students and to university officials, but most care was taken over the
photographs with a Miao minority theme. First, it was arranged that we were to have
our photographs taken alongside students from the music department who dressed in
the costumes they used for displays of minority dancing. These were an 'improved'
version of West Hunan minority dress, tunics and trousers decorated with traditional
Miao embroidery but made in bright synthetic fabrics, and worn with city shoes.
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However, we were told that these were not real Miao people, and that the next day
we should go to the scenic park at Dehang where we could find the Miao laobaixing
(ordinary people, lit. the old hundred surnames).
Images of these kinds, found in an urban environment where there are few
indications of day-to-day minority life, tell us more about the people who create
them than about the minorities themselves, a process which is similar to Westerners'
constructions of themselves in opposition to essentialised images of 'orientals' as
described by Said (1978). Such images imply a contrast between the urban,
modernising Han and a rural, even exotic, minority people. The variety of minority
images found throughout China also implies that, in contrast to the minorities, the
Han are a homogenous group. In order to demonstrate this opposition, images of
minorities are constructed with great care. It may not be enough for the minority
people to be themselves. As well as being rural and economically underdeveloped,
minority people must be shown to be simple and erotic and diverse, features which
contrast them with an ideal image of the Han.
Dehang Scenic Park
The setting for most interactions between Jishou people and the Miao, as well as for
many photographs of the Miao and the training of Miao dancers, is the scenic park at
Dehang. An account of the scenic park illustrates the extent to which images of the
Miao in West Hunan are artificial constructions. The village of Dehang is about
twenty kilometres from Jishou, surrounded by beautiful countryside. The scenic park
was set up there in the early 1980s. The area was chosen because it combined a
beautiful landscape and Kho Xiong speaking people in traditional dress in an area
relatively accessible from Jishou. There is now a restaurant there and a simple hotel,
although non-Chinese are not allowed to stay. (This is the case with many small
hotels and may also be a result of it being in a rural area.) There is also a large
courtyard, which doubles as a performance area and a basketball court, living
accommodation for the employees and a building for holding performances. This
last is built with a wooden balcony and pillars in a pastiche of local architectural
styles.
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The surrounding park encompasses a village, fields and mountains and epitomises
the natural and the rural but a visit to Dehang is a highly controlled experience. Far
from involving contact with the laobaixing, no contact takes place between visitors
and villagers, apart from with those who sell noodles and with the occasional hostile
small child. Instead there is a very managed interaction in which visitors and
performers look at the village and mountains, and Miao people are presented as a
visually attractive package along with the landscape.
On the road into the park there is a gate and an office selling entrance tickets.
Students at the university are given reduced rates but, in a pricing system which is
widespread and, until recently, officially sanctioned, foreigners must pay double the
Chinese rates. Access is limited in other ways. Visitors to Dehang make contact
with Miao people in the form of a group of young women employed by the park,
who greet them on their arrival. There is no actual contact with inhabitants of
Dehang village. The young women, who also act as guides, were often described to
me as 'real Miao' girls from the village of Dehang. Though they are officially
registered as Miao and speak Kho Xiong, they are in fact trained performers,
recruited from a wider area.
The performers are dressed in colourful versions of West Hunan Miao costume,
similar to those used by the music department at Jishou University. Sometimes they
wear skirts in the style of Miao people in Guizhou. The visitors' interest in the
colourful costumes is seen in the enthusiasm with which they dress up in them to
have their photographs taken. They may pose with the guides in front of the
performance hall or a feature of the landscape creating colourful and attractive
images. These present a strong contrast with the village women who, dressed in dark
or faded tunics and rolled up trousers, spend all afternoon sorting out rice on woven
rush mats on the performance courtyard.
The visitors, however, are participating in a form of staged authenticity. The Miao
performances appear to have nothing to do with the 'maintenance of traditions' nor
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the 'positive encouragement of ritual practice' (Swain 1978), but to be something
grafted onto the original village at Dehang. The scenic park appeals to the tourists'
'search for authenticity' and for the 'back region' but is in reality 'a staged back
region, a kind of living museum' (MacCannell 1973: 596). They can be seen as a
kind of 'invented tradition' but unlike the invented traditions described by
Hobsbawm (1983), they represent an image not of one's own people, but an 'Other'.
Minority People in Pictures
Dehang is one of many places where photographs and pictures of minority people are
created which then travel throughout China. With its landscape and colourful images
of Miao people, Dehang was considered an ideal setting for photographs to promote
Jishou University. Arrangements were made for us to have time off from classes and
we were driven there in the university car. When we arrived, the car was parked on
the performance courtyard and the photographer went into the restaurant and
explained who we were and what we wanted. Two of the guides were chosen and
sent off to change into their 'minority' costumes and fetch buckets. We then went
together into the village where photographs were taken of us talking together by the
river. The intention was that it should look as if we had met them by chance while
washing their clothes and the artificiality of the situation was highlighted by the fact
that the two guides found the idea of washing clothes in the river very amusing.
When we came across an old woman in Miao dress who actually was washing her
clothes in the river she was completely ignored by the photographer and did not
feature in any of the photographs.
The presence of Westerners juxtaposed to these images of minorities is not so
unusual. Similar situations have been described by Schein, who was often the
subject of media interest during her fieldwork among the Miao in Guizhou. She
suggests that both Westerners and Miao are objectified and the media interest is in
the 'disjuncture' which results from ' juxtaposing these two intriguing objects'
(Schein 1993: 334). Minorities and foreigners may have more in common than this
suggests. Gladney points out that minorities are considered sui bian, which he
translates as loose and can also mean casual (1994: 92). This is an adjective
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typically attached also to foreigners who have a reputation in China for being casual
and sexually 'loose'. It may be the unexpected similarity, as much as the disjuncture,
which makes pictures of this kind so popular. However, I suggest that this
photograph was posed to provide an image of Jishou as a minority area which is
primitive but clean and appealing, romantic, but controlled. This could be assumed
to be attractive to prospective students as well as potential conference visitors.
Visual images of minority people, often of minority women, have become widely
popular in China. Similar images are promoted to tourists in other parts of China
(Chao 1996: 210, Cheung 1996a: 26If., Cheung 1996b: 184, 225f., Diamond 1994:
110-11, Schein 1993, Oakes 1998). Schein (1989: 201) describes how artists and
television crews from all over China visited the area of Guizhou where she worked
looking for images of minority people. Whilst in West Hunan, I met someone who
was photographing minority people in order to collect images to include in his
paintings. He told me that every Miao area has its own local special cultural features
(tese) but, in reiterating these cultural features himself, he showed that his interest
was largely in the variations in women's costumes. Similarly, the expectation at
Jishou University was that I, too, would want to go and look at Miao people. The
visual nature of the research I was expected to do was indicated by the suggestion
made by cadres at the university that I should go to Laershan, because there 'you can
see women wearing high turbans.'
Images of minorities are also widely seen in metropolitan areas. Throughout China,
footage of minorities singing and dancing is some of the most popular material for
television programmes. Despite their associations with remote areas, images of
minorities are constantly found at the heart of Han Chinese culture, such as
billboards in the middle of Beijing and television programmes for Chinese New
Years. As Gladney writes, 'even in the areas of popular culture, art, film, and moral
value, the so-called "peripheral minorities" have played a pivotal role in influencing
and constructing contemporary Chinese society and identity' (1994: 94). Gladney
suggests that images of minorities assume not just the superiority but also the
homogeneity of the Han. By drawing a contrast between the alluring but exotically
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different minorities and the Han majority, there takes place, he argues, a
'homogenisation of the majority and the expense of the exoticised minority' which is
'central to [China's] nationalisation and modernisation project' (1994: 95). I will
discuss the question of Han homogeneity further in Chapter Five.
Minorities and Gender
In particular, the images I have described are of young minority women. Harrell
suggests that the representations of minorities as female are part of a definitional
process in which they are shown to be inferior to the Han. Often, images of minority
women are erotic ones, part of what Harrell describes as 'the eroticisation and
feminisation of the peripheral' (1994a: 9). For example, the province of Yunnan is
the home of the Yunnan style of painting, initiated in the early 1980s, in which
minority women are portrayed as 'colourful, erotic and exotic' (Gladney 1994: 110).
At Dehang, a shop sells locally made hangings, some of which depict scenery, rural
women in Miao dress and in some, almost naked dancing 'minority' women. It also
sells a variety of small products including charm necklaces and fans decorated with
photographs of Western women in a state of semi-undress.
These romantic or erotic images of minorities in West Hunan reinforce the notion
that they are images of an 'Other' in opposition to Han perceptions of propriety. An
example of this contrast is in the pictures in the locally produced Picture Album of
XiangXi (sic) Tujia and Miao Nationalities Autonomous Prefecture show four
nationalities, Tujia, Miao, Bai and Han. All the young minority nationality women
wear festival dress and smile shyly away from the camera whereas the Han woman is
dressed simply and modestly, her hair tied into bunches, and smiles directly into the
camera. As Gladney points out,
Minorities become a marked category, characterised by sensuality, colorfulness, and
exotic custom. This contrasts with the 'unmarked' nature of Han identity (1994: 102).
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Gender difference can be taken as a metaphor of domination and this it is not of
course peculiar to China. For example, Luhrman writes of the British in India that
they
constructed themselves as dyadic opposites, particularly around the categories of gender,
age and race. The British were hypermasculinised, scientific and progressive, a high step on
the evolutionary ladder; the Indians were effeminate, childlike, primitive, and superstitious
(1996: 8).
However, the metaphor of colonised people as female does not simply elicit ideas of
weakness in the face of strength or backwardness contrasted to progress. The
relationship between Han and minority, like that between coloniser and colonised in
other parts of the world also incorporates elements of desire (cf Bhabha 1994: 44)
and erotic qualities have long been attributed to the Miao (Diamond 1988).
Representations of the Miao as female do not just express an idea of the Han as
dominating, they also allow the Han to enjoy mildly erotic images which would not
be acceptable if they were attributed to the Han themselves.
It has been argued that the image of simple and primordial minority people, may
evoke not just sexual desire but desire for a more 'traditional' way of life. Minority
regions are seen as 'stable, essential categories of people and places that convey
timelessness and security from the uncertainties of change' (Oakes 1998: 58), places
where 'traditional culture persists relatively untainted' (Schein 1993: 104). Some
visitors to West Hunan do regard minority culture in this way. For example, the
young artist who was taking photographs of minority people told me that Han people
liked to see Miao customs because they were ancient, and an employee of the Jishou
City Tourism Department told me that overseas Chinese come to the area to see
ancient Chinese customs. However, there were few visitors to Jishou from larger
metropolitan centres and such reactions did not appear to be paramount.
Nevertheless, in describing these carefully constructed representations of the Miao
as images of an 'Other' we should not lose sight of the complex mixture of
superiority and desire which these images evoke in the onlooker.
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Minorities and Landscape
The background to the visual images of minorities which I have been describing is
the dramatic, craggy landscape of West Hunan and for many onlookers the two
images are inextricably related. Both are seen to represent the natural, the antithesis
of urban life and both are viewed in ways which tell us more about the aspirations of
those doing the observing than of the inhabitants of the landscape.
The appreciation of the landscape of West Hunan, like that of images of minorities,
has been a preoccupation of people from outside the area, rather than people from
West Hunan itself. In recent years, viewing landscape has become a popular activity
for many tourists from China's urban areas, and the northern part of West Hunan has
become particularly associated with landscape through the fame of Zhangjiajie, a
newly opened National Forest Park (Guojia shenlin gongyuan) two hundred
kilometres to the north of Jishou. The area was unknown until it was 'discovered' by
visitors from Hong Kong in the early 1980s, but since then has become Hunan's
foremost tourist site. Incorporating gorges and rocky pinnacles it is sometimes
described as exceeding Guilin, China's most famous scenic park, in beauty.
Like the images of minorities, the promotion of landscape is closely connected with
projects to bring income into the area. Zhangjiajie has become a major source of
income for the northern part of West Hunan as a result of government investments
which include the building of a new airport. Originally part of the West Hunan
Autonomous Prefecture, it split off from the rest of the Prefecture in the early 1990s
after complaints that too much profit from the investment was going to Jishou.
Today, few people combine a visit to Zhangjiaje with visiting Jishou and the
promotion of the much smaller park at Dehang is an attempt to redress this.
Admiring the scenery is an important aspect of a visit to Dehang. A set of steps has
been built up the most sheer of the mountain outcrops, described in the brochure as
'the splendid Pangu peak which towers into the clouds'.
Appreciation of landscape in China has, of course, a long history (cf Powers 1998)
and one which has been part of the world-view of the educated elite. During the
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Ming and Qing dynasties the appreciation of landscape was central to Chinese travel
writing. Ward, in his study of the eighteenth century Chinese travel writer Xu Xiake,
concludes that Chinese travel writing was concerned with 'the fusion of the human
self with the landscape' rather than with any contact with the inhabitants (Ward
1997: 118). This distancing from the indigenous people is indicated in the fact that
places were not considered to be beautiful unless designated as such by a member of
the elite, after which time it was the duty of the local inhabitants to look after it
(Ward 1997: 13). This intimate connection between the educated observer and the
landscape has been attributed to the expression of power relations on a wider scale.
Noting that Chinese landscape painting flourished in the eighteenth century, at the
height of China's imperial power, Mitchell suggests that landscape painting in
general can be seen as, the "'dreamwork" of imperialism' (1994: 10) and it has been
suggested that in China the appreciation of landscape had a 'rhetorical function' to
play in a 'projection of universalising imperial claims' (Powers 1998: 10).
In West Hunan this element of power is suggested in the way that the appreciation of
landscape runs parallel to the viewing of minority people. Viewing landscape is
often clearly prescribed, this particular mountain is worth seeing from that particular
viewpoint, and like the images of minorities it is managed rather than spontaneous.
As I have said, the mountains of Dehang are often used as a background for
photographs of visitors dressed up in 'Miao' costume accompanied by Miao guides.
Often, images of minority peoples are seen as, almost literally, part of the landscape.
It is not unusual for Chinese travellers to view minority people as part of the
landscape or scenery (fengjing) which they have come to see. I myself have heard
someone say how much he liked the well known Chinese tourist destination of Guilin
because 'the place was good, the scenery was good and the minorities were also
good' thus packaging them together. Usually these images are female. Gladney
(1994) describes how in the narration of one film, minority women, pictured bathing
in a river 'literally become the "scenery"' (101) when the voice over says, '[t]he
scenery is beautiful enough, they make it more fascinating' (102).5
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This fixed notion of landscape (including the women), as an aesthetic object which
only the educated are capable of appreciating, stands in contrast to the constructions
of locality by the inhabitants of the landscape. I go on to discuss this later in my
thesis. Where attitudes to landscape were concerned I became very aware of a
difference between local and non-local views. Far from appreciating rocky
mountains or steep gorges, the inhabitants of this landscape often have good reason
to avoid such sights. On a visit to a highland village I was shown a gorge which was
nearby. The student who showed it to me had been taken there from her school and
knew that it was a scenic sight. However, she also told me that people from her
village did not like to go there because over the years, a number of people from her
village had fallen and been killed while collecting animal fodder in the area.
Indeed, one of the most common topics of conversation which I had with people I
met casually on buses or in the road was their aversion to the land in which they
lived. Most saw it as a source of inconvenience and poverty. Complete strangers
would talk to me quite bitterly about the mountains. 'It's a mountain district (shan
quY was the commonest explanation given for the area's poverty and was used as an
explanation for all kinds of mishaps from buses breaking down to general
underdevelopment (luohou). People often asked whether we had mountains in
Britain, and expressed surprise when they learned that such a developed country as
Britain did have mountains.
The cumulative impression I gained from all these conversations and comments was
that far from being seen as a place of beauty, or a 'deeply loved native land' as a
West Hunan television programme promoted it,6 West Hunan is seen by its
inhabitants as a place of last resort to which their ancestors had fled. This seems to
be a view held among everyone, whether classified Miao or Han. A young Kho
Xiong speaking woman told me that she had heard that in the past Miao people had
lived in a level place by a big river, but that other people had wanted the land and
tried to kill the Miao people so they had run away to the mountain ridges and forests.
Similar stories are described by Graham who says of the Miao people of Northwest
Guizhou that 'their folk tales reveal the fact that they dread the steep paths and high
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mountains and live there only because they are a defeated people' (Graham 1961:
70). People of Han Chinese descent, whose ancestors had come here looking for
land, were also among those who complained about the quality of the land in West
n
Hunan.
Interacting with the 'Miao'
I have described a series of images of minorities and landscape through which, I
suggest, local government has produced particular images of West Hunan. While
these may appeal to a nostalgia for the past, they also reinforce a sense of superiority
among urban visitors. Often these involved little or no contact between visitors and
villages. In contrast to the lack of contact between tourists and the villagers, there
was a limited amount of interaction with the performers and tourists, as is indicated
in the following introduction to the Dehang area, translated locally,
The local customs 'welcoming guest wine', 'flower drum dance', 'song and dance
evening' all brim over with rich local features and make visitors reluctant to leave.
But, given the artificiality I have described, it is no surprise to find that what
interaction there is has been carefully stage managed so that there is no contact with
the actualities of minority life.
Interaction between visitors and Miao guides and performers often has romantic and
playful elements. Visitors are greeted by young women offering them drinks,
something also found in tourist activities in minority areas of Guizhou (Schein 1993:
228, Cheung 1996b: 214). Dance performances usually include one or more items,
described as traditional Miao games, which involve audience participation. These
games usually require a certain amount of agility on the part of the performers. In
one, a pair of long pieces of wood shaped like skis, are brought out. These have
multiple foot-loops in which a line of people must stand and walk simultaneously,
resulting in much laughter. Visitors are encouraged to join in and male visitors are
sometimes almost dragged onto the stage by the female performers.
During the day, tourists can walk around the park with one of the Miao performers as
a guide and male visitors may expect something more romantic than this from the
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encounter. For example, on one visit to Dehang we met one of the performers,
wearing a bright pink skirt and a wide peasant hat, and leading a group of men up to
the Liusha waterfall. We met her again at some stepping stones across a river. She
went across the stepping stones first, laughing from the far bank at the visitors'
slowness and laughing again when they were splashed and teased by children from
the village. When they finally joined her, she rushed on up the hill to a small
pavilion. Both sides were enjoying the game but, when we got to the pavilion, we
found the Miao woman more subdued. One of the men was asking her to have her
photograph taken sitting on a rock with him. As far as I could see, the only way she
could do this was by sitting on his lap, and she was refusing to do so. This suggests
that far from being automata, the young Miao women who are being positioned as
'Other' are also able to some extent to set their own terms revealing 'resistance to the
utilisation of their bodies and their smiles' (Schein 1997: 83).
Although there was relatively little interaction between those who wanted to view the
Miao and the villagers themselves, often visitors had no wish to see more. I was told
that when some visitors came to Jishou University from the teacher training college
at Huaihua, about 100 kilometres south of Jishou, they were driven up to a village
near Dehang to see the village and the people working in the fields, but they did not
get out of the bus. Then they were taken to another vantage point to look at the
scenery. Further evidence of this is seen in the fact that students from other parts of
Flunan would often tell me that they were disappointed because they expected to see
young women in minority dress on the streets of Jishou. If I pointed out that some of
the rural women in the markets were quite young they would say, yes but they are
not wearing beautiful colours and jewellery. Some students would seek out festivals
aimed at tourists, of which there were one or two a year in the Autonomous
Prefecture, to see the colourful images of minorities they had expected. On visits to
Dehang, students who admired the colourful Miao guides would laugh rather
derisively when they overheard old village women speaking Kho Xiong, and try to
imitate the sound of their speech.
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This lack of contact contrasts with the situation in Guizhou as described by Schein
(1993, 1997) and by Oakes, where the tourists have much closer contact with the
villagers themselves who, in turn 'strive to mediate the construction of that
landscape' (Oakes 1998: 59). In fact, many images of minorities in West Hunan are
produced without minority people taking part.
Minority Dancing
In the following section of this chapter I consider in some detail performances of
minority dancing at Jishou University. I suggest that these dances illustrate the
degree to which images of the Miao are removed from what the Miao say about
themselves and also the ambivalent relationship of fear and desire which educated
people have with the images of minority people.
'Minority dancing' at Jishou University was enacted by the students themselves. It
was one of the most popular forms of entertainment at the university and students
and teachers often told me how much they liked it. Like the performances at
Dehang, these dances made use of colourful versions of minority costume and
jewellery and were often based on playful or romantic themes. Most people, when
asked, would say that they knew that these images were not actually representative of
life in a Miao village, but they still regarded the dancing as a local feature. For
example, one young Communist Party member told me how much she had enjoyed a
recent performance because the music, dancing and costume were typical of this
area.
I describe one from a series of five dances, all on similar themes, which were
performed by members of the Music Department at a graduation day performance.
In some ways all the dances were similar. Certain steps were used repeatedly
throughout the performance. Some of these were typical of the Western style disco
dancing which is so popular in China today, though with the Miao style silver
jewellery whirling around it looked rather incongruous. Other steps were peculiar to
the 'minority dancing' style which has developed, the most characteristic being a
sideways jumping with fists turned upwards and hips thrusting forwards. From time
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to time the steps indicated that they were climbing steep hills and crossing fast-
flowing rivers. In this way Western and 'minority' influences combined to suggest
the vigorous and the erotic.
This particular dance was on the theme of lovemaking between young Miao people.
The dancers appeared on the stage in two groups, girls on one side of the stage and
boys at the other. Unlike some of the other dances, in which the women wore bright
or light coloured costumes, the costumes in this dance were darker coloured. They
differed from actual minority dress in West Hunan in that the women wore above the
knee skirts rather than trousers with a band of silver jewellery across the fronts of
their turbans, and a yoke of silver jewellery across their tunic tops.
At the start of the dance, one girl was standing in the middle of the group of boys
whose gestures towards her suggested attention and admiration. She, however,
pushed them away and went to join the other girls. The girls made a circle, all facing
inwards, the music began and there was a parody of shy laughter with their hands
held in front of their faces. Then the groups of girls and boys approached each other
and danced. This was followed by another very common feature of 'minority'
dancing where the boys picked the girls up and put them over their shoulders. The
narrative of the dance proceeded with the girls running away and laughing shyly and
then, one by one, consenting to form couples with the boys. Romantic gestures
between them ensued, followed by each girl becoming angry and pushing her over-
eager partner away with exaggerated gestures of rejection. Then girls and boys fell
down into an exhausted heap and slept. Finally, one by one the girls got up and
attracted their partner's attention coyly and they went off stage in couples. The last
girl got up and left by herself and the last boy, the clown of the group, followed her a
few seconds after her with a broad, foolish smile of anticipation on his face.
Clearly this is a representation of a Han Chinese view of Miao courtship. The dance
is based on a common Han misconception that young unmarried Miao men and
women meet and sing love songs to each other and that this is immediately followed
by making love. The dance varied between expression of spontaneous and
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uninhibited feelings to coy flirting. The only obstacle to apparently random pairing
was the need for the men to overcome the girls' shyness. Although at the end of the
dance it is the women who lead the men away, the dance also suggests a lack of
choice. The women are picked up by the young men and cannot escape. The last
young woman to pair off has no choice but to go with the remaining young man.
However, a comparison of this dance with an account of Miao courtship suggests
that the dance is based more on a Han Chinese fascination with minority sexuality
than on reality. The Miao practice of pre-marriage sexual relations fascinates as well
as repels the Han Chinese (cf Gladney 1994: 102) and it was suggested to me more
than once that I should take Miao marriage as my research theme.
Liang Zhaohui had grown up near Aizhai where Miao courtship took place even
during the Cultural Revolution and his account, based on what he had been told by
his contemporaries there, shows how far from the truth this kind of representation is.
His account was as follows: If some boys meet some girls in the market and they
tease them and the girls don't get angry then one of the boys will make an
appointment with one of the girls. The boy and girl who make the arrangements are
usually slightly older than the others and it is for the girl to arrange the time and the
place and how many 'sisters' to bring with her. The place chosen is usually
somewhere in the mountains, away from the villages. There they sing songs, ask
riddles or just talk and form couples. The two groups make an appointment for
another night. At the second appointment they talk all night and at the third
appointment they make love. The liaisons formed would not normally end in
marriage, since many young people are betrothed from childhood, but might do if
long term relationships were formed and the couples insisted on staying together.
His account emphasises that far from being an expression of uninhibited, primitive or
natural feelings, the occasion is a ritualised event in which women play an equal
rather than passive role, since the young women plan the meeting in advance and
always choose the time and place. He also stresses that, unlike the dance, the young
men and women choose their partners on the basis of displays of singing and wit.
Such meetings are neither illicit nor casual (sui bian). Though not discussed with
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their parents, they will be encouraged by the girls' brothers, who may help them
finish their farm work so that that they will not be late. As I have suggested, the
dance described above is more a representation of what the Han find fascinating and
'Other', than of actual Miao practices.
Despite the evident erotic and romantic content of some of the dancing, this aspect of
it was rarely alluded to by people at Jishou University. For example, I was told by a
member of staff, in English, that the dances were popular because they were lively
and 'crowded' (presumably a translation of renao) and that the best dances were the
most colourful ones. Through these dances the students are able to enact and enjoy
these mildly erotic images. The fact that the Chinese educational system which has
only recently permitted university students to 'date,' suggests that these images are
only acceptable because they are associated with the non-Han and the rural. In
enjoying them, however, the students participate in an ambiguous relationship with
this constructed 'Other' which comprises both closeness and distance. That is, they
are able to enact aspects of their own desire, while attributing it to someone else.
Television Series
A similar emphasis on colourful images and erotic feelings at the expense of social
interaction, can be seen in a television series made to accompany the Miao/Hmong
conference which was held in Jishou in 1994 (see Chapter Eight). Three, hour long
episodes were based on the following aspects of Miao culture: silver jewellery,
embroidery and drum dancing. Since the drum dancing was presented as
entertainment for tourists, each episode was in fact also promoting investment in the
area and, like the images of the Miao at Jishou University, it was a means of
promoting the area.
The episodes all include pictures of young smiling Miao women in embroidered
costumes and jewellery, walking in beautiful landscapes. There are few signs of
modern developments, people are shown washing in tanks and sewing by candle¬
light. However, they are sanitised images, no mud or dirt is shown. Many of the
scenes appear to have been filmed at Dehang, since people are shown walking on
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flagstones rather than ordinary paths. The inaccuracy of these images is underlined
by the fact, unknown to many viewers, that most of the participants are actors, many
of them brought in from other parts of Hunan.
The television programme I consider here does cover the history of the Miao
rebellions and Miao marriage practices and does therefore provide a richer picture of
Miao people than do the performances I have discussed above. However, the
episode constantly returns to the subject of romance and its unifying theme is the
beauty of Miao jewellery and the happiness this brings. There is also frequent
mention of the antiquity of Miao. Their love songs, for example, have been sung 'for
thousands of years, century after century'. There is no hint of poverty and in the
opening moments of the episode we are told;
The clear cry of a bird leads us into a quiet Miao mountain range, leads us
into a mysterious but colourful world. Six hundred and seventy thousand
Miao relatives (tongbao) have multiplied in their ancient, deeply loved
land. With their industrious hands and sparkling sweat they have
cultivated the high mountains and created their own unique customs.
Wearing silver jewellery is a custom which the Miao women follow as a
source of pride. Pure and beautiful, silver jewellery embodies the Miao
peoples' history of appreciating beauty and it symbolises happiness and
luck.
In contrast to other works on Miao people (cf Lemoine 1978: 803, Ruey Yih-fu
1962: 184 ), there is no mention here of conflict with the Han Chinese. But the
history of the Miao rebellions is mentioned and attributed, as is often the case, to the
evils of feudalism and 'the blood stained oppression of the Qing dynasty.'8 The
Miao are also described as heroic fighters against French imperialists and, in recent
years, against the Vietnamese.9 This historical account is, however, trivialised by its
association with jewellery and dancing and it is through a description of silver
jewellery that the subject of history is introduced. Attention is drawn to an
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ornamental curved silver knife in a woman's head-dress and the explanation for this
is that it is in memory of the rebellions against the Qing dynasty. The description of
the rebellions is accompanied by footage of a war-like 'shield dance', another
choreographed 'minority' dance with as little relation to the actualities of life in West
Hunan as have the performances of 'minority dancing' at Jishou University. In the
scene which follows this, the camera follows a man wearing a Miao tunic and turban.
The commentary says that he is a forest warden and praises his unique skills and the
'string of firm footsteps' that he leaves behind him. He too carries a curved knife
and the voice-over, suddenly knowing, says 'Oh, now I understand why the Miao
girls wear knives in their head-dresses, it is both in memory of their martyrs and out
of reverence for their heroes!' The explanation is to turn once again to the erotic.
From here, the narrative moves on to Miao love songs and marriage. It is indicative
of the relatively scholarly nature of the series that the love songs we hear sung are
typical of the West Hunan Kho Xiong people, since in the depiction of courtship
ritual described above, the accompanying music is of a more popular and commercial
type. However, the details of the ritual are inaccurate and suggest that courtship is
precipitate. Young people are shown singing love songs by the roadside and later
leaving tokens on the trees to show they are not to be disturbed.
The representation of Miao as 'Other' is indicated by a number of comments to the
effect that Miao practices are strange and different. For example, the courtship scene
begins with a couple of young men bumping against some young women on market
day, to attract their attention and we are told that 'the strange thing is that they do not
mind, they even feel pleased'. Later we are told that the bride and the girls who
accompany her 'are not at all put out' when they have to wait before entering the
bridal chamber and 'when Miao people get married, they do not bow to the ancestors
and they do not enter the bridal chamber.' There is in these descriptions an implicit
contrast to Han norms of behaviour.
The television programme is filled with praise for the Miao. It ends with the words
which purport to be a wedding toast; 'Sound the happy note of the horn, praise the
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song of happiness, praise the pure beauty of silver, praise the sweetness of love.
Praise the nationality, which is pure like silver.' This, however, is indicative of the
trivialising emphasis on colourful images and happy feelings which is found in most
of these images. In its emphasis on these aspects and on the way that the Miao Tack'
Chinese customs this programme is similar to the images of Miao people found in
18th century Miao albums (see for example Lin 1940: 286-7, Playfair 1986). Some
of these also contain pictures where, as described by Diamond, Miao people were
pictured always in the forests or outside isolated homesteads without 'any indication
that people live in organised communities.' Though the men were shown as coarse
and dark, beautiful young women were depicted and the emphasis was on 'sexual
license, with variants on the theme of young men and women meeting in the
wilderness to dance, sing, drink or repair to the nearest shelter for further intimacies'
(1994: 100, 103).
Conclusions
These are images which are 'highly produced' (Schein 1993: 10). They are
rehearsed sequences in particular settings, which convey particular and repeated
images. They have more appeal for educated people from outside the area than for
West Hunan people, fitting in with a China-wide image of the minorities as 'Other'
to a progressive and homogeneous Han Chinese. Ignoring the hardships of mountain
life and Miao social organisation or religious belief, they are images which show
Miao people as colourful and erotic, concerned with simple uninhibited feelings. In
addition to this they provided a means of income for local government. As such,
these images are representative neither of the Kho Xiong speaking highlanders, nor
of the Chinese speaking people who live in the lowlands. Instead, they can be seen
as a form of invented tradition, with particular appeal for urban people who come
from outside the area to whom they are both the antithesis of civilised Chineseness
and objects of desire.
What do West Hunan people and in particular West Hunan minority people make of
these images? As I have mentioned, this is not a line of enquiry which I intend to
cover in depth but I finish with a few observations. It would be difficult to make a
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case that these images of 'Other' are hegemonic in their effects (cf Said 1978). At
times, rural people would informally make use of the tourist facilities at Dehang
themselves, reappropriating them and giving them their own meanings (cf Schein
1997: 86). Ordinarily the site at Dehang provides a place for village children to play
and for adults to dry and winnow rice. Once when I was there, the proceedings for
an inter-village basket ball match were opened with a drum dance by the performers,
who were also keen members of the audience. On other occasions people might also
contest the official images, such as when Miao people told me that whereas Han
people think Miao women are forward, in fact they are very shy. Most commonly,
however, it seemed that the images of the Miao in Jishou were of no great interest
and they were rarely consumed or discussed by the people of West Hunan.
1 I confine myself here to images which are accessible and well known to all through television and
magazines and I do not cover local scholarly works.
2
Though the term Kho Xiong is used in the West to refer to the people and the language (e.g.
Lemoine 1978: 797), indigenously it is the word 'Xiong' which is used to denote the language, andpu
Xiong means to speak Xiong. The word kho means people and Kho Xiong therefore means the Xiong
people. For the sake of simplicity, however, I use the words Kho Xiong to refer to both language and
people.
3 See for example, Gladney (1991) & Guldin (1984). I discuss this point further in Chapter Five.
4 Schein reports similar attitudes on the campuses where she studied in Guizhou (1993: 31 If.).
5 Oakes writes that in Shen Congwen's work, the landscape of West Hunan 'was represented as a
beautiful woman upon whom Shen's audience could gaze before she was inevitably "taken"' (1995:
93). Shen's work is not widely popular in China today and cannot be seen as representative of ways
in which images of gender and landscape are currently expressed.
6 See below.
7
But the landscape is, of course, also invested with considerable power in the form of sacred sites and
fengshui, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter.
8
For other examples of the ruling classes being held responsible for oppressing the Miao, see Ma Yin
(1989) and PuQiu (1989).
9 See Diamond (1994: 110) for comments on a similar history of the Da Hua Miao of Guizhou.
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Chapter Four - Festivals as Images of Minority Culture
The colourful and romantic images I have been describing are produced largely for
those from outside the area. In this chapter I consider events at which West Hunan
people themselves are involved in creating and viewing images of minority culture.
These are of a rather different kind, consisting of'healthy' activities, many of which
take the form of competitions. I begin by describing festivals in the Jishou area,
most but not all of which were held at the Chinese Lunar New Year in 1997. These
were promoted by the local government and, as with the material described in
Chapter Two, they are based on particular images of minority culture. I attended
these festivals as a visitor since, with the exception of the Jishou New Year
procession, they were put on in small towns in rural areas, where I was not resident.
Despite this, however, the material provides useful insights into the influence of the
local government on local cultural events. These festivals were usually referred to as
huodong (events, activities).
Rural festivals are held on market days, thus attracting a fairly large number of
people. As in the rest of China, most festivals, particularly those considered to be
minority festivals, come under the responsibility of local government (Feuchtwang
and Wang 1991: 259). Two departments of the Prefecture local government are
involved, the Cultural Department (Wenhua Ju) and Minority Affairs Bureau (Min
Wei). However, most rural festivals are arranged, with the approval of the Cultural
Department, at the relatively low level of town government, that is by the local
Cultural Station (Wenhua Zhan).
From an interview with an employee of the Cultural Department in Jishou, I learned
that the organisation of such festivals is intended to improve local culture and
promote a favourable image of the area to people from other regions. He told me
that the purpose of supporting such festivals was to revive local culture which had
suffered during the Cultural Revolution, and to promote a warm atmosphere at New
Year. He also said that such festivals are used to show how there are good relations
between Han and Miao and, when I asked if holding these festivals meant that they
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would attract the interest of the Provincial Government he said 'Yes, of course.'
Some of these festivals may be granted money from the Cultural Department, but
usually the money came from other sources, often private sponsorship.
In addition to the small-scale festivals arranged by the Cultural Stations, which I
shall describe later in this chapter, there are a small number of 'Miao', 'Tujia' and
'Han' festivals which are both funded and organised by the Cultural Department.1 In
these cases the initial suggestion may come from the Cultural Department, who ask
local officials to hold the festival and provide funding and experts to guide
preparations. These are the festivals that will be attended and viewed by outsiders,
bringing money and publicity to the area. One of these was the 'Miao' festival of Si
Yue Ba, (literally the eighth of the fourth lunar month) which I will describe in the
next section.2
Si Yue Ba festival
In the spring of 1996, the Si Yue Ba festival was held in Shanjiang, a Miao speaking
settlement in the mountains of Fenghuang county. Shanjiang is something of a
showpiece. It is a place where officially organised groups, such as the delegates to
the 1994 Miao conference held in Jishou3, and groups of tourists, are taken to see a
minority market day. The covered market area and some of the recent buildings have
been built with traditional Chinese style roofs, which may seem contradictory until
we recall that minority people are taken to be survivals of a primordial Chinese
culture.
The staging of the Si Yue Ba festival alternates between Shanjiang and a location in
Eastern Guizhou.4 On the occasion I attended, it was a relatively small affair
compared with previous years. Despite this, the festival attracted tourists, journalists
and some other delegates, whose importance I did not learn, as well as people from
Dehang and the surrounding villages. A friend and I were the only Westerners
present. The reason for the choice of Si Yue Ba for government support is that it is
said, in officially approved historical accounts of the area, to commemorate a local
revolutionary hero, though others say that it is a festival when young people sing
75
Kho Xiong dialogic love songs to each other. However, the event I attended was
concerned with presenting images of the Miao, and not a chance for young people to
find partners.
Though it was held on an ordinary market day, the festival was highly organised,
with many people from Shanjiang performing prearranged roles. There were a
number of young people dressed up in Miao costume and head-dresses, and there
were women adorned with jewellery. The costumes were more 'authentic' than the
colourful versions seen at Dehang and at Jishou University, but were obviously not
their usual dress since the costumes were all identical. I had never seen young men
wearing Miao dress in other circumstances and the girls were wearing their Miao
costume together with high heeled shoes. As the young people of the township, they
would normally have been wearing western style clothing. Among the crowds there
were young people with name tags making sure everything was running smoothly.
There were also a large number of police. As well as stalls selling the usual market
day produce, some stalls selling jewellery and minority embroidery were doing brisk
business with the young tourists.
The festival consisted of a series of performances representing different aspects of
Miao life. It began with a performance of vigorous dancing, accompanied by
drumming, in which the performers held staffs. This style of dance is often used to
represent the rebellious history of Miao people. The schedule was disrupted by rain
and the artificiality of the situation was made more obvious when the weather cleared
and the delegates and tourists went back to the entrance of the village. Here, midway
through the morning they were 'welcomed' back in by drum dancing, horn blowing
and a lion flanked by two masked figures.
The welcome was followed by a performance of singing Kho Xiong songs, by a
group of women in festival costume, which some of the onlookers recorded. After a
while, guests, journalists and some of the villagers moved on to a stone house nearby
which had been chosen to stage a scene from the ritual of 'waiting for the bride'.
Inside it people were acting out the scene. One woman was untying and retying her
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turban the whole time we were there. Others were sitting, looking rather bored and
being photographed.
At all these events we were very aware of the presence of about fifteen photo-
journalists. The situation, though based on an indigenous festival, was set up as a
performance to provide raw material for making images of minority people, which
could later be used as media images at provincial or even national level, for purposes
similar to those described in Chapter Three. It appeared at times that the event was
intended more for the journalists than for the other spectators and, as soon as a
performance took place, they would rush to the fore, often obscuring the event for
others. They were of course careful not to include each other in their shots, but they
were anxious to include that intriguing anomaly, the foreign visitors. Usually, when
photographing local people, the journalists were scrupulous about getting names and
addresses and promising to send them copies. However, in their efforts to get both
foreigners and exotic minority people in the same photograph, they tried to
manipulate the situation, showing little respect for people's feelings. For example, at
one point the photographers asked an old woman who was watching one of the
performances to be photographed in conversation with me. She refused, looking
upset and saying she was 'bu hao kan' (not good looking). Despite this, the
photographers urged me to go and talk to her and, when I refused, they decided to
find someone young to talk to me. Later, at the 'wedding', they asked me to have
my photograph taken with some young Miao women who were looking on, but the
women recoiled in fear when I approached them. When I refused again, on the
grounds that I was making the women feel embarrassed, the journalists replied that
this didn't matter (mei guanxi).
The wishes of local people were ignored, not just by journalists in search of
intriguing images, but by the organisers of the festival themselves. Later in the
morning, two religious specialists arrived at the festival. One man, wearing gold
coins at the base of his fingers and a chain between his first finger and thumb
repeated a series of steps, slowly by himself.5 When I went to look more closely, one
of the organisers approached him and told him to leave. Soon afterwards, another
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man appeared, dressed in a woman's bib with flowers in his hair and rouge on his
cheeks. He was accompanied by musicians with an erhu6 and flute, and danced
while they played. He, too, was asked to leave.7 I had been told that if the weather
was good the young people of the area would hold their own unofficial singing
contest in the evening but since the rain appeared to have set in it seemed unlikely
that this would occur and we left when the official performances ended.
The festival had provided different experiences for different people. The tourists and
journalists appeared to be satisfied with the images of colourful aspects of Miao
culture which the organised festival was presenting to them, as was a young artist
from Sichuan who had come to collect material for his pictures. He was also pleased
to have seen the ritual practitioners and he told me that Han people liked to see
customs like these because they are ancient. And the young people who were
walking back to their villages in the rain appeared to have enjoyed their day out.
Schein, discussing a rather similar occasion in Guizhou writes that 'local practice and
official sponsorship constitute two facets of a single process' and suggests that 'as
minorities celebrate their own occasions, China celebrates minority cultural practice
as living evidence of cultural diversity' (1989: 210). However, at the Si Yue Ba
festival it was questionable how much people were celebrating their own culture and
how much they were simply taking part in a performance prearranged to official
guidelines. The occasion conformed well to the officially approved approach, which,
encourages a selective continuation of the colourful aspects of Miao culture. This excludes
overtly religious events Yet some of the music, dance, and costume formerly associated
with religious festivals are acceptable, provided that they are presented in a secular
framework and packaged for tourism (Handbook for Minority Work 1985; Diamond 1994:
110).
I was also told, by people who lived locally, that rural people were becoming bored
with Si Yue Ba and did not like to go because it was always the same.
It appeared, then, that people had become either performers or observers at these
festivals and that their opportunities to be participants were limited. There was no
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opportunity during the festival for any activities of religious significance, nor to
choose a partner. The activities simply hinted at rebellious past, religious meaning,
love and marriage in order to create images suitable for use elsewhere. The meaning
of the day had been reduced to, as Poppi says of a reconstructed Ludin ritual, 'a
token gesture to amuse the numerous tourists who are the bulk of the audience'
(Poppi 1992: 127).
Rural New Year Festivals
The rural New Year festivals organised by the towns' Cultural Stations are also
intended to create particular images of Miao people. These, however, do not attract
tourists and journalists, and the images of Miao culture which they create are rather
different. They are images of 'healthy' activity rather than of exotic strangeness. The
Ministry of Culture and its regional branches, the Cultural Departments, are
concerned with 'the selection of some "traditional customs" (chuantong minsu),
which involve especially '"healthy" traditional annual festivals' often taking the
form of competitions (cf Feuchtwang & Wang 1991: 254, 260, Cheung 1996b: 222).
New Year festivals are almost ubiquitous throughout China. Though a time of
celebration, New Year is also a time when people believe that the world has narrowly
averted a catastrophe and a time when people are especially vulnerable to ghosts and
demons. It is a time when people dress as dragons and lions and visit other members
of the community to counter these malignant influences. Liang Zhaohui, who
accompanied me to the New Year festivals and who had lived in this area as a child,
told me that in these parts displays of martial arts (wushu) were also included in the
New Year activities. Representatives from each village would arrive at the market
place armed with staffs and swords and accompanied by lion dancers.
As well as their manifest purpose in quelling demonic powers, these displays were
also ways of expressing and creating relationships between the villages. Both 'Han'
and 'Miao' villagers had similar events but where 'Miao' and 'Han' villages were
interspersed, such inter-village encounters were usually between villages of the same
group. Lion dance festivals were particularly important for forming friendships
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between Miao villages. They were opportunities for the girls of the village to meet
young men from other, friendly villages. Sometimes, when lion dancers from one
village were visiting another, the visiting lion dancers were invited to stay for supper
and they refused out of politeness. If the host village insisted, the guest lion would
run away and the host lion would have to catch it. If they succeeded, the group from
the visiting village would all eat supper at the host village.
Lion dancing and displays of wushu sometimes spark off fights between villages.
Liang described how, in the early 1990s, a fight almost arose between two Han
villages in Majingao, where displays of wushu, lion and dragon dancing are put on in
the fields at New Year, and people from other villages come to watch but do not
participate. On this occasion, a young man from another village, who was watching the
display, stepped forward and said, 'Now I'll show you how it's really done.' The
response from one of the home team was, 'We'll see you at the next market,' and both
sides knew that a fight had been arranged. On the next market day a group of villagers
approached the market place armed with muskets and knives, accompanied by lion
dancers and people playing drums. But the market was surrounded by people from the
other village, also armed, some of them with staffs. In the event local government
officials and the police from Jishou stepped in to stop the fight.
Descriptions of these New Year activities suggest a close link between ritual action and
social action, where relations between villages, good and bad, are enacted and perhaps
changed during the New Year activities. They also suggest that there is little difference
between the practices of Miao and Han villagers in these activities.
Festival at Aizhai
New Year festivals today, influenced as they are by the Cultural Stations and by
urbanisation, are quite different from those I have just described. The first festival
we visited was at Aizhai, near Dehang scenic park. We were already prepared for
the change when, on the way, the bus-driver told us that Aizhai people weren't very
interested in traditional things these days and they preferred karaoke and basket-ball
matches. In part this may be because, as Liang pointed out, people no longer feel the
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need to use wushu to defend themselves. It was also partly because people now find
these activities old-fashioned, especially those who have television or other ways to
entertain themselves.
What struck me first at the New Year festival at Aizhai was that it was an occasion to
buy or look at manufactured goods, and seemed to be an aspect of the urbanisation of
rural China. It was also a place to meet people. People were converging on the
market from all directions, most of them quite well dressed, many of them in western
style clothing. Liang Zhaohui was recognised in the street by a former student who
told him that he had been to Guangzhou to look for casual work (da gong) and was
back in Aizhai for the holiday. Like several other young men there he was dressed
cheaply but with big-city flair, and had had his hair lightened to a red-brown colour.
When we arrived the activities had not yet begun and we walked round the street
stalls which were selling food and household goods. Typical of the mixed array of
imported goods was a stall which displayed, among other things, plastic birds,
ornaments made from shells, miniature Communist Party flags and plastic idols of
Guanyin. Artefacts such as these suggest that the market was an opportunity to come
into contact with the outside, urban, world.
The funding for this festival had come from private enterprise, but private enterprise
from another part of China. Posters said that the festival was sponsored by a Chinese
medicine company from Shandong in East China, which was promoting a medicine
popular for treating stomach ailments. However, this was private enterprise working
together with local government, as was made evident by the inclusion of opening
speeches by local officials. There were several indications that the occasion was also
an attempt by the local government to promote 'healthy' aspects of 'local culture'.
On the walls, as well as the ubiquitous slogans welcoming back Hong Kong, there
was one about the Two Socialisms, (one material, the other spiritual) and another
which said, 'Unite and Develop the Economics and Culture of the Nationality.' I
asked Liang if developing the culture of the area was what was occurring today and
he agreed, this was exactly what was taking place.
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In contrast to lion and dragon dances, which are shared by Miao and Han, the festival
appeared to be promoting a distinct Miao culture in the form of drum dancing and
o
Miao singing. These, however, had been removed from their normal contexts and
modified. The singers, middle aged women in traditional Miao dress, began with the
well known Communist Party song, 'Without the Communist Party there could be no
new China' (Mei you Gongchandang, mei you Xin Zhongguo), and proceeded with
other political Chinese songs. The singing was amplified and attracted a small
crowd. They went on to sing dialogic songs in Kho Xiong. However, the form was
removed from its original social context, since the songs were not formerly used for
public performances but would be, and still are, used to welcome guests, at weddings
and to express love and flirtation.
More popular was the drum dancing competition. Drum dancing has been developed
into a kind of acrobatic performance, in which its most skilled performers show
considerable suppleness and agility. But, as Liang said to me, it is different from
before, it has been changed, to make it into something which looks nice and can be
shown on television. The event began with some old women, who were doing it for
fun, but they were later replaced by younger people taking part in a competition.
They were watched with fascination by a large crowd of people, many of them
women in their best tunics.
Though it did not have political connotations, drum dancing was also removed from
its former context. Ling and Ruey write of thirty different kinds of drum dancing
which existed in West Hunan in the 1930s, some danced by men, some by women,
and some together. According to these writers the dances depicted various activities
such as 'The Rice-Shoot-Transplanting Dance' and 'The Turning-a-Mill Dance', and
different animals, such as 'The Monkey Dance' and 'The Fish Jumping Dance'.
They write that, 'in recent times the local governments have repeatedly prohibited
licentious rites among the Miao, and so dances such as the drum dance are now
rarely held' (Ling & Ruey 1963: 310). Ling and Ruey don't make clear why the
drum dance is considered licentious, but the most likely reason seems to be that it
was associated with drinking alcohol. It is clear from their description that these
dances were entertaining and witty, and though dances of this kind are rarely
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performed today, they are still appreciated. A young woman from a highland village
told me of some young people from her village who went to market in the nearby
town to meet other young people and do some shopping. They found, to their
surprise, that the centre of attention was an old man who could do the old drum
dances very well. Though, like most young people in the village, they professed not
to be interested in such things, they came back talking enthusiastically about this
incident.
As at the Si Yue Ba festival, there were people who tried to bring their own
spontaneous performances to the occasion. A couple of groups of lion dancers stood
around for a long time hoping to have a chance to perform and bring the village good
luck, perhaps for money, since this was usually the case, but they were turned away
because, they were told, there was no place to perform, since the whole area was
taken up with official performances.
Festival at Daxingzhai
Another town, Daxingzhai, did arrange activities which were closer to what,
according to Liang, New Year activities had been like in the past. Lion dancing and
acrobatics were held, instead of drum dancing and singing. It is possible that they
chose these activities, not only because the town is more isolated and less influenced
by urbanisation, but also to entertain visitors from the Shandong drug company, who
were also sponsoring this festival. On the first day of the competition representatives
from the company attended, seated in a stand which was put up specially for them,
and footage of the event was shown by the local television station.
Five days later, on the following market day, the teams which had not had time to
perform at the main event were invited back. The activities were held in the school
playground, a dramatic setting, surrounded by mountains and overlooked on one side
by the school and on the other by an old fortified house. In the middle of the
playground were fifteen tables, stacked up into a triangle with its apex five tables
high. The visiting 'lions' arrived one by one, led by wushu experts and each was
welcomed by the Daxingzhai lion and by people playing horns. The lions paraded
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around the playground led by the wushu experts and then the competition began.
The lions weaved in and out of the tables, climbing precariously to the top.
Individuals and groups put on acrobatic displays, climbing and jumping. Each
performance was accompanied by encouragement and, sometimes, warnings from
team-mates. One man's performance was stopped because there was a loud cracking
sound from the stack of tables.
With its elements of danger and skill, the display drew a large crowd, but the
activities still had a controlled feel about them. They were overseen by an employee
of the local government who was shouting instructions and warnings to be careful, in
a mixture of Chinese and Kho Xiong, through a loudspeaker system. There was no
opportunity for the lions to leave the playground to bring luck to the rest of the
village, nor were there inter-village interactions of the kind Liang had described
happening in the past. Again, it was being run as a 'healthy' competition rather than
a socially and ritually meaningful activity.
There were, however, hints at a departure from this secular, disengaged approach. A
member of the home team lit incense and burned paper money around the stack of
tables, investing the occasion with supernatural meaning. There were also hints of
counter-representations of authority. One of the visiting lions had come
accompanied by two fierce looking men, one dressed in an American style jacket and
carrying a spear, the other dressed as a rather sinister looking Chinese soldier,
wielding a sword. The latter wore a green uniform, dark glasses and a cap with a red
star. At first, people didn't seem quite sure what to make of him, but later, as he kept
back the crowd with extravagant sweeps of his sword, people smiled or laughed.
However, as at Aizhai and Shanjiang, I was told by residents that activities of this
kind were not as popular as they used to be, that people preferred activities such as
basketball. There are several possible reasons for this. One is that, as is commonly
said, people are more interested in what they perceive as urban matters. Another is
that, as people's horizons are expanded by migration, inter-village relations are no
longer so important. Also, as I have suggested, festivals of this kind, organised by
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officials from the local Cultural Station and removed from social context have little
in the way of social or religious meanings for the participants.
In contrast, inter-village basketball tournaments are highly popular. An inhabitant of
Daxingzhai said that between the 1 Oth and the 15th of the lunar month there had been
a basketball competition at Daxingzhai involving teams from a large number of other
townships, including a team from a mine in Huayuan country. When asked how the
village could arrange such a big competition, he said that it was very popular in the
area and could get a lot of support. Ironically, basketball appears to be more
meaningful than much of the supposedly traditional activity both here and in
Guizhou (Schein 1993: 272). Liang said that, in West Hunan, as with lion dancing in
the past, basketball matches are a way to foster relations between villages. If a
village is playing at home against a village with whom they are friendly, and the
away team keeps losing, the home team allows them to win because they want the
girls from the village to admire the young men from the other village and 'talk love'
with them.
Schein (1993: 13) argues that in looking at Miao cultural practices, we need to get
beyond the 'spurious dichotomy between the authentic and the manufactured.'
Certainly, the involvement of local government officials in these festivals did not
preclude them from being occasions of social interaction. However, I suggest that
when looking at the festivals it is useful to keep in mind the difference between the
spontaneous and the officially planned and not to underestimate the influence of the
Cultural Departments in the promotion of local festivals. Chao suggests that the
modification of minority culture by local officials is politically motivated. Writing
of the official promotion of Naxi minority culture, she argues that
the promotion of ethnicity involves local and state efforts to appropriate, invent, and
represent ethnic tradition for the purposes of controlling indigenous cosmology and creating
local subjectivities (Chao 1996: 212).
Wu (1989: 15) suggests that these 'officially sponsored festivals, officially
sanctioned religious celebrations, and officially approved songs, dances and
costumes' all act to create images of unified minority cultures, particularly in areas
where the officially classified minority itself is not locally perceived as an entity.
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The festivals appear, then, to be attempting to fulfil a number of functions. They
present a positive image of the minority areas, they provide an alternative to religious
or 'superstitious' activities at New Year and they represent an officially sanctioned
West Hunan Miao identity. However, in view of the widely held belief that these
festivals are less popular than before, they are not wholly successful in this. In the
remainder of this chapter I consider two New Year activities which continue to be
popular. The first is Jishou City's New Year procession, which is a relatively
sophisticated spectacle, and the second is an unofficial festival in which the Cultural
Department plays no role.
New Year in Jishou
I have suggested that one reason why traditional festivals are loosing support is
because of the growing appeal of popular urban culture and the widespread
popularity of Jishou City's own New Year activities seems to support this. While
urban people showed no interest in going to rural festivals, the New Year procession
in Jishou, arranged by the Propaganda Department (Xuan Chuan Ju), was popular
with people from both the rural areas and the city. The crowds it drew included
Jishou people and country people, and some women wore their best Miao tunics. On
the morning of the procession, people gathered along the side of Jishou's main street
and waited.
As with the rural festivals, part of the appeal of this event was the chance to buy
things. Although there was no market, there were a few stalls around the main cross¬
roads at the centre of Jishou. Here one could buy locally produced foodstuffs, such
as bottles of honey and sugar cane, as well as cheap manufactured products such as
red balloons with double happiness characters on them9, paper lanterns, fold up
dragons, paper windmills and cheap plastic toys.
The event consisted of a highly organised procession, the participants in which were
members of work units and other urban associations, such as the Old People's
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Associations. At the start, police on motorbikes kept the onlookers back but after
they had gone past, people crowded onto the road, including journalists and TV
cameramen, many of whom directed their attention towards me, the only Westerner
present. The procession included a dragon and a lion dance, both from Jishou
schools. The lions were neater and more colourful than the ones I had seen at the
rural festivals. These were followed by a procession of decorated floats with school
children depicting various scenes. The first floats showed current political issues;
one, for example, had three children in red jumpers and the characters 'Hong Kong
comes back' (Xiang Gang hui gui). Another had a girl and boy with a doll and the
slogan 'One Child is Best.' There were also floats with children representing the
armed forces and soldiers, peasant and intellectuals, followed by others who were
presenting scenes of various stories from ancient Chinese history.
The procession was not characterised by a particularly strong minority theme, but
one of the performances featured retired people from one of the Old People's
Associations where the women were dressed in Miao costume and jewellery. I was
told by a Jishou resident that they 'used to be Miao' or had Miao ancestry. Some of
them were beating a drum on the back of an open truck. The rest, all women, walked
along behind, smiling. Some of them looked particularly embarrassed. The people
in the crowd behind me were enjoying everything, but this one struck them as
particularly appealing (you wei, lit. appetising or interesting).
There were some similarities between this rather politicised event and the rural
festivals, such as the use of lion dancing and drums. In this case, however, the Miao
performance from the members of the Old Peoples' Association was particularly
unrepresentative of everyday life. It was almost a caricature of the much younger
urban women who are dressed up in Miao costume to represent the area in dances
and at conferences (see Chapter Three). But touches such as this and the use of
children to represent political themes meant that the event, though politically
motivated, was entertaining. This, it appeared, was the intention. Later I was
introduced to the head of the Propaganda Department who specifically asked whether
I had enjoyed it, and he was pleased to hear that I had.
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Opportunities to participate in this event were even more limited than at the rural
festivals. People were there as spectators, but this may have been part of its appeal
since it was an urban, colourful and sophisticated event, not so different from
processions seen on national television at New Year.
An Unofficial New Year Festival: The Dragon Dance at Majingao
The Jishou New Year procession was not the only New Year activity which appealed
to people from both urban and rural backgrounds. My final example is a New Year
dragon dance which takes place in the Han village of Majingao on the thirteenth,
fourteenth and fifteenth of the first lunar month.10 The tradition of burning the
dragon, usually in the form of throwing firecrackers, is widespread in China, and in
Majingao it was taken particularly seriously.
The Majingao event is unusual in the Jishou area in that it is arranged by the
inhabitants of the village, without any input from the Cultural Department or local
Cultural Station. The fact that a Han village rather than a Miao one has taken this
initiative is probably an indication that people in Han villages are less discriminated
against, slightly richer and more influential than people in a Miao speaking village
and so have less to fear from putting on an unofficial display. Miao people take part
only as spectators, but it is also an occasion when young Miao people can 'talk love'.
It was dark when we arrived in Majingao and there was an air of excitement which
had been lacking in the other festivals. In the newer part of Majingao there were
three dragons, surrounded by crowds of people. Above them, on the balconies of
work units, people were holding bamboo pipes, each one fitted at one end with a
bamboo funnel which was filled with gunpowder and emitting a shower of sparks.
Every so often, there was the sound of a muffled explosion and people gasped at the
noise and drew back a little. When we got closer we saw that there were three teams,
each led by people playing cymbals, horns and drums and they were running with
their dragons under the sparks. I had been told that they had to dance skilfully to
avoid the showers of ignited gunpowder but, on the contrary, the young men,
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shirtless to avoid their clothes catching fire, charged into them, shouting and dancing
around under the sparks. The dragons were smouldering in places and would have to
be remade each night. Other people joined the dragon dancers, including wildly
excited children and groups of young men who linked arms and danced under the
sparks. One man walked under the sparks with a small child in his arms. No women
participated, though they were among the spectators.
The blurring of the division between participants and spectators, and the rowdy,
good-natured atmosphere, made this event completely different from the officially
organised festivals, which had, for the main part, been sober, aesthetically pleasing
performances. Zhang, a native of Majingao who usually participated in the dance,
was accompanying us. He later told us that when he arrived and heard the drums he
felt excited and wanted to join in. It was quite wild, he said, and it was more fun
than other festivals. He had to look after us that night, but he would come back the
next night and participate.
From the work units, the dragons moved into the narrow streets of the old part of the
village where, even for the spectators, the smell of gunpowder was sometimes
overwhelming. Bits of smouldering dragon brushed over people in the crowd, who
had to turn away to protect their faces, but no-one seemed to mind. Later in the
evening, the tail of one of the dragons broke off as two dancers tried to go in
different directions and this caused much laughter. Bottles of beer were drunk, there
were friendly confrontations between the teams, performers and observers mingled
and both were showered with sparks.
However, this festival differed from official festivals in other ways besides its
boisterousness and the chance to participate. The performance of the dragon dance
was concerned with the village as a whole in a way that the reconstructed minority
festivals had not been. The dragons had to follow a set route through Majingao, and
Zhang mentioned several times that it was important that no family was missed out,
even if the members of that family were not burning the dragons that night. Each
family has a bamboo pole for burning gunpowder, which they must use to burn the
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dragon. In this they were, in an overt and obvious way, including the whole village
in the ritual11. Nor was it confined to private houses. Work units were also visited,
as was the local government, and Zhang told us that the following night, government
officials would attend the festival.
The ostensible purpose of the dragon dance and dragon burning was to bring good
luck to Majingao, and people in the crowd were overheard saying that if it was not
performed, some disaster would befall the village. It also brought luck to individual
families within Majingao, and it is particularly important for a family to burn the
dragon if they have been lucky over the previous year. The need for good fortune
has certainly not decreased in recent years. While opportunities to make money have
increased with the freedom to involve oneself in private enterprise, the removal of
the commune system has led to increased insecurity for many rural people, who are
not benefiting from economic reforms (cf Flower and Leonard 1997: 214-5).
According to my companions, there were various indications of the supernatural
nature of the event. Zhang told us that although the sparks from the gunpowder
might land on peoples' skin and make a mark, this would never become infected.
Liang Zhaohui said that he'd lived in Majingao for ten years and never heard of a
building being burnt down as a result of the flying sparks, and he thought that this
was strange.
The final part of the festival takes place when the dragon has been declared dead. On
the sixteenth day of the first lunar month, which is market day in Majingao, if a
dragon team has some money left over, the leader will buy some meat. The team
then processes round the village accompanied by drums and cymbals, announcing
that tonight they will eat the meat of the dragon and anyone who wants to can come
and join them. People go along to the dragon dance leader's house for a taste of the
dishes and this is also said to bring good luck. In ordinary life it is not, of course,
normal practice to eat in each other's homes without a personal invitation. Even
when an invitation is issued people often refuse, making excuses that it will give the
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host trouble (mafan ni). Again, this part of the festival demonstrates solidarity
among villagers in an overt way.
This, then, was not a reconstructed, aesthetic, performance or an attempt to preserve
a tradition. Nor was it concerned with developing 'the economics and culture of the
minority' or with elaborating cultural diversity. The teams of shirtless young men
were, to the sophisticated eye, an uncouth sight. However, the festival also attracted
people from Jishou because it was wild and exciting, and local people because they
were concerned with the consequences for good fortune. Like Bakhtin's carnival, it
was not a spectacle but something to participate in (cf Bakhtin 1994: 198). This,
again, implies that the declining popularity of officially organised festivals may not
be simply a result of increasing interest in urban popular culture but also because
they deal only with 'healthy' secular activities.
Conclusions
Official rural festivals are intended to present Miao people as a happy, united group
with particular features which differentiate them from the Han Chinese. However,
they are events which have been removed from their former contexts and reworked
into situations where distinctions between performer and observer are clearly
demarcated, with further divisions between officials, who attend on stage, and
ordinary people. Scheiffelin writes that 'the power of performativity turns crucially
in its interactive edge, and hence on the nature of the relationship between
'performers' and others' (1998: 200). I suggest that the lack of interaction between
performers and observers is closely connected to the lack of relevance which these
occasions have for the people observing them.
This is not to imply that the occasions are not enjoyed for a variety of reasons. Like
ordinary market days, they are a chance to dress up and meet other people and to
look at and buy manufactured products. In the case of New Year festivals, this
includes migrants back for the New Year holidays. However, while the popularity of
urban spectacle is demonstrated by the large crowds of people, both urban and rural,
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who attend the Jishou New Year Procession, at all the official rural festivals I
attended, I was told by local residents that they were less popular than in the past.
The festival at Majingao presents a strong contrast with the official promoted
occasions. The visiting of every family and the invitation to the whole village to
come and eat in a ritual of comensality underlines a perception of the village as an
entity. Equally important is the fact that the festival is believed to be instrumental in
bringing good fortune which, in a situation of out-migration and rural urbanisation is
highly relevant to the everyday experiences of the inhabitants, many of whom also
make up the observers. However, though this appears to be an alternative to the
government supported festivals, it cannot be seen simply as a form of resistance to or
conflict with the state, since the festival includes all parts of the village, including
work units and government offices, and government officials are invited by the
people to attend.
1 If it is a big minority festival the Minority Affairs Bureau (lMin Wei') may also be involved.
2 New Year celebrations, like temple festivals and the dates on which market days fall, are calculated
according to the Chinese Lunar calendar.
3 See Chapter Eight for a discussion of the Hmong/Miao conference.
4 See Schein (1993: 249) for a full description of one such occasion.
5 This appears to be form of ritual which, like lion and dragon dances 'trace[s] the points and the
shape marked by the stars of the Dipper, the so-called steps of Yu, the legendary sage who tamed the
rivers of China and revealed the map of the world to the founders of Daoism' (Feuchtwang 1992a:
55). For an in depth discussion of the history of the steps of Yu, see Anderson (1989)
6 A small two stringed musical instrument, played with a bow. The erhu is popular throughout most
of China.
7
On transvestism and shamanism, see Eberhardt (1968: 306).
8 This was a common pattern, 1 also came across politicised Miao songs and competitions (in this case
a rock throwing competition) at another New Year festival nearby.
9 -V-fa-
The Chinese character ( g t7 ) usually associated with weddings.
OQ
10 The lunar calendar was used in Imperial times for civil purposes. Today, ritual observances, such as
temple festivals and the calculating of auspicious days are still calculated by the lunar calendar. It is
also used in West Hunan, to calculate rural market days. Most commercially produced Chinese
calendars give both versions.
11 The teams were not necessarily all from Majingao. Sometimes, dragons from Han villages outside
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Chapter Five - History, Administration and Classification
The officially sponsored performances as vehicles for the representation of Miao
culture, which have been described in the previous chapter, derive from the
objectifying concerns of scholars and administrators. Such performances and the
related images of the Miao seek to characterise the whole area as 'minority'. This is
despite the fact that much of the social context of lowland West Hunan, the area in
which many of these images are found, is unmarked as Miao. Even as images of the
highland areas, these performances reveal more about the values and identity of local
government and visiting or non-local Han Chinese than they do about the highland
Kho Xiong people of West Hunan.
I begin this chapter by considering how the classification Miao, with its implications
of a separate and primitive people, is the work of Han Chinese and also of Western
scholars. I go on to show that during the Qing dynasty, the categorisation of the
population into Miao and Han was an important aspect of the administration of West
Hunan and that today, those who are concerned with the official classification of
ethnic groups in the region are usually educated urban people. This in turn raises the
question of the extent to which such classifications, though apparently informed by
distinctions made in terms of ancestry and descent, are or are not shared by others in
the population. It seems that in this wider setting contemporary distinctions of
identity and cultural difference are recognised and articulated in terms of a
vocabulary which appeals to a spatial idiom, that of the local (bendi) and the non¬
local.
'Miao' as a Scholarly Term
Images such as those which I discussed in the previous chapter represent Miao
people as a distinct and separate group. Such images form part of what Harrell
(1994a) describes as the 'Chinese civilising project', in which the centre, in this case
Han Chinese culture, attempts to transform the periphery, that is the minority peoples
(3). He writes that, from the Ming dynasty onwards, there have been a number of
'civilising projects', Confucian, Christian and Communist, each of which resulted in
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'asymmetrical dialogues between the center and the periphery' (7).1 All of them
involved the administration and education of the minority people and of central
importance to each was 'to define, to objectify, the objects of their civilising project'
(Harrell 1994a: 8), that is, to classify and describe them as separate groups.
A view of the Miao as a separate and distinct people is held by Chinese and Western
scholars alike, and is vividly conveyed in the following quotation from Savina (1928:
quoted in Geddes 1976) in his Histoire des Miaos;
Living continuously on the heights, away from all other Asiatics, these men speak a
particular language unknown by all those who surround them, and wear a special dress
which is seen nowhere else (Geddes 1976: 3).
However, a consideration of the history of the classification 'Miao' indicates that the
term, implying a unified, discrete Miao people, is a construction employed by
Chinese and Western scholarship and the Chinese administration. The people who
today are officially classified as Miao, did not necessarily view themselves, and
others included in the designation Miao, as belonging to the same group. Before
1949, they did not use the word 'Miao' to describe themselves, since, until recently,
it was a derogatory term, meaning 'barbarian' and, of course, a Chinese rather than a
Kho Xiong term. A study of the usage of the term Miao is, therefore, revealing about
perceptions, by others, of Miao people as a primitive, indigenous and homogenous
group.
According to Ruey Yih-fu (1962), over the centuries the designation 'Miao' has been
used in at least three different ways. Firstly, it was used to refer to a legendary
group, the San-Miao, who are said to have lived between about 2,300 and 2,200 BC.
Later, between 200 BC and 1200 AD, the term was equivalent to 'barbarian', and
Ruey Yih-fu writes that 'the designation Miao is somewhat loosely used as an
equivalent of the collective term Man or Nan-Man covering various ethnic groups in
the regions concerned' (Ruey Yih-fu 1962: 182).
Only after this did it come to refer to the people sharing particular cultural and
linguistic features, who are today called the Miao. But even then the term designated
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one of a number of barbarian groups as is indicated when Ruey Yih-fu writes that in
the 1190's,
In his preface to Chu Fu's Ch 'i-Man Ts 'ung-hsiao or Funny Things of the Stream
Barbarians, Yeh Ch'ien pointed out that there were five kinds of aborigines, known
collectively as the Wu-ch'i Man or the Barbarians of the Five Streams, namely, the Miao,
Yao, Lao, Chuang and Keh-lao (Ruey Yih-fu 1962: 182-3).
As the title of the book from which this is taken, Chu Fu's Ch 'i Man Ts 'ung-hsiao
(Funny Things of the Stream Barbarians), suggests, the term continued to be used in
a derogatory sense, in this case representing Miao people as objects of amusement.
In addition to its usage, the character Miao itself has connotations of the primitive or
less than human. Another meaning of this character is 'plant shoot', with
implications of the immature and this has implications of 'aboriginal tribes with the
added connotation of "uncivilised"' (Geddes 1976: 14). A further association which
Chinese writers have made is with cats, some saying that Miao people were
popularly supposed to have tails, and Geddes writes that 'The implication of the cat
association therefore seems to be the same as that implied by the other derivation of
the name: the Miao were a wild species' (1976: 14-5).
Within the category Miao, the Chinese have identified and named different
subgroups. These were usually based on features of costume but, as Geddes writes,
'other characteristics were used also, often of an uncomplimentary kind, making
up a weirdly exotic list.' These included names such as 'the Tooth-Knocking Miao,
the Dog-Ear Miao, the Horse-Saddle-Flap Miao' (1976: 15). Similarly, Lin Yueh-
Hwa writes that;
A sub-group of the Hua Miao are the La-pa [Trumpet] Miao; a sub-group of the Ch'ing
Miao are the Ch'ing-t'ou [Blue Flead] Miao; sub-groups of the Hei-Miao are the Kao-p'o
[Steep Slope] Miao and Shan [Mountain] Miao (Lin Yueh-Hwa 1940: 279).
These terms are clearly derogatory and based on observations by others rather than
indigenous terms.
Moreover, these terms have not been used exclusively in China. Western writers,
even those who profess a great deal of concern for minority peoples, have used the
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same terms. Thus Hudspeth, a missionary who worked among Miao people, writes
that Miao are,
divided into a great many tribes, numbering, it is said, more than fifty. They are often
called from the colour of their clothes, Black Miao, White or River Miao, Red Miao,
Magpie Miao (Hudspeth 1937: 9).
These are quite different from the indigenous naming practices I have described in
Chapter Three.
Another feature evident in much scholarly material on the Miao is that, though now
divided into different sub-groups, they have a common origin. For example, Wang
Huiqin writes that previously Miao people had 'only one common origin, one
common history, one common language' (1987: 1). Geddes and Tapp point out that
Chinese scholars often suggest that the original ancestors of the Miao were a group
known as the San Miao, who lived in the north eastern province of Gansu 4,000
years ago (Geddes 1976: 7, Tapp 1989: 174), and Schein, suggests that this
assumption 'bestows the dignity of great antiquity and a standing in the documentary
record' (Schein 1993: 25). However, these Chinese accounts are based on Miao
legends and Chinese writings and it is difficult to argue for a common origin for the
Miao people since it seems likely that the story of the San Miao cannot be taken as
historically accurate. This point is made by Ruey Yih-fu, who writes,
we shall never be able to trace the Miao who now inhabit south China and north Indo-
China back to their original seat or to say precisely where they had their beginning (Ruey
Yih-fu 1962: 181).
Though in saying this he does imply that they have an 'original seat'.
It may be the case that the people now classified as the Miao developed their broadly
similar cultural characteristics as a result of a common history rather than a common
origin. Tapp suggests that 'much of what passed for specifically Hmong, Yao, Lisu
or Lahu social organisation formed part of a 'common conceptual system' which had
in the past been shared with the ancestors of the southern Han Chinese and from
which ethnic identities had themselves evolved' (1990: 116). I have already
suggested that the people now classified as the Miao may have diverged from the
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southern Han Chinese more as a result of different historical experiences than
because of a different ultimate origin.
In addition to the difficulty in determining origin, there is considerable evidence that
Miao people are not as culturally different from other groups as their classification
and the description of them such as 'stranger and traveller for five thousand years'
(Savina: Geddes 1976: 7) suggests. This is particularly the case with respect to
another classified group, the Yao, since the Miao and Yao peoples share strong
cultural and linguistic similarities and are often referred to collectively as
'Miao/Yao'. It can also be argued that Miao people share many cultural
characteristics with the Chinese. Tapp (1990), writing on northern Thailand,
suggests that Western anthropologists have assumed certain aspects of culture,
particularly material culture, to be specifically Hmong because they had come across
such artefacts among the isolated Hmong populations of Thailand and Laos.
However, they are in fact typical of south China as a whole and in this respect the
uniqueness of Hmong culture has been exaggerated.
Moreover, an indication of the obscurity of the meaning of the term 'Miao' and the
doubts that can be cast on any assumption that it refers to a separately identifiable
ethnic group can be seen from Shiratori's work. Shiratori argues that Miao were
subjects of the Yao people and that 'Miao' was 'originally a family name of the Yao
which was adopted as a family and tribal name by their subjected tribes' (1966: 151).
This is an individual view but one which draws attention to the complexity of the
situation.2
The evidence suggests that Miao are not in fact so different in origin from other
peoples of South China, and that their categorisation has had associations with the
notion of a primitive 'Other' long before the creation of the images I have discussed
in Chapter Three.
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Classification of Minorities in the Twentieth Century
After 1949, administrators were, of course, no longer recruited from the gentry
classes. However, as Harrell implies when he includes the Communists in China's
ongoing civilising project, some similarities in the approach to the classification of
minority peoples remain. The scholarly classification of Miao people, which I
describe above, has its counterpart today in the official classification of minority
nationalities.
The Chinese government has, since 1949, established a systematic classification of
ethnic groups throughout China, as I described in Chapter One. Heberer (1989: 39)
writes that although the opinions of minority groups themselves were taken into
account, this classification of nationalities has not always reflected 'everyday life and
everyday ethnic relations' (Harrell 1990: 519). In some instances the process has
subsumed people of different languages and cultural practices under the label of a
single nationality. This has been the case with the Miao, as I have mentioned above,
and also the Yi (Harrell 1990: 522, 1994b) and the Naxi (McKhan 1994). Other
writers describe how classification on the basis of language sometimes resulted in
contradictions (Ramsay 1987: 271), and that the categories were drawn up by
minority elites (Cheung 1996b: 4,188). In West Hunan the classifications Miao and
Tujia included many Chinese speaking people of minority ancestry who had
previously been considered to be Han.
It has been suggested that the formal definition of these categories since 1949 has
resulted in the development of a new sense of ethnic minority identity among those
categorised (Gladney 1991: 302, Harrell 1994a: 29-30). This is taken to be evident
in claims to ethnic identity among people who had formerly insisted that they were
Han, as in the case of the people now formally classified as the Bai of Yunnan (Wu
1989: 14).
There is evidence that a similar situation has arisen where Miao are concerned.
Schein writes that although, until recently, 'the name "Miao"' was 'derogatory, used
mostly by Han and outsiders,' a decision was made by the post 1949 government 'to
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adopt it without its original connotations' on the basis of linguistic similarities
between peoples referred to as 'Miao'. Now, she writes, people use the term to refer
to themselves and 'although a striking degree of cultural diversity obtains within this
group, the subgroups are said to recognise each other as co-ethnics' (1986: 77). A
similar situation is described by Diamond (1994: 115). However, both writers point
out that this recognition of ethnic unity is found largely among the elite, educated
people, and it seems possible that among others it is not widespread. In West Hunan,
I found that although people might define themselves as Miao, they showed little
knowledge of, or interest in, Miao people outside Hunan, apart from those just over
the Guizhou border who also speak Kho Xiong3.
In recent years, there have been several cases where groups of people have contested
their officially designated nationality, claiming that they belong to a smaller
nationality which has been subsumed under one of the larger nationalities in the
official classification system (Harrell 1990: 524-5, Wu 1990: 2). One of the best
recorded cases is that of the Ge people of east Guizhou who are involved in a
continuing struggle to be recognised as Ge rather than Miao (Cheung 1996b: 240). A
similar situation occurred in West Hunan where people talk of how the Tujia there
were also originally designated as Miao and the change was made after a delegate
from the area visited Beijing. However, by seeking a change in classification, these
movements are not contesting the classificatory system itself. As Cheung writes of
the Ge, in their struggle to change categorisation from Miao to Ge, 'it is through the
process of self-representation (such as the writing of official minzu [nationalities]
history) according to the master narrative of the minority institution in which they are
groomed that the native elite transform their local identity into an institutionalised
minority identity' (Cheung 1996b: 245).
The implication of these classifying projects, like that of the images of minorities I
discussed in the previous chapters, is that the minorities are discrete, classifiable
entities. In contrast to this emphasis on ethnic variety and difference, Han Chinese
culture itself appears, by implication, homogenous and continuous. Later in this
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chapter, I consider how the development of a shared local identity in a minority area
such as West Hunan, challenges both these perceptions.
Administration of West Hunan in Late Imperial times
The classification of minority peoples has not simply been a scholarly exercise, it has
been of fundamental importance to the 'civilising project.' For example, in Guizhou,
during the Ming period, one of the first tasks for the administrators of newly settled
minority areas was to categorise the people in the region for which they were
responsible (Lombard Salmon 1977: 280).
In this section I discuss the administration of West Hunan, during the Ming and Qing
dynasty, and consider in particular the separation of the population of West Hunan
into 'Miao' and 'Han' as a means of effecting control. Since the writing of history
cannot be separated from the context in which it is written, I will introduce the
backgrounds of the three writers on whose work I base this account.4
One source which I make use of is Xiangxi Miaozu Diaocha Baogao (A Report on an
Investigation of the Miao of Western Hunan) by Ling Shun-sheng and Ruey Yih-fu.
This is based on research done in 1933 and was published in Chinese in 1947 and
later in translation in 1963. Ling and Ruey were non-local Chinese ethnographers
educated in the Western anthropological tradition and they collected their material
through interviews using local research assistants and short visits to villages.
Cheung (1996b) explains how, despite claims to be largely descriptive, their work is
strongly influenced by the early twentieth century western notion of the bounded
society. They focus on Sinicisation of Miao culture in a way which implies that it
used to be intrinsically different but that little of authentically Miao culture remained.
As Cheung writes, 'Ling and Ruey somehow grafted an "orientalist" strain of
Sinology onto the newly transplanted Western anthropological practice in China'
(Cheung 1996b: 78). However, they make detailed use of local historical records5
and their account provides useful insights if treated with care.
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After Ling and Ruey left, Shi Qigui, their Miao research assistant, continued to study
West Hunan, travelling around the area interviewing people. Of the sources
available, his account, with the almost identical title Xiangxi Miaozu Shidi Diaocha
Baogao (A Report of an Eyewitness Investigation of the Miao of West Hunan) (Shi
1986), comes closest to describing the area from the point of view of the highland
villages. Though published in 1986, most of this work was written before 1949,
during the Republican period, and much of it is a well supported critique of the
injustices of the local administration, the tun system, then in its last years.
Finally, I refer to the early twentieth century writer, Shen Congwen, and to Kinkley's
biography of the writer (Kinkley 1977). Shen Congwen was from an educated
Fenghuang family of mixed ethnic background and he wrote fiction and non-fiction
based on his life in West Hunan in the early part of the twentieth century. His
description of a vibrant local culture still has relevance to West Hunan today.
All these histories of West Hunan recount a series of incursions into border areas by
soldiers and settlers from what was then China proper, that is the people described as
the Han Chinese. I describe the history of West Hunan in more detail below but,
briefly, events unfolded as follows. Han Chinese soldiers first entered West Hunan
during the Han dynasty but were soon driven back by the indigenous people and by
disease. At this time the indigenous population, some of whom were later classified
as the Miao,6 practised shifting cultivation, rather than the wet rice cultivation of the
Han, they did not speak Chinese and were neither literate nor directly administered
by the Chinese state. Later, during the Yuan dynasty, forts were set up and a
tributary system was established, with local headmen acting as intermediaries (tu si).
The indigenous people who lived near to these forts, often developed close links with
the Han. In the Ming dynasty, the area was settled more heavily by Han Chinese,
including farmers and traders, many of whom had left Jiangxi Province as it became
overpopulated (Perdue 1987: 103). These incomers, like earlier Han Chinese
settlers, occupied the more fertile land in the valley floors. At the beginning of the
Qing dynasty the tu si system was abolished and, after a series of rebellions, the
control of West Hunan was reorganised as a military colony.
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In line with other writers, I continue to use the word Miao to denote the indigenous
people of West Hunan and Han to denote the incoming settlers. However, I suggest
that the history of interaction has resulted in a gradation of difference in which some
people were not easily classified as either Miao or Han. As I discuss, administrators,
including those in West Hunan used the term min (lit. civilians) to denote people who
encompassed incomers from the east, their descendants and the descendants of
indigenous people who had been assimilated. Although these people spoke the
Chinese language, many of them shared some traits with the unassimilated Miao.
The term min is not in current use but, when I write of lowland, West Hunan people
as local people or local Han it should be borne in mind that this term probably
includes people of mixed indigenous and Han ancestry. Likewise, although I refer to
other indigenous people as 'Miao' because this is the term used in the literature, I am
aware that it is a category constructed by scholars and administrators and, where
appropriate, I use terms less implicated in the official classification of the area, such
as highland and indigenous.
Pre-Qing Han Chinese settlement of West Hunan
At various periods, the administration of West Hunan has encouraged contact
between the unassimilated Miao and the lowland people, the min, and at other times
it has attempted to enforce a separation, as is indicated in the following brief history
of the early settlement of West Hunan.
Incursions by the Han into West Hunan began during the Han dynasty. The Imperial
general Ma Yuan, also known locally as Ma Fubo, led an expedition to the area in 49
AD but was driven back, and it is reported that he died there of malaria (Shi 1986:
33, Sutton 1989: 102). Major expansion into the area only began with the Ming
dynasty. Ling and Ruey write that a native head (i.e. a tu si) had been set up in the
area by the end of the Yuan dynasty and this practice was continued at the beginning
of the Ming, by which time the institution had been recorded by a Chinese
commander in chief in the settlement of Ganziping, a village not far from Qianzhou
(Ling & Ruey 1963: 148).
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This military settlement of the area was intended to be beneficial to the indigenous
people, who were by this time classified as the Miao. By the end of the 14th century,
the official Ying-lung was sent to establish a military station with 1,000 soldiers in
Jishou (then known as Chen-Ch'i suo). Ling and Ruey quote from Miao Fang Pei
Lan that
when the emperor went to the pavilion to send him on his way, he proclaimed, "I have a
single pellet of Miao territory, and I ask you to go ahead to open up headquarters for bringing
the barbarians under our administration. Do what is good for them and your descendants will
enjoy the use of the office without limit (Ling & Ruey 1963: 149).
Unassimilated indigenous people were organised to provide tribute and, as Ling and
Ruey write,
[t]he other 132 villages became a local army 'to protect the city moats.' When there were
uprisings then they would be called to service; when conditions were peaceful they would
disperse as civilians (Ling & Ruey 1963: 149).
This suggests that by the 14th century there was considerable contact between
incoming Han and the indigenous people, particularly those in the lowland areas.
This contact was intended to assimilate the lowland Miao who would then support
the Han against attack from other, unassimilated Miao.
However, only a proportion of the indigenous population mixed with the Han.
Conflicts arose between those termed the 'wild' Miao (i.e. unassimilated, usually
highland Miao) and the people in the lowlands. In 1615 a wall was built to keep the
'wild' Miao away from the lowlands because 'the garrison outposts were so scattered
and the Miao roads so rugged, it was difficult to defend against Miao incursions'
until a rebellion by the highland Miao in 1628 brought it down (Miao Fang-pei Lan:
Ling & Ruey 1963: 53). The area was continually occupied by soldiers, whose most
important task at the time was to keep communications open (Ling & Ruey 1963:
70). However, according to Ling and Ruey, '[t]he 7,800 guard troops in the Miao
area of the Ming dynasty were reduced to 1,600 men at the beginning of the Ch'ing
dynasty' (1963: 168), and once again there was considerable contact between the
Han and Miao people.
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In the early years of the Qing dynasty, between 1662 and 1722, the native headman
(,tu si) system was gradually replaced by direct rule by Chinese officials, a change
known as gai tu gui liu (changing from native headmen and going back to appointed
officials), which was instigated all over southern China. This was accompanied by
an official policy of attempting to integrate the indigenous people, allowing them to
intermarry with the Han Chinese and setting up schools to educate them into elite
Han Chinese culture (Rowe 1994, Ling & Ruey 1963: 168). I describe this policy,
which was being implemented all over Southwest China, in the following section.
By this time there had been an influx into the area of Han merchants and poor
peasants looking for land, and this appears to have been a factor in the ensuing unrest
among the indigenous population. Shi writes,
Manchu and Han officials and soldiers, unscrupulous merchants and wealthy men from the
'guest people' [i.e. the Han] crowded into the Miao area. They exploited and cheated the
Miao and annexed Miao property at will (Shi 1986).
And in the rebellions which followed, a rallying cry among the rebels was 'expel the
guest people and regain our old land' (Shi 1986: 42, Ling & Ruey 1963: 168).
Undoubtedly, the main supporters of the rebellions, which spread throughout West
Hunan and into neighbouring Guizhou between 1795 and 1806, were the people
classified as the Miao. In the Jishou area, Qianzhou was quickly occupied by the
rebels, and it was only after considerable expenditure by the state and great loss of
life on both sides, including those of high ranking Chinese officials and soldiers, that
the rebellion was put down.
However, despite the fact that officially they were described as the Miao rebellions,
an element of this movement was not so much anti-Han as anti-official. There were
disaffected Han among the rebels and Shi refers to the 'Han traitors' who had
instigated the rebellion (Shi 1986: 49 - 50). It seems probable that a situation had
developed not so different from that which developed in neighbouring Guizhou in
the mid-nineteenth century. There, as Jenks has pointed out rebellions, also officially
described as Miao rebellions, 'consisted of congeries of different revolts involving
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other ethnic minorities, Muslim (Hui), religious sects, secret societies, and
disgruntled Han Chinese' (Jenks 1994: 3). However, he suggests that because Miao
people were seen as naturally rebellious barbarians the blame was put on them and
'the onus was removed from the government for its role in precipitating the turmoil'
(Jenks 1994: 4). The situation in West Hunan was further complicated by the fact
that by no means all the people engaged in suppressing the rebellion were Han. Shi's
account gives numerous examples of Miao being enticed to betray their former allies
and winning peacock feathers as a sign of favour (Shi 1986: 51).
The Qing administration's answer to these rebellions was to initiate a strict division
of the population. As Ling and Ruey put it, 'the Manchu court realised that the time
was yet inopportune to change the Miao by teaching, and the blockage policy was
once again used' (1963: 168). The result was the tun system, a system of
administration unique to West Hunan in which much of the population became at
once peasants and soldiers, ready to be called upon should the need arise. The
system was instigated by Fu Nai in the last years of the 18th century. Fundamental to
it was the classification of the population of West Hunan into two groups, Miao and
min (civilian), who were to be separated and administered differently. Miao were
also divided into 'subdued' and 'wild' Miao and these again were administered
differently.
The term min here is probably not strictly equivalent to the term Han. It is likely
that, as in other parts of China, indigenous people who had been administered by the
Chinese state for some time were classified in this way.7 In this case, they probably
included lowland people of indigenous ancestry, and thus the term covers both Han
people descended from incomers and lowland people of indigenous descent who had
had close contact with the Chinese administration. The term min is no longer used
and, as I mentioned, when I write of the West Hunan 'Han' I am aware of the fact
that they probably include people descended from the min.
Presumably, this separation was instigated not simply in order to prevent harassment
of Miao by Han (or min) and vice versa but to prevent mixing between the two. Not
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only was there a danger that Miao and Han would find common cause for revolt,
there had also been a continuing process by which Han incomers became assimilated
with the indigenous highland minority people, that is, those classified as Miao, in
contradiction to the intended direction of the 'civilising project'. It was not
uncommon in China for incoming settlers to become assimilated with minority
people (Wiens 1967 208-9, Pu 1989: 35, Harrell 1989: 186, Lombard-Salmon 1977:
279, Tapp 1995: 209). We learn that, in West Hunan, some families 'became Miao'
during the Ming dynasty after arriving in the area from the east (Ling & Ruey 1963:
128). And Shi writes of a 'junior Wu' clan, who were originally from east China, but
had adopted Miao language and culture. In the late Qing they registered as Miao to
take advantage of the civil service entry quota for Miao officials (Shi 1986: 182). A
similar process is indicated by the fact that in east Guizhou, in 1727, Han incomers
were forbidden to marry Miao women on the grounds that their children would take
on Miao culture (Lombard-Salmon 1977: 225).
Under the tun system, however, the Han (or min) who had been living in the Miao
lands were forced to move out and 'no mixed inhabitation was allowed in the Miao
area' (Shi 1986: 49, 53). Apart from officials, min were not permitted to go into
Miao land, nor Miao into min land. Intermarriage was not permitted. All land was
taxed to support an army of local inhabitants, the Gan army, who could be called
upon to defend the area in the event of further rebellion. However, the population of
this part of West Hunan was effectively divided into three groups, the min, the 'tame'
(,shu) i.e. subdued Miao and the 'wild' (sheng) Miao, that is the highland Miao. The
min lived in fortified towns and villages (pao) which would also have included some
Miao who had been assimilated before the rebellions (Kinkley 1977: 245). The men
were divided into tun men and fighting men. The tun men received fields to
cultivate, and guarded the tun guard houses' (Ling & Ruey 1963: 182). The fighting
men were on hand to defend the area and to suppress any further rebellions.
A parallel system was set up for the subdued Miao. They were overseen by Miao
officers and lived in fortified towns and villages in the lowlands, in a system parallel
to that for the min but, unlike the tun system for the min, the soldiers also farmed.
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Land which had no owners after the rebellion and land which Han settlers had seized
from Miao people, was claimed by the government and granted to the subdued Miao,
but administered by the tun administration office.
The highland Miao continued to live in zhai, which were mazes of narrow streets, but
they too were overseen by Miao officers chosen by the Chinese administration.
Sometimes the officers were those who had won peacock feathers as a result of their
actions helping the government during the rebellion (Ling & Ruey 1963: 153). They
had a role similar to the old native headmen 'uniting in their persons judicial,
financial, and military command powers over all the Miao people in the five districts
[i.e. West Hunan]' (Kinkley 1977: 15).
Though scholars agree over the structure of the tun system, accounts of its effects on
the population differ greatly, reflecting the authors' different sympathies and sources.
Kinkley writes of a relatively benign system where 'military officers would hold
direct authority over most families, but only because most families themselves would
be connected with the military and enjoy at least a supplementary income from their
"soldiering,"' where, 'the Miao would finally be ruled by their own kind' and 'the
land would be nationalised and redistributed on behalf of the common defence, or
rather the public livelihood' (Kinkley 1977: 9). While Kinkley's account is based on
Shen Congwen's work and the official records, Shi's was based on interviews with
highland people in his own native area and he paints a much darker picture. He
stresses the cruelty of the Miao officers towards other Miao and the biased responses
of Han officials to disputes between Han and Miao (1986: 202-3, 221). He also
claims that the Han officials often mismanaged the Miao, at times passing on to the
Miao officers matters which they found too troublesome to deal with themselves and
at other times installing
hot tempered and incompetent Miao people to help them deal with problems. These Miao
officers can do nothing but act as puppets of the Han authorities, with whose support they
abuse their power tyrannically and bully the ordinary Miao masses (Shi 1986: 208).
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His account states that though some Han did enter the highland areas, interaction
between Miao and Han was tense. Miao women were sexually harassed by Han
males (Shi 1986: 208), relations between Miao and Han were hostile and
intermarriage between the two groups rare (Shi 1986: 207).
The picture which arises, then, is one in which the interaction which had been
occurring between incomers and indigenous people was discouraged by the
administrative system, in part, at least, to prevent the highland Miao people having
too great an influence on the lowland people that is, the incoming Han people, their
descendants and the descendants of the assimilated and 'tame' Miao people. This
was an attempt to draw a rigid demarcation around groups which had previously
been less sharply defined. Another effect of the drawing of this boundary was that
the rebellious elements in the population of West Hunan could later be subsumed
into the generalising description of Miao rebellion.
Education and the Civilising Project
During the Qing dynasty, the establishment of clear demarcations between Han and
minority paved the way for a further attempt to assimilate Miao people. This time,
rather than permitting intermarriage, something which had not resulted in what were
perceived as civilising effects, an attempt was made to bring minority people in line
with elite Chinese ways of life by teaching them wenhua (culture, or written culture).
Thus, rather than encouraging contact with Han peasants, with whom they had all too
much in common, the minority people were encouraged to align themselves with the
wen (culture) at the centre of Chinese culture. This was part of the emperor Yung-
cheng's 'extraordinary attempt to make orthodox ideology not only the ideological
pattern for the literati but also the political behaviour of everyone within the empire'
(Huang 1974: 188). In Guizhou, for example, charity schools were set up for
minority people 'to enforce the orthodox ideology and promote the imperial
authority' (Huang 1974: 297) through education in the Confucian classics. The
purpose of this was to effect hua (moral transformation) (Rowe 1994: 419).
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Education was closely associated with the control of minority peoples. While
scholars might describe this as 'promoting adherence to Confucian social obligation
and hierarchy' the emperor Yung Cheng regarded it as 'an instrument of control' and
even referred to it as "'mind-washing and thought-cleansing'" (Rowe 1994: 419).
West Hunan also took part in this process. Shi writes that, after the tun system had
been set up,
a certain amount of the tax levied on grain was appropriated to educate the Miao people
and scores of schools were set up to civilise the Miao and educate the Miao children (Shi
1986: 215).
This move, he writes, was popular with a number of Miao people. It was followed
by the reservation of a number of positions in the regional Imperial administration
for which only West Hunan Miao people were eligible, though they were not
permitted to rise further (Shi 1986: 215).
The transformation of minority people throughout China was not to be effected
solely through literacy and formal education, since cultural traits were also to be
changed. The institution of Confucian and Buddhist rituals was considered an
important part of this. Rowe writes of Ch'en Hung-mou's schools for minority
children in 18th century Yunnan, that he 'devoted a major part of his schools'
curriculum to instruction in etiquette and ceremony, including visits to the Confucian
temple twice a month' (Rowe 1994: 438) and Zhang (1994) writes of the importance
of schools and Confucian temples in 'disseminating Confucian thought' (126).
Everyday practice was also targeted. One of the most important criteria for assessing
the minority peoples of Southwest China was 'whether or not they "knew shame"
(chih-ch 'ihy (Rowe 1994: 424). Sexual freedom, particularly among women, was a
particular target for change. In West Hunan Miao people were forced to wear
Chinese dress (Jenks 1994: 69) and this was part of a wider trend in Southwest China
(Huang 1974: 297). As mentioned above, Ling and Ruey (1963: 310) write that in
the 1940s, Miao people were reluctant to speak about drum dances because they
knew that such dances were considered to be licentious.
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However, the project had only limited success. As Jenks' quote from the Qianlong
emperor's edict of 1751 indicates, the successful education of minorities was not
considered to be straightforward. According to the edict,
the Miao people are by nature stupid. It would be very difficult to make them
comprehend the meaning of the Four Books [i.e. the Confucian Classics]. Yet after
they are taught to read, it is extremely easy for them to peruse novels and other vile books
(Jenks 1994: 44).
The employment of education as a means of integrating the population of China has
continued since 1949. Attempts have been made to design bilingual education texts
for primary schools in minority areas, but education at secondary and tertiary levels
is almost always in Chinese. Moreover, political education often underlines the
importance of a unified Chinese identity. Postiglione argues that one of the aims of
Chinese education today is to achieve national integration by 'the socialisation of a
new national person' including members of minority nationalities (1992: 329). He
refers in particular to the education of an elite, but a similar process can be seen in
the moral and political education which is found in schooling at all levels and in both
Han and minority areas. For example the first of the 'Rules for Primary School
Education' is 'Ardently love the motherland, the people, and the Chinese Communist
Party, Study well and make progress every day' (Price 1992: 221).
The practices of those classified as minority people have not been the only ones to be
targeted by attempts to civilise through education. In Imperial times the educated
elite also regarded many peasant practices as heterodox. As Rowe writes, 'the
achievement of moral-cultural uniformity through ch 'iao-hua [moral transformation]
was a persistent theme of Confucian reformers in dealing with folk traditions in the
Han areas themselves' (Rowe 1994: 421). A similar attitude to local Chinese culture
persists today (Tapp 1995: 196, M. Cohen 1991: 122). In particular, this can be seen
in the attempts by the Chinese government today to contain 'superstitious' practices,
many of which are also considered to be local practices (Feuchtwang & Wang 1992:
262, Anagnost 1994: 222-3).
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It appears that, in intention at least, the educational projects in China have constituted
a form of state hegemony. They have aimed to integrate the people of China by
encouraging them to identify themselves with a standardised idea of what it means to
be Chinese and by doing so to absorb notions of hierarchy and the authority of the
emperor. The attempt to integrate by means of education has not, of course, been
confined to China. For example, Weber writes of the socialising and centralising
affects of French schooling in the nineteenth century that 'there were no better
instruments of indoctrination and patriotic conditioning' (1977: 333). And the aims
of the educational project in China would appear to parallel Gellner's description of
the modern nation state, where the creation of Targe centrally educated, culturally
homogenous units' are produced through education within which 'local sub-units of
society are no longer capable of reproducing' (1983: 33-4).
However, Chinese attempts to foster integration through education have not been
entirely successful. My intention in the remaining chapters of this thesis is to
consider how a sense of locality continues to be produced through the recreation of
temples. In the remainder of this chapter, however, I turn to a discussion of the
diversity of practices and points of view found among the people classified as the
Han Chinese. To do this, I consider the literature on 'Chineseness' generally, before
moving on to look at the situation in West Hunan.
The Heterogeneity of the Han Chinese
The civilising project is intended to promote an idea of a homogeneous, civilised
Han Chinese culture which contrasts with 'barbarian' diversity. It does not therefore
draw attention to the diverse aspects of Han Chinese culture, often referred to as
local cultures, which are found throughout China. Indeed, Gladney suggests that the
images of minorities themselves are intended to promote this notion of a
homogeneous Han culture. By emphasising the diversity of the minorities, it
distracts from the diversity within the Han (Gladney 1994: 99). As I discuss below,
much of the considerable diversity found within China is nonetheless considered to
be part of Han Chinese culture. Despite their divergence from elite culture, local
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cultures are still considered to be Chinese, that is, separate from minority culture. An
area like West Hunan, however, presents a problem. Distinctions between local Han
and minority practices become blurred and uncertain making it hard to classify.
Han Chinese culture is seen by many Western scholars to have only a superficial
uniformity, imposed on great regional diversity (e.g. Jenner 1992: 228). As Gladney
writes, 'Ethnic differences within Han society, while readily accepted as separate
cuisines, cultures, and languages outside of China, within China are regarded as local
dishes, customs and dialects' (Gladney 1991: 306). Writers such as these stress the
considerable amount of local diversity in China. At provincial level, different
localities can often be distinguished by dialect, cooking style and other cultural
practices (Crissman 1967: 185-6, Gladney 1991: 306).
The Han Chinese also perceive differences among themselves. For example, Han
Chinese people who migrate from China to other parts of Asia develop communities
based on place of origin and dialect. They may at different times, draw on wider or
narrower group identifications, based on province, county or town. Alternatively,
common surname may be used as the basis for forming a community (Crissman
1967: 190-1, Guldin 1984: 146, Blake 1981). Within China, there is considerable
emphasis on tongxiang relationships. Today, in the People's Republic, a person
with whom one shares a place of origin is referred to as a tong xiang (lit. 'person
from the same village', but used more widely to mean 'from the same locality'). In
Late Imperial times, the importance of tong xiang loyalty was indicated by the large
numbers of merchant guilds and self-help societies in Chinese cities and among
overseas Chinese, based on place of origin (Skinner 1976). The tong xiang
relationship still implies a considerable amount of trust. Gamble writes that in
Shanghai, migrant workers from out of town are often employed by someone from
their home area (1996: 248). In West Hunan, students whom I met at schools or at
Jishou University, made friends with and depended on their tongxiang, even if they
were not acquainted before. Tongxiang relationships could be made quite casually.
For example, friends who visited me from Shaoyang county trusted a street vendor
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enough to leave their bags with her because they recognised her from her dialect as a
tong xiang.
Nonetheless, there are common factors among the Han Chinese and Cohen writes
that '[tjaking this Han or ethnic Chinese culture as a whole, there can be no doubt
that the historical trend in premodern times was toward increasing uniformity' (M.
Cohen 1991: 114). For example, Chinese is commonly held to be a unifying
element. The Han themselves consider it to be a single, common language, despite
including several branches, as well as the considerable variation in dialects (difang
hua, lit. the speech of a place) which are found, especially in Southeast China
o
(Ramsay 1987: 16, 2If.). This and other factors must have been, at least in part, a
result of the attempts at integration through education described above. Cultural
homogeneity among the elite during Imperial times could to some extent be
accounted for by the importance of the works of Confucius, works on which 'they
consciously modelled their own social norms'(Ward 1965: 115). Since educated
people all over China sat examinations set on these works, in the hopes of achieving
official positions, they were influential in unifying elite culture (Ward 1965: 115, M.
Cohen 1991: 116). However, it is also claimed that certain aspects of life, such as
'features of family organisation' and death rituals, show considerable similarity
throughout the whole of Han Chinese culture, rather than just the elite (M. Cohen
1991: 116, see also Watson 1988). Watson also suggests that it was orthopraxy, the
'standardization of ritual', which has contributed most to 'the creation and
maintenance of a unified Chinese culture' (Watson 1988: 3), and Cohen extends this
argument to suggest that an orthopraxy of etiquette was also a unifying factor (M.
Cohen 1991: 117).
Drawing on this evidence of disparate and common factors, the argument that
'Chineseness' (Siu 1991: 19) is characterised by both unity and diversity, has been
put forward by several writers (e.g. Fei 1988, Siu 1991: 20, Johnson et al. 1985: xi,
M. Cohen 1991: 121). For example, Watson (1988: 17) shows that during the Ming
and Qing dynasties, there were nine aspects of death ritual which were uniform
among the Han Chinese, including wearing white and the burning of spirit money
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and these were seen as evidence of the uniform nature of Han culture. However, he
also points out that in other aspects the rituals differed considerably from place to
place and might even contain elements which were considered disgusting by Han
from other parts of China.
It appears to me that today, it is by discussing and comparing these differences that
Chinese people confirm their sense of common identity. Variations of dialect and
cooking are topics of conversation which are common, perhaps even de rigeur,
among strangers from different parts of China who meet casually while travelling.
They are also a stock component of many comic routines which are performed on
television and, by amateur performers, at parties. However, these differences are
recognised as variations on a common theme. Though they may fail to conform to
the highest standards of orthodoxy, they are still accepted as Chinese and therefore
contribute to a sense of shared identity.
It appears then that, if the Chinese are indeed unified, it is the notion of being
Chinese which unifies people, rather than a common interpretation of what it means
to be Chinese. Writers on Han Chinese in the People's Republic of China are struck
by people's insistence that their way of life, however different from that of the elite,
is Chinese. For example, Guldin writes that the Guangdongese, who are seen in the
rest of China as having a local cuisine and dialect regard themselves as 'if not the
originators of Chinese culture, at least its best executors' (1984: 141). Similarly, the
Tanka boat people, despised as unorthodox by their neighbours on land, consider
their marriage and foot-binding practices to be more correctly Chinese than those of
their neighbours (Ward 1965: 114). Gamble, too, finds that the Shanghai people,
though they regard themselves as very different from other Chinese people,
particularly peasants and Beijing people, speak of themselves first and foremost as
Chinese (Gamble 1996: 117).
Locality in West Hunan
As I have mentioned, border areas such as West Hunan present a challenge to the
idea of a Han culture which, however diverse, is still regarded as having an essential
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unity and being discontinuous with minority cultures. It is apparent from my
discussion of the min that lowland practices in West Hunan have been influenced by
contact with non-Han, indigenous people. In this section I consider the uncertain
border between what are seen as local Chinese practices and what are seen as
minority ones.
Some accounts of regional identities in China have suggested that the diversity found
in South China has grown out of the remnants of pre-Han cultures (e.g. Jenner 1992:
228, M. Cohen 1991: 119). Minority people are described as being subsumed into
Chinese culture (M. Cohen 1991: 114), acquiring the 'cultural symbols' of the
majority Han (Siu 1991: 22). Cohen suggests that as Han culture penetrated the
culture of the Bai minority of Yunnan, some local traits were maintained, but these
came to be considered an important aspect of being Chinese, and were transformed
into 'the identifiers used by the local elite to glorify their place of origin within
China' (1991: 122). The implication here is that cultural traits which had represented
differences between non-Chinese, minority peoples, were modified and contained
until they became considered as local traits, which were, and still are seen as
variations of a wider Chinese culture.
As I shall show below, this approach fails to take account of the interactive nature of
the encounter and the counter-vailing effects of minority peoples on the Han. A
situation which is closer to my field-work material is described by Watson. He
writes of how in Sichuan, Han people place the coffins of their relatives in caves, a
practice which has been influenced by minority peoples. In other respects, however,
their rituals conform with Han Chinese cultural practices (1988: 17). I go on to
consider the two way interaction between Chinese and minority influences.
It is undeniable that Han Chinese ways have been influential in West Hunan. As in
many parts of China, there has been widespread adoption of the Chinese language
and a Han Chinese way of life (cf Ebrey 1996: 24, Brown 1996). Shi writes that,
'
[i]n places near the Han regions, the Miao family structure has been completely
assimilated with Han customs' (1986: 171). He describes a group of Miao people
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who have become assimilated with the Chinese, and found that only people over 80
or 90 years old could speak a little Miao (Shi 1986: 160f.). This process is
continuing today. A teacher at one of the Jishou schools said that Miao people who
came to live in Jishou, such as his students, stop speaking Miao and try to lose any
trace of Miao accent in their Chinese because they want people to think that they are
Han. Young urbanised minority people sometimes deny that they are minority,
presumably because of its association with rural poverty. For example, I sometimes
heard young people claim that though their parents were minority, they were Han.
It is the Han Chinese culture which is associated with urbanisation and, as I have
discussed, television, Taiwanese pop music and karaoke have become widely
popular in the rural areas, including Kho Xiong speaking areas. In the villages of
Shizian and Pingshanpo twenty years ago, Kho Xiong was spoken and monkey
dances, a form of drum dancing, were performed. Today, it is hard to distinguish
them from other Chinese speaking villages, though the black turbans worn by the old
women are an indication that, as urban people say, 'they used to be Miao.' Recently,
the adoption of Chinese language and culture in formerly Kho Xiong speaking areas
has also accelerated. I was told that, in the past, one would often hear people speaking
Miao in Jishou and in the villages nearby but now even in villages far away from Jishou
you hear people speaking Chinese. Such changes are not surprising since today, as in
the past, Chinese language is required to advance in education and in work and even
to work as a migrant labourer.
However, the influence has worked both ways. Though it appears that at the
beginning of the Qing dynasty, West Hunan was characterised by 'an intense
community or sub-ethnic consciousness, sharpened by the heterogeneous origins of
the border region populations' (Jones 1978: 132), there is evidence that by the
beginning of the twentieth century a shared lowland culture had emerged. Though
the tun system had been intended to keep Miao and min peasants separate, in practice
it was impossible to enforce separation in the lowland areas and there was a gradual
merging of the lowland Miao with the min. This cannot be regarded simply as the
overwhelming of the indigenous culture, and Shen Congwen, who writes in the early
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part of this century, describes the merging of Han and lowland Miao when he writes
that, within Fenghuang city walls,
are Miao people comprising one out of every three persons, and Han people who have
been transported here from elsewhere making up the other two thirds, living together
interspersed. Although the majority of Miao people still live outside the city, you can
almost say that there has been a mutual assimilation in customs and ethnic characteristics,
like the alloying of tin and lead in the making of a pot (Shen Congwen 1928: 39; Kinkley
1977:247).
Rather than emphasising a distinction between Han and minority peoples, it might be
more helpful to consider the area from the point of view of a difference between the
centre and the border areas, where the centre is typified by literate, Chinese wen or
wenhua. As I mentioned in Chapter One, Yokoyama (1990) writes that 'the value of
"wen" united the Chinese state, and it continuously expanded its sphere of influence
towards the outside. In this "wen " centred structure of the society, the "tu" category
was marked as its peripheral area, where the influence of the "wen" had reached but had
not penetrated into the masses' (1990: 12-13). This situation has arisen in Yunnan
where, as in West Hunan, minority people, most famously the Bai, (Wu 1989,
Fitzgerald 1941, Hsu 1948, Yokoyama 1990), who were classified as Minjia, have
adopted aspects of Han Chinese ways of life.
However, rural Han can also be described as tu (Yokoyama 1990: 2). As Han people
live further from the centre, they are seen by those in the centre as having not just a
local culture but a border-area culture, one which is closer to that of minority people.
For example, incoming Han Chinese soldiers have adopted indigenous ways of life in
the border areas. Harrell (1989) writes of the Lipuo, who are descended from
marriages between Han soldiers and local people and who today maintain that they
are minority people. Yokoyama writes that in the early Qing dynasty, the Bai and the
Han soldiers were classified as minji (citizens) and junji (soldiers) respectively.
However, in republican times, the local Han and Bai were classified together as benji
(local) whereas city Han Chinese were registered as keji (guest people).9
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As I have indicated, contact with minority peoples also influences the incoming Han
with the result that local identities have arisen in Yunnan which are seen to be, as
Yang wrote of the people now classified as Bai, 'not quite minority, but not quite
Chinese either' and people of whom this can be said were classified under the term
min (1978: 23). A similar situation has arisen in lowland West Hunan today, where
an awareness of a shared locality is pronounced which does not classify people by
ethnic group. When I talked to people who lived in the Jishou area, I found that a
discussion of cultural practices almost always led to the word 'local' (bendi) being
applied to them, rather than the words 'Miao', 'Han' or 'Chinese'. The word 'local'
was also commonly applied to people and a contrast was commonly made between
local people (bendi reri) on the one hand and outsiders (xvai di ren), that is, those who
had come as party officials or teachers, to develop the area after 1949 or had come
more recently as small traders. Unlike the situation described by Gamble in
Shanghai (Gamble 1996: 117), West Hunan people did not draw a contrast between
me as a foreigner (wai guo ren), and themselves as Chinese, but talked of themselves
as 'we West Hunan people' (women Xiangxi ren) or, if they wanted to be more
specific, used the name of their village, as in 'we Yaxi people' (women Yaxi ren).
The salience of the local/non-local division is implied by the fact that a British
teacher, on being asked where he was from and replying that he was from Britain,
was told, 'Yes I could see that you are not local (bendi),' rather than, 'I could see that
you are not Chinese'.
Often, bendi is taken to refer to the unorthodox. Some practices, such as consulting
spirit mediums or worshipping a number of deities from different traditions in
temples which were nominally Buddhist, were also described to me as bendi and
these were often regarded by educated people, especially educated people who were
not local, as backward (luohou) or unorthodox. These are practices which can, in
fact, be found in many parts of China but local people are often unaware of this. As
Johnson (1985) writes of Late Imperial China, elite culture may permeate popular
culture through writing, but communication between different areas of local culture
is more problematic. This has the effect of strengthening the identification of
heterodox practices with locality.
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However, many of these practices are closely linked to what are generally considered
to be minority practices. For example, local (bendi) food included dishes of soured
vegetables and soured uncooked fish. These were made by leaving them over-night
in salted water and, in the case of the fish, in an airtight container. Although Chinese
historical sources describe these dishes as Miao and, indeed, as disgusting barbarian
food (Playfair 1876: 94-5), local people in the Jishou area never did so. Further
examples of practices which are generally considered to be minority, which in the
Jishou area were described as 'local' (bendi), are the burning-off of vegetation to
form temporary plots, hunting and the gathering of wild plants. These were also
practised by farmers who claimed Han nationality and were an appropriate response
to the mountainous, and in places almost uncultivable, terrain.
This situation suggests that, despite the attempts of the administration to separate
lowland people into Han and Miao a process of mixing and interaction has resulted
in a situation where it is hard to classify people as either Han or minority. In using
the term local (bendi) West Hunan people do not identify themselves as minority
people, and many do not see themselves in this way, but they do characterise
themselves as people of a particular area and a particular history. This is unsettling
to those from elsewhere, who depend on the drawing of clear boundaries between
Han and minority. Despite the fact that many lowland people claim that they are
Han and that their ancestors came from Jiangxi, people from outside West Hunan
often assume that all the inhabitants are minority people. Incomers to Jishou, many
of whom are teachers or government cadres, explain that local people are lazy, they
keep to their own way of doing things and are hard to get to know because they are
minority people. Further evidence for their minority status is found in the fact that
they are very superstitious, favouring, for example, Daoist funerals rather than the
state run Confucian style funerals. These views were summed up in the words of one
retired cadre, that 'they are all Miao people and very backward.' By classifying
Jishou as a minority town the same people often also assume that there were no
urban organisations, schools or city life until the area was developed by the
Communist Party. This view of Jishou is also promoted by the city Tourism
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Department (Luyou Ban). Tourists are taken to see the old section of Jishou, where a
number of pre-1949 wooden houses remain, and are told that this is a Miao district,
despite the fact that local inhabitants claim to be descended from migrants from
Jiangxi. Here they are sometimes taken across the river by ferry and told that there is
no fixed charge, they only have to pay the boatman if they want to as this is the Miao
custom.10
In refusing to accept the practices of the West Hunan people as Han, incomers
distance themselves from them by labelling them as minority. Like the migrants and
minority people in other parts of the world, the position of West Hunan people is
indicative of the 'cultural hybridity' which arises in the 'interstitial passage between
fixed identities' (Bhabha 1994: 4). Their 'discordant, even dissident histories and
voices' (Bhabha 1994: 5) unsettle the Chinese views of what constitutes Han and
minority by continually drawing attention to the fact that the boundaries between
these two groups cannot clearly be defined.
The case of gu magic
An illustration of the tendency of educated people from outside West Hunan to
classify heterodox practices as 'minority' and to fail to see that such practices are
known to people of both Han and indigenous ancestry, is seen in perceptions of the
practice ofgu magic. Though previously found all over China, from the Song period
onward, gu magic has been associated with the minority people of the Southwest and
has been used as a mark of their barbaric behaviour.
Making gu is said to be a form of magic performed by women, who become
possessed by an evil spirit and have to practice gu to satisfy the spirit. Such women
are said to have red eyes. To make the gu they put insects into a sealed pan
overnight and in the morning one survives which has eaten all the others. This
surviving insect can be used to make people sick and it can also wither trees.
The character for gu (which incorporates the components for insect and cooking-pot)
was used 3,000 years ago and it is known that in pre-Han times it was already
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associated with insects, disease and 'women inveigling men' (Feng & Shyrock 1935:
1). Until the Tang dynasty, the practice of gu was a widespread Chinese
phenomenon and it 'appears to have been a cultural feature which the ancient
inhabitants of the Yellow River valley shared with the inhabitants of the more
southern regions' (Feng & Shyrock 1935: 10). It was even believed to have been
used at court (Bodde 1975: 101). From the Song period onwards, however, it was
attributed only to the minority peoples of the Southwest. Han people, such as
officials and travellers, were thought to be particularly at risk, though there is a story
that a 'virtuous scholar' was in no danger (Feng & Shyrock 1935: 16,23). This is
perhaps because it was associated particularly with sexual approaches by minority
women (Feng & Shyrock 1935).
Diamond argues that the beliefs around gu are 'a Han fantasy about these groups',
and that 'in no way do they coincide with the practices or beliefs found within these
societies' (Diamond 1988: 23). When discussing the works of researchers who
describe the practice, such as Ling and Ruey (1963) and De Beauclair (1970), she
argues that they have been heavily influenced by Han scholars and, perhaps, the
written literature. It is, she says, a misapprehension which persists to this day, which
Han people still believe in. According to Diamond, ambiguous feelings among the
Han about gu arose because the minorities represented a disturbing 'Other' to the
Chinese world view. This was particularly the case because the Miao practice of
premarital freedom for young women and men shocked the Han and yet, in many
cases, Han men settling in the minority areas had no choice but to marry local
minority women. As Diamond says, 'In contrast to the Han society where women
were politically and economically powerless and where sexual activity outside of
marriage was valid cause for a woman to be put to death or at least severely beaten,
here is a society that is a moral nightmare' (1988: 11), and the fear ofgu women
expressed this.
The fear of gu persists among Han people today. Miss Shi, a young woman student
from a Miao speaking village, told me that Han people are afraid to go to the Miao
areas because they are afraid of gu. She said that when her sister went to Huaihua
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her teacher asked her if she was Miao, and when she said she was she told her a story
about how she and her husband had gone to Guizhou, he had later died and she
attributed this to gu. As a result she was very afraid of gu and the Miao areas.
However, contrary to Diamond's argument, concern over gu is not just a Han fantasy
about the minorities. Cheung was told about gu by the Ge of Southeast Guizhou in
the early 90s. Miss Shi also told me that her mother (a Kho Xiong speaking woman)
also believed in gu and she appeared to half believe in it herself. She said that her
mother told her she should never pick up small things by the side of the road and she
should be careful drinking from wells in hot weather since these were both ways gu
could get into her body, cause an illness and perhaps death. I noticed that when Miss
Shi drank from wells she blew on the surface of the water before drinking, or spat
most of the mouthful out again. She also said that a woman in her village had been
accused of doing gu magic. She said it happens to women who aren't liked,
sometimes single women, sometimes married. In this case it was a woman whose
family was not doing well and she and her children were dressed in rags. She said
she'd heard that gu women have red eyes but had never seen it to be the case with
this woman.
Though the subject was not openly talked about, I was told by four West Hunan
people that gu existed in West Hunan, or at least that local people believed that it did.
And in all cases I was told that it could be practised by Han as well as Miao. One
woman told me that it was a real danger, that gu women were everywhere, even in
Jishou, but if you were lucky you would not come across it. Another said that they
could be found in Yaxi village.
The weakness of Diamond's argument is that she presents a situation where
Confucian values meet minority values head on. She suggests that Miao values as
regards virginity, rank and female inheritance were completely different from those
of the Han, where Han refers to the 'strict Confucian world that was historical China'
(1988: 18). However, I suggest that, in actuality, this was not the case. Not only is
gu more real than a Han fantasy, it is also shared with the local Han, either because it
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was a technique acquired by Han people from Miao people or because it is part of a
common shared culture. In either case, the Han soldiers and poor peasants who came
to West Hunan were not necessarily part of a strictly Confucian world and divisions
between Miao and Han were not as absolute as they are presented.
Conclusions
In this chapter I have shown how Chinese scholars and the Chinese administration
have drawn clear distinctions between Han and minority. Following from Chapters
Three and Four, I suggest that in doing so they reinforce a view of Han identity
which is clearly demarcated, homogeneous and advanced. When these distinctions
were applied through the administration, Han elements which were dissenting or
rebellious were often characterised as minority. After this division between Han and
minority had been effectively reinforced, minority people were encouraged to cross
it. The intention, however, was not that they should interact with the Han peasants,
who were all too likely to be influenced by the minorities rather than vice versa, but
that they should be educated by the Han elite into the orthodox Chinese behaviour
which was standard throughout China.
Despite the opposition between Chinese and minority and the attempt to promote
elite culture, Han Chinese ways of life are by no means homogeneous. In East China
differences within Han Chinese practices are usually presented as variations on a
common theme of Chineseness, an identity which is characterised by both unity and
diversity. The West Hunan situation is rather different however, because of the
presence of the (imaginary) Han Miao border. We find ourselves at a place of
cultural hybridity, where local practices are by their nature challenging to attempts to
demarcate bounded groups.
Official images of West Hunan often represent it as a remote, static, timeless place of
traditional people in an aesthetically pleasing landscape. It is also a place of out-
migration, serving the more dynamic cities of the East and South but otherwise
appearing rather disconnected from the flows of people in China today. When we
listen, however, to the voices of West Hunan people themselves, we find that it has
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for centuries been a place of cultural mixing and interaction. This cautions against
any assumption that such movement and mixing is primarily a recent event since to
do so is effectively to essentialise the people of the past as more easily definable and
categorisable. In the final chapters of the thesis I will show that it is on the
awareness of this mixing that much local collective memory and local cultural
activities are based.
1
In this thesis I do not discuss the influence of Christianity, since it appears to have had relatively
little effect on the Miao of West Hunan.
2 On the overlap between perceived status groups and ethnic groups in more recent Chinese history,
see Hansson (1996).
31 consider this point further in Chapter Eight.
4 It is of course risky to make too definitive a use of historical sources, particularly when I go on later
in the thesis to look at how the differing histories of the Celestial Kings and the Bandits are aspects of
social memory which are more informative about those telling the stories than about the past.
However, a description of the events of the Ming and Qing dynasty, though tentative, illuminates my
discussion of ethnic and local identities and the part of the Chinese state in this.
3
In particular Yen Ju-yu 1820, Miao Fang-pei Lan (A Look at the Miao Defences).
6 Others were of course classified as Tujia.
7 David Faure pers. comm.
8 Western scholars, however, have pointed out that if languages are defined on the basis of mutual
unintelligibility, branches and dialects of Chinese would be, by this definition, languages (Crissman
1967:183, Gladney 1991: 302f.), thus undermining the claim for a common language.
9 Ke is also a term used to describe the Han in West Hunan.
10 There are similarities here with the famous story by Shen Congwen, Border Town, which was
written in 1934 and set in West Hunan (Shen Congwen 1988). In this a leading character is a
ferryman who refuses payment on the grounds that the ferry is public property and he already receives
payment for his work.
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Chapter Six - Recreating Temples
Introduction: Buddhist and Territorial Cults
In this chapter I describe activities which take place in temples, focusing on Buddhist
temples and the temple of the Celestial Gate Earth God. In particular, I show that
these temples are places where people, especially women, address personal problems
in their own lives and in doing so form relationships with other individuals
confronted by similar anxieties. Temples are also places which are strongly
connected to the sense of locality which I have discussed in the previous chapter,
associated with particular sites and, often, particular stories of the area. I suggest that
in recreating temples, people set them up as places in which notions of locality are
expressed. My approach to the discussion of these activities is therefore to consider
their relevance to other aspects of life, rather than to examine beliefper se. As
Feuchtwang writes,
by examining the practices and contexts of temple festivals and in particular by
interpreting them as a kind of drama rather than as beliefs, I think we can see that they do
imply and convey a moral and political nature (Feuchtwang 1992).
Broadly speaking, one can divide the deities1 found in temples in the Jishou area into
two types, Buddhist and Daoist on the one hand and territorial on the other. In the
past, there was a third form of temple which was part of the Imperial state cult.
Temples to Wen (culture), often referred to today as 'Confucian' temples, were part
of this. These, however, no longer exist in the area. Whereas Buddhism is, of
course, a widespread 'institutional' religion (Yang 1961: 20) in which sacred texts
and organised institutions play an important part, territorial deities, which may be
known within a small area only, do not have these attributes.2 The two types of
deities are often distinguished by local people as non-meat eating and meat eating
deities.
In Late Imperial times, and more recently, Buddhism has been encouraged, or at least
tolerated, as a preferable alternative to what are regarded as local practices. In the
late 18th century, the introduction of Buddhism was seen, by educated people, as a
means of discouraging local 'superstitious' practices. In West Hunan, Buddhism,
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along with formal education, was introduced by Fu Nai. This was part of what Jones
describes as his 'deliberate policy of destroying Miao culture by introducing Chinese
education and by forbidding the practice of traditional Miao ceremonies' (Jones
1978: 132, see also Zhang 1994: 30). These Buddhist temples succeeded the Daoist
temples which had been built in the area during the 18th century (Zhang 1994: 124)
and at the time I was in West Hunan, I was aware of no working Daoist temples.
Contrary to the widespread belief among incomers and people from other areas, that
the indigenous population knew no institutions until 1949, Buddhist temples were
also built in the highlands where several of them were used as schools during the
Republican period. The introduction of Buddhist temples can be seen therefore as
part of the state's attempt to integrate Miao people through education, part of a
project which was intended to be both hegemonic and homogenising. In fact,
however, Buddhism in West Hunan has accrued characteristics which are considered
by many to be unorthodox and, sometimes, specific to the locality. At the time I was
doing my fieldwork, most Buddhist temples contained a mixture of deities from
different religious movements, in many cases Daoist, but in some cases specific to
West Hunan. This is in the tradition, past and present, of popular religion all over
China (Baity 1975: 47, Jordan 1972: 29).
In contrast to the institutional religion of Buddhism, territorial deities are often
protective figures who are specific to particular areas. Many of them resemble the
Imperial bureaucrats who wielded state power in China until the beginning of this
century. Their dress is equivalent to the robes such bureaucrats would have worn
and the process of drawing lots, as described below, resembles the procedure for
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approaching a magistrate in Imperial times. However, rather than comprising part
of the hierarchies of the state cult, the maintenance of which was the responsibility of
local officials, the cults of territorial deities often represent a distinctly heterodox
point of view. They are closely connected to ordinary people and to the history and
landscape of one's locality, or of the locality from which one's ancestors originated
(Baity 1975:32, Feuchtwang 1992: 109, Dean 1993: 88, 218, Sangren 1987: 112).
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The stories concerning local deities tell how, though originally from unremarkable
peasant families or holders of some minor local state position, they displayed
outstanding courage and ability so that, after death, they are held to possess the
quality of ling (responsiveness, efficaciousness) which 'is associated in particular
with those who have led extraordinary lives and died extraordinary deaths'
(Feuchtwang 1992b: 101), see also Yang 1961: 162, Hansen 1987: 165). Some of
these individuals lived their now legendary lives as long ago as the 5th century A.D.
and some in the more recent past (Stein 1979: 59, 65, Yang 1961: 153, Dean 1993:
30).4 Some of these deities have been and are associated with virtue (Yang 1961:
162, Feuchtwang 1989: 19), whilst many cults are concerned with protective military
figures. Such figures are believed to have command of spirit soldiers (Diamond
1969: 87, Jordan 1972: 51-3) and attendance at their festivals may include unofficial
local militia bands who put on performances of marital arts (Feuchtwang 1989: 17,
Jordan 1972: 48-9). In West Hunan, the most well known territorial deities are the
Celestial Kings, who are three legendary military brothers. Although I heard nothing
of organised militia bands, in one of their temples I did come across a group of
young men who were apparently associated with organised crime.
Territorial deities are usually considered to have a close relationship with the living.
Individuals could, and still can, turn to them without the need for a third party to
intercede, though custodians or spirit mediums might also be present to perform this
task (Hansen 1990: 13, Yang 1961: 327). If the deities' responsiveness fails, they
become less popular and, as people's needs change, the deities either change in their
capabilities or are replaced by others (Feuchtwang 1992: 137, 1989: 17, Hansen
1987: 7, Jordan 1972: xvi).
Often these deities are the protectors of a specific territory and this becomes
particularly clear at festival times. In contrast to Buddhist festivals and to China-
wide observances such as New Year and mid-Autumn festival, the dates of which are
standardised throughout China, the festivals of territorial cults fall on dates which are
specific to the particular deities. Each has his or her own specific festival
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observances, related to the history of his or her life. In East China, festivals are often
associated with a procession which marks out the boundaries of a territory. Thus,
though they are dressed as Imperial officials, these deities represent something
relatively heterodox, reworking symbols of the Imperial bureaucracy into places and
activities expressive of local identities. As Feuchtwang writes, such cults can be
seen as a form of 'dissenting history' which is 'interposed within and counterposed
to a unified and single-centred history of dynastic China (1992: 7, 196).
The deities described above were, and still are, considered to be responsible for
protecting a sizeable area such as a village or a region. In addition to these there are
also a very large number of deities called Earth Gods (Tudi Gong) who protect small
areas such as neighbourhoods. These too are regarded as the equivalent of officials,
but of very minor officials. Usually they are identified by their position as protectors
of a particular area, rather than as individual personalities, though they too may also
be associated with historical or legendary figures (Feuchtwang 1992: 97,105,125,
Sangren 1987: 139n, Seaman 1978: 97).
On the face of it there would appear to be considerable differences between territorial
deities and Buddhist deities in West Hunan. Territorial deities are concerned with
specific local histories and, in the case of military deities, have the capacity to harm.
Buddhism is part of a widespread text based religion which was introduced into West
Hunan as part of a civilising measure. A feature of Buddhist temples in China is the
prominence of Guanyin, the Chinese form of the Bodhisattva Avalokiteswara, the
goddess of mercy and the most popular deity in China (Sangren 1983: 6). However,
in practice the contrast between Buddhism and territorial deities is hard to apply and
many people cannot distinguish between Buddhist temples and those to territorial
cults.
I leave further discussion of larger territorial cults and military deities aside until the
following chapters. Here I consider Buddhist temples and one Earth God temple, all
of which housed deities who were strongly associated with virtue. I begin by looking
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at how the recreation of aspects of local culture is a means of coming to terms with a
situation of social and economic change. I will begin by showing that what are
considered to be quite orthodox Buddhist festivals and gatherings provide an
alternative space and morality in which people criticise the current situation in China.
This is particularly the case for women.
Women, temples and alternative moral spaces
My visits to the Clear Lake Temple with a group of women from Jishou made me
aware of the needs which temple visits met. As well as places of prayer, they were
places of leisure activity, places where they could make friends, and also places
where they could find support and a sympathetic listener. I was told several times
that the relationships formed between women who went to the temple together were
special. An important element of this was the fact that Buddhism supplied a contrast
to other aspects of life, associated as it was with themes of purity and virtue.
I visited the Clear Lake Temple with a group of women who came from some work
units in the centre of town. They were workers and cadres most of whom were either
retired or not fully occupied in their work units. Not all of them were born in West
Hunan and some, like Mrs Shui, were relatively well educated. Mrs Shui was the
member of the group who was most knowledgeable about orthodox Buddhist
practices. She was respected by the others because, among other things, she had
visited the sacred Buddhist mountain of Hengshan5, where she had bought a statue of
Guanyin, the Buddhist Goddess of mercy. She kept this in her room and prayed to
her everyday. A widow and former cadre at the Grain Procuring Unit (Liangshi Ju),
she was originally from Changsha. She lived apart from her sons and said she
preferred it that way.
In March 1997, shortly after Deng Xiaoping's death, we paid a visit to the Clear
Lake Temple to pay our (Lunar) New Year respects to the deities. As well as Mrs
Shui there were two other retired women from the Grain Procurement Unit and a
younger woman called Mrs Fang who was from another unit. Mrs Fang was on
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leave from her work unit while her children were young, a privilege for which she
had to pay a small sum of money each month. She came accompanied by her mother
and small niece. Her mother was retired, but busy looking after her son's daughter,
Mrs Fang's niece, in another work unit.
In addition to its religious importance, the occasion was a time for forming
relationships, 'playing' {wan) and performing favours for one another. The intention
from the start was not only to pray but also to take some photographs of one another
and I had brought my camera and some film. We met in Mrs Shui's flat at the Grain
Procuring Unit. Before we left there was much getting ready of incense and
offerings and discussion of how much of each to take. Everyone laughed when Mrs
Shui's young grandson, whom she was looking after temporarily, asked whether the
e mi tuo fo, a Buddhist mantra, at the temple was 'zhen de huozhi jia de' (true or
false). This was the title of a popular television quiz show in which participants had
to guess whether items of news were true or false, but may also have reflected that
even he was aware of the official attitude to religion. However, the proceedings
were not just concerned with pleasure. Mrs Shui's daughter-in-law wanted to come
but was told she must stay at home because she was menstruating.6 While we were
leaving Mrs Shui's work unit, an old woman stopped one of the group to ask her to
say some prayers on her behalf, apparently for peace in the days after Deng's death.
When we got to the temple, I was struck by how organised it was, compared with
other temples I had been to. It is the only temple in the city of Jishou which receives
money from the local government. The deities are all Buddhist and many of them
are behind glass. The custodian was a nun and she was accompanied by several
other old women one of them also a nun. But despite the presence of the nuns, much
of the worship was organised as a shared responsibility among the women
themselves. Though the nun was friendly and put on a tape of the chanting of 'e mi
tuo fo' when we arrived, she soon withdrew to the kitchen and we had little further
contact with her. When we left, Mrs Fang's mother told the nun that she did not
have time to come back for Guanyin's birthday and asked if it would be all right if
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someone else came and prayed on her behalf that day. The nun reassured her that
this would be acceptable and she left some fruit and glutinous rice cakes, a traditional
New Year dish, at the temple for this festival.
The women all prayed to the deities in turn. In a procedure which is almost identical
at all temples, they put offerings of food on the altar and put sticks of incense in front
of the deity. Then, with their hands put together in prayer, they bowed three times
before the deities, making their requests silently. Mrs Shui showed her greater
knowledge of Buddhism and, perhaps, a more serious approach, by chanting some
words. She also bowed much deeper, bringing her hands up towards her head each
time. When I had my fortune told, a form of drawing lots, Mrs Shui organised it
herself, saying that I must introduce myself to the deities, say my name and where I
was from. They were happy to include others in their group and soon got talking to
another woman who was visiting the temple alone. She also lived in a work unit in
town and had a son who worked at Jishou University. They discussed together
which temples they had been to and how this was a good thing to do. The woman
said that we were all good people because we prayed to Buddha. Though it was
uncommon for people to greet strangers with trust and openness, this was not so in
the temple. Indeed, I had got to know the group myself through an earlier chance
meeting at the Clear Lake Temple.
The subject of conversation moved on, as so often, to people's problems. Mrs Shui
said that if she didn't pray everyday she felt apathetic. Then she started talking about
how naughty her grandson was and she got some red cloth from the nun to tie round
his waist. It was piled up in front of the Buddha, already blessed, and her friend Mrs
Fang took some too. We all left together, and Mrs Fang gave me some red cloth to
put around my waist and they said that now, when I was married, I would have a son.
Then we walked off together and someone said that we were Lhao pengyou' (good
friends) because we had been to the temple together. Outside the temple and on the
way down, we took several photographs of one another but there was no sense of
discontinuity between this and praying. It was clear that the occasion was one of
137
pleasure as well as prayer and that much of the initiative for the activities which took
place came from the visitors to the temple rather than from the custodian there. It
was also apparent that visits to the temple allowed women to create an alternative
place of morality, trust and relationships in contrast to the materialism and moral
deterioration they perceived in modern urban life.
Such a gathering of women at temples was not exclusively an urban educated
phenomenon but was a feature of all the temples I visited. Even when women go
individually to pray at temples, they often walk back with the people they meet there
and when they have friends who worship at the same temple they go together,
combining prayer with an enjoyable day out. Women also attend the festivals in
honour of Guanyin which take place three times a year. Guanyin festivals and
temple visits appeal to women of all social ranks. These are held all over China at
rural and urban temples and are almost exclusively female. Whereas the Clear Lake
temple was in Jishou and was attended mainly, though not exclusively, by urban
people, others were based in villages on the outskirts of Jishou and attracted more
rural people. Some of the festivals fall at times when rural women have little to do in
the fields and constitute a kind of holiday, sometimes combined with a visit to Jishou
itself.
On one such occasion I went to a festival at Pingshanpo which had both Buddhist
shrines and shrines of the local territorial deities, the Celestial Kings. Pingshanpo
temple is situated on a hillside above Jishou near the village of Pingshanpo which, I
was told by urban Jishou residents, 'used to be Miao' but now the people all spoke
Chinese. Most people at the temple came from one of the villages nearby. One
group of friends met one another at a pavilion on the way up, and later entered the
temple together led by a woman who was chanting Buddhist scriptures. Others
arrived in ones and twos and greeted friends on their arrival.
For most women, the morning was spent sitting around and talking or listening to the
intermittent chanting and watching the people coming to have their fortunes told.
Whereas urban women might use such occasions to meet new people, here, it was a
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case of meeting again people whom they already knew. However, everyone
welcomed me and several commented that they knew me by sight but had not had a
chance to talk to me before. As at all festivals of Guanyin a vegetarian lunch had
been arranged and money was collected to cover expenses for the lunch and work on
the temple. I was told that some people would stay all night talking and singing
songs. In fact, the people who attended were not exclusively village women. Others,
who from their dress and manner were distinguishable as urban women, and
including a group of students who turned up saying they wanted to swear sisterhood
with each other, came to make offerings to the deities. One of them, who co-
incidentally was a student of mine, told me this was because they wanted to be
friends for ever, and that her friends were Buddhists.
As at Clear Lake temple there was a concern with morality. The nuns insisted on
proper conduct. A local man, apparently a spirit medium, who was keeping the
company entertained by questioning me in an ebulliently friendly manner, was asked
to leave because, as the nuns pointed out, he was drunk. The occasion was also a
chance for everyone to discuss the conduct of the Minority Affairs Department over
the temple of the Celestial Kings, which everyone disapproved of.7
I have suggested that visits to temples constitute a form of leisure activity. However,
whereas the leisure activities described in Chapter Two indicated a wish to distance
oneself from the political nature of pre-1979, and to some extent contemporary
China, people who regularly attended temples often regard these occasions as an
alternative to the materialism and social change which has followed the reforms.
Though they have access to television and the consequent images of urbanised
culture, many of the older women who attend temples cannot afford to, or do not
wish to, decorate their houses or follow fashion. I often heard people at temples
complain about other aspects of life today, that people have become more concerned
with money, that family members could not be depended on to support each other
and that there was too much crime. In particular, older women would complain that
their children and in-laws were too concerned with making money, or with going out
and enjoying themselves, leaving them to do the childcare. The women who attend
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the temples do not regard these activities as marginal, but as an effective way of
addressing issues such as the continuity of their families and of peace in the area.
In China, temples, particularly Buddhist temples, have long had an attraction for
women. The marginal situation of women in pre-revolutionary Chinese society has
been illustrated by several writers. Women were often not known by name, but were
known as the mothers' of their sons (R. Watson 1986). Before 1949, women in rural
Guangdong were often married into lineages which were in competition with their
own. As a result of this they provided the means for affinal ties which connected the
lineages, but they were also regarded as a potential threat to their in-laws (Potter &
Potter 1990: 254). An indication of the unhappiness experienced by many rural
Chinese women in the early part of the century has been demonstrated by the high
levels of suicide recorded in rural Taiwan (Wolf 1975).
It has been argued that in Imperial times, the popularity of the cult of Guanyin was a
response to the dilemma in which Chinese women found themselves. Marriage
involved both a separation from one's family and was also believed to represent
entry into a polluted state. To be without children, however, would leave one
without the prayers of descendants, which were needed to ensure one's position after
death as an ancestor rather than a ghost. Sangren argues that the appeal of Guanyin,
the Buddhist goddess of mercy, lies in the perception of her as a woman unpolluted
by marriage and childbirth since Guanyin refused marriage, was killed by her father
and later returned, offered her father 'her own eyes and arms in a magic potion' and
'having shown her father the true path she entered Nirvana' (1983: 7).
Women's cults often offered a practical and material alternative to marriage. For
example, the White Lotus Sect, which first appeared in the 16th century and
flourished in North China until this century, 'offered a community supplementary to
those of family, village, market and bureaucracy' and 'this sort of sect was
particularly appealing to women, providing them with a complementary community,
new avenues for education and leadership and an escape from their families' (Naquin
1985: 261). Women's marriage resisting groups existed in Guangdong, from the
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early 19th century until the early 20th century, because the loneliness and restrictions
of a traditional marriage led some women to find the option of a celibate sisterhood
preferable (Topley 1978: 245). This was made possible by employment
opportunities for women in the silk industry.
The experiences of women today cannot of course be seen as a direct continuation of
pre-revolutionary times. In mainland China, the Communist revolution has brought
considerable changes to women's status. Marriage and divorce laws have been
instituted and with the introduction of work units and communes women began to
play a wider role in the work force. Nonetheless, inequalities still remain at work
and in educational enrolment (Bauer 1992). Suicides among rural Chinese women
also continue to take a high toll, with Chinese female suicides comprising 56% of the
total of female suicides world-wide (MacLeod 1998: 62).
The experiences of Chinese women vary greatly with economic background and age.
The reason given for the high level of suicides among rural women today is not so
much direct oppression by men as the belief that they are losing out in comparison
with urban women. The Far Eastern Economic Review quotes a Hunan woman
saying "'[T]he education they have had, and access to the outside world, make them
realise the gap between what life could be and what they could do. That increases
their despair'" (MacLeod 1998: 62). Rofel contrasts the 'liberation nostalgia' among
the older generation of women factory workers in Hangzhou with the 'yearning for
modernity' among younger workers (1994). I found similar divisions expressed in
Jishou when older women talked about their younger relatives.
Young, urban women such as those in Jishou also find that their lives are not without
difficulties. For example, female students find it hard to break into business and if
they did so, it was usually on the basis of their attractiveness. One student went to a
recruitment fair in Guangzhou and was accepted for a job as an interpreter.
However, she later found that she was expected to have sexual relations with her
employer and was forced to give up her plan to take this job. Another student talked
about how she had been unable to get jobs because she didn't have money for bribes,
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didn't have family connections, and was not good at flattering people. She said that
one employer rejected her because she was not beautiful enough, since they wanted
someone who would dress up and could drink a lot when accompanying clients at
banquets. However, few of the young women I met were as critical as were older
women of the changes in society and they were less likely to discuss them at temples.
Temples are places where people, particularly women, come to talk and find a
sympathetic listener.8 Common problems brought to the temples are health, anxiety,
family problems and concern over daughters' fertility. Despite the changes brought
about by the Communist Party, women still express frustrations with their role in
their families. While I was often told I should get married and have a child I was
also told at times by peasant women that if I have money there was no need for me to
get married, it was too troublesome and it was better for me to stay single. I once
visited a small Buddhist temple in Qianzhou where a local woman visitor was telling
a monk he was lucky having such a small temple since there was no-one for him to
guan (take responsibility for). It was easier to live by yourself, she said, and she
started to talk about herself, how she had to cook and do housework. She didn't like
children and he was lucky not to have them. The monk sat listening to conversation
and making sympathetic noises, which seemed to be all that was asked of him.
Many of the complaints voiced at temples are made by older women and are related
to what Sangren describes as the problems of'post-parenthood' (1983: 18).
Whereas, before 1949, married sons usually remained with their mothers in the
family home, in urban China today, mothers increasingly live either alone or in the
homes of their sons or sons-in-law in work unit accommodation. Here there is often
little room and they are expected to take responsibility for childcare since both
parents are usually working. On one occasion a middle aged woman who was
discussing with a friend why she went to the temple explained that she felt worried
and tense, and that her children and grandchildren gave her a lot of trouble. The two
of them talked about how Chinese people in their thirties were not good these days.
She said that as soon as she prayed to the deities she felt better, but it seemed that,
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having someone with whom to discuss her motivations for going to the temple, was
also helpful.
Temples, therefore, cannot be seen as part of a clearly demarcated women's sphere
which stands in contrast to a men's sphere. Rather than being inclusive of all
women, they often appealed to older women who contrasted themselves to younger
women. Nor did temples exclude men. Though men did not attend the temples in
the numbers that women did, individual visitors to temples often included men who
had come to address specific problems.
The Birthday of the Celestial Gate Earth God
I have suggested that temple visits are often indicative of people's responses to other
aspects of their lives. Evidence for this is found in the way in which worship at
temples has changed in form considerably since pre-1949 times, a process which has
been facilitated by the fact that often there is no custodian to oversee activities. In
this section I describe the festival of the Earth God's birthday. What is interesting
about the festival is the fact that, whereas in the past it was celebrated in one's
immediate neighbourhood, today it is similar to the Buddhist festivals in its emphasis
on communal eating and making contacts with other people.
Earth Gods are the most minor kind of territorial deity and are found all over China.
They are responsible for protecting a small area such as a neighbourhood or a temple
precinct and are particularly associated with protecting them from ghosts (Wolf
1978: 134). In West Elunan, the Earth Gods are usually represented as an old
husband and wife. They are found in villages, in the older parts of Jishou and
outside temples of all kinds, but I have never seen them around work units.
I was told about Earth Gods by Mrs Fang, one of the women who attended the Clear
Lake temple. She said that, as in the ordinary world, where there are good and bad
people and the Public Security (Gongan Ju) protect us from the bad, so in the yin
world (the underworld) there are good and bad spirits and the Earth God protects us
from the bad spirits. This view that the Earth God is equivalent to a minor official is
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widely held in China (Feuchtwang 1992: 96, Skinner 1977: 262, Weller 1987: 2). I
was also told by an elderly inhabitant of the old section of Jishou, where there are
many Earth God shrines, that they can make direct reports to Heaven on peoples'
behaviour, another commonly held view (cf Feuchtwang 1992: 96). However,
although Earth Gods are important, they are also considered unremarkable. They are
spoken of with affection rather than awe. I was often asked whether we have them in
Britain, which suggested that they were seen as ubiquitous. People do not usually
make offerings specially to the Earth Gods except on the day of the Earth God's
birthday but, if people make a prayer or hold a festival for a larger deity, offerings
are also made to the Earth Gods around the temple precincts in case they become
jealous.
Mrs Gu told me that when she was a child, her family would offer incense to the
neighbourhood Earth God and his wife, on the first and fifteenth day of each month,
and make a larger offering on the Earth God's birthday, practices for which there is
little evidence today. However, in contrast to the lack of interest shown in ordinary
Earth Gods, the Celestial Gate Earth God (Tian Men Tudi Gong) is becoming
increasingly popular, and in spring 1996 I attended the celebration of the birthday of
the local Celestial Gate Earth God with Mrs Fang. The Celestial Gate Earth God,
though of similar rank to ordinary Earth Gods, is responsible for guarding the gate of
heaven. The dates of the festivals at this shrine correspond with that of the ordinary
Earth God's birthday.9 Though few people visited the ordinary Earth God shrines
that day, the birthday of the Celestial Gate Earth God attracted a large number of
worshippers.
The shrine to the Celestial Gate Earth God is situated at the top of a wooded hill just
outside Jishou. It has been crudely built from rocks and, on ordinary days, is
unattended. In addition to shrines to the Celestial Gate Earth God and his wife there
is one to Guanyin and one to the deities of Sun and Night. When we arrived, at first
people were rather perplexed to see a foreigner at the temple, so we walked on
through the woods for a while but on our return we were approached by the warden
of the surrounding forest, a government funded post, who urged us to stop and eat. A
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relative newcomer to worship at temples, Mrs Fang was as interested to find out
about everything as I was. We were told that as well as being the Celestial Gate
Earth God's birthday, this was the day when people gathered saplings of a particular
tree which gave off a perfume when burnt. We were told that you should burn them
on the first and the fifteenth of each month and then they would communicate with
(.kai lit. open the eyes of) the Celestial Gate Earth God. The warden and other people
who were from the nearby area also explained that the temple10 of the Earth God was
quite different from Buddhist temples and that the Earth Gods, unlike the Buddhist
deities, were officials who protected the people in that area, but only those who came
to worship there. In this they were like real people in powerful positions and would
help you if you had good connections (,guanxi) with them and attended their temple
frequently (lai lai wang wang lit. came and went).
Not only was the Celestial Gate Earth God like a living person, he had once been
one. We were told that the temple was first built in the early part of this century
because there had been a man there who was very good to everyone around him so
that when he died they built a temple to him. Two people told us this story and both
drew an analogy with Chairman Mao, saying that he had achieved many things when
alive and was now a god. However, only the people who lived in the immediate area
of the temple showed any knowledge of this history. To others it was just like
another Buddhist festival.
The activities which took place were similar to those at other festivals I had attended.
Groups of people, many, but not all of them women, converged on the temple,
stopping on the way up to leave offerings at the shrine of the ordinary Earth God.
Many of them were from villages and suburbs on that side of Jishou. A group of
women arrived from one of the Buddhist temples carrying a flag. Some people who,
I was told, were from the suburb of Jishou closest to the temple had organised food
and were collecting money for it. At the top, near the temple, groups of people,
many of them women, were playing cards and picnicking.
145
Like other temple festivals, it was a chance to meet people. Mrs Fang, who
accompanied me, was always interested in going to these events since she had no
work, her children were at school and she found it boring staying at home during the
day. In fact, the work opportunities which were open to her were not very appealing.
Because her education had suffered during the Cultural Revolution, she had found it
hard to get any kind of regular employment. She did now have a permanent position
in a work unit but had asked for leave due to the pressures of having to look after two
small children. Her husband had opened a bath house and asked her to work there but
she said she didn't like doing this because the other people there were all men, their
conversation wasn't interesting and they expected her to do all the cooking. She
much preferred the company of the people she met at temples. She had started
attending temple festivals quite recently and as a consequence already knew quite a
number of other women, some of whom were also at this festival. As usual, eating
lunch together was a good time to get to know other people and we got talking to a
woman retired from a work unit in Jishou. She and Mrs Fang found that both of
them came in part to play (wan), because they had nothing to do during the day. As
we went back, Mrs Fang spoke happily of how she had got to know so many people
now that she had started going to temples.
This festival is notable because of its departure from Earth God birthdays of the past.
People chose to celebrate the Earth God's birthday now by climbing a wooded hill,
rather than by marking it in their own neighbourhood or home. The contrast was
discussed by the women at the temple. While we were talking over lunch, several
women went into the woods to collect the perfumed saplings and the women who
remained started discussing how they didn't need any because they didn't worship
deities at home, or worship the ordinary Earth God. They just came out to temples.
In part the change may have occurred because today many neighbourhoods do not
have Earth Gods, and in those that do it can no longer involve the whole community
in a ritual since most of the younger people, or those with close contact with the
Communist Party, would not attend. But it must also be because people are drawn to
the festival as a chance to have a day out with friends or to meet new people, forming
a different kind of community from that associated with everyday urban life.
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Drawing Lots
In addition to being places where people find company, another important function
of local temples, including Buddhist temples, is that they are places where people
address unresolved questions and uncertainties by divination through drawing lots
(chou qian). Though some do this as part of a festival or group visit, many come
alone or with a friend, and this is often the way in which men visit the temples. Like
the form of the Earth God festival, the context of drawing lots has also apparently
changed. For example, I was told by an older, educated woman, that Buddhist
temples used to be devoted to learning about Buddhism through the study of texts,
but now people just went to play (wan) and draw lots.
One Buddhist temple where people go to draw lots is at Shizian, a village a few
kilometres outside Jishou. Twenty years ago, the villagers in this area spoke Kho
Xiong and the women wore the Miao dress of embroidered tunics and turbans.
Today, this minority ancestry is suggested only by the black cloths some of the old
women wear around their heads. I was told that before the Cultural Revolution the
temple at Shizian had been very beautiful but hidden from the road by a grove of old
trees. Passers-by knew of its presence from the sound of bells. During the Cultural
Revolution, like the other temples in the area, it was destroyed and the images of the
deities were thrown down a cliff into the river. Some of the foundations of the old
temple's walls remain but the rest of it was rebuilt in the 1980s. The trees have now
been cut down and the temple, rebuilt from breeze blocks and smaller than before,
can be seen positioned on the top of a rocky bank overlooking the river. There are
also several shrines to guardian spirits and the Earth God and some new trees have
been planted. Like everywhere in the area, it is surrounded by mountains. An old
Buddhist nun and her sister take care of it during the day and tend the vegetable
patches outside it, but at night they sleep down the hill in the village.
One day when I was visiting the temple in the company of a Chinese friend, the nun
told us that she was worried about a man who had been loitering about for some
time. She thought he might mean some harm and when we left she and her sister
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would be alone with him. I'd already noticed him wandering in and out of the
courtyard. He looked drawn and sunburnt and, though his clothes were not in tatters
like a beggar's and his shoes were intact, his bloodshot eyes and slouched, shuffling
gait were not reassuring. My friend went over and asked him what he wanted. He
said he wanted to draw lots, that is, to ask the deity a question. The nun said that he
had already done so once but he replied that he wanted to do it again so, looking
rather resigned, the nun went over to the altar and rang the bell to attract the deity's
attention. Drawing lots involves shaking a bamboo container in front of the deities
and choosing one of the spills, which is read and interpreted in order to gain insight
into one's circumstances and how they will unfold. While he was doing this, the
man explained what his problem was. He wanted to find out whether his wife was
alive or not. A few months ago he'd gone back home to find his wife gone and his
two month old baby left alone in the house. He didn't think she'd run away because
she wouldn't have left the baby alone like that, and he wanted to find out if she was
dead or had been kidnapped. When the nun asked what had happened to the baby he
said that three months after his wife left it had died. I don't know whether the lot he
drew was encouraging or not but the nun's response was that he should pray to
Guanyin, goddess of mercy, which he did. Soon after this we left him talking with
the nun and her sister who were now quite relaxed in his company and appeared to
be giving him the sympathetic attention he needed.
The man's dilemma was concerned with the widely perceived deterioration of social
order, a subject which was also of concern to the women who visited temples. His
appeal might, in other circumstances, have been made to the Public Security
Department (Gongan Ju), and it is perhaps a sign of people's uncertainty about the
situation today that he had not approached them. West Hunan people frequently talk
about how the area has become more disordered than before, particularly at temples,
and it was not a coincidence that on our way back, my companion started to talk
about how there is disorder everywhere in China these days, and to talk about how it
affected him. He went on to talk about how work units practise luan shoufei, putting
extra charges onto things, an example being railway tickets. It's never made clear
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what the extra cost is, though in fact it is shared among some of the people in the
unit.
The practice of drawing lots is not confined to the poor or the old. It is particularly
common among school children facing exams and among business people about to
leave the area to do business. For example, once at a Buddhist temple outside the
village of Yaxi I was present while a woman was seeking guidance through
divination. She asked if she should leave the area to do business. At first the lots
appeared to say that she should not do so, and the woman who was accompanying
me said that this was because she was married and should not leave. Later, when she
said she wanted to go to Fujian, the reading was changed and she was told that it was
all right for her to go there, but not to the north or south. Party members may also go
to temples to draw lots, though they do not talk about it in the work unit. Others
whom I saw drawing lots at the temples included policemen and sophisticated young
urban people.
The drawing of lots is often a way of finding a context to express one's dilemma,
expressing it, and deciding on a course of action. Feuchtwang writes that drawing
lots is 'a standardisation and an extemalisation of an uncertainty' (Feuchtwang 1989:
15). The ritual is similar in form to the approach which, in Imperial times, would
have been made to a magistrate, reinforcing the impression that the activity is an
appeal to an alternative authority and one which has reference to the past (Ahern
1981: 87-8).
But people also turn to Buddhist temples for counselling and material help. In the
case of the man at Shizian, the opportunity to raise and talk over the matter was
probably as important to him as getting an answer from the deity. At the Buddhist
temple outside the village of Yaxi I was introduced to the xiao sifu (young master), a
young girl of about nine, and was told that she and her younger brother had been
found abandoned in the Earth God shrine outside the temple. Her younger brother
had had a hare lip which the nun, whom I was told had previously been a barefoot
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doctor, sewed up. In turning to the Buddhist temples, rather than to Public Security
or other forms of local authority, people are giving importance both to the past and to
locality.
Official and Unofficial Contributions to Temples
Though the activities at temples are not overtly critical of the Chinese state, they
imply the existence of an alternative source of authority. It is not surprising, then
that there is a tension between official and local views of how Buddhist temples
should be organised. This is seen in the importance, in official eyes, of
distinguishing between 'religion' and 'superstition' as discussed in Chapter Two.
Officially recognised Buddhist temples in China are administered by the United
Front Department (Zheng Xie)u and are not permitted to house deities from other
traditions. Some temples, such as the Clear Lake Temple which I visited with Mrs
Shui and friends, receive a small amount of money from the United Front
Department which supports a nun or a monk, and perhaps some repairs. These are
the most 'orthodox' Buddhist temples, they house only Buddhist deities and attract
relatively educated people, many of whom are not from the surrounding area.
However, this status means that despite the orthodox appearance of such temples,
they are all the more acceptable for work unit organised leisure activities and their
clientele may not be always be as devout as the women I met at the Clear Lake
Temple. At one such temple outside Qianzhou, groups of women were often to be
found. They went there to have a vegetarian meal, enjoy the scenery and play mah-
jong, as well as to look at the deities, have their fortunes told and perhaps to pray too.
Government funded temples such as these are, of course, attended by local people
but specifically local practices are not in evidence. To see the interaction between
local and orthodox practices one needs to look at temples such as those at Shizian
and Pingshanpo.
Shizian is one of nine temples in the Jishou area which are registered with the United
Front Department but do not receive money, depending instead on local donations,
often from a nearby village. The remaining Buddhist temples are those, like that at
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Pingshanpo, which also depend on local donations but do not have recognition from
the United Front Department and these temples have shrines to the 'meat-eating,' i.e.
territorial, deities as well as to Buddhist deities. Despite this, the Buddhist
ceremonies may be quite orthodox, as in the case of the Pingshanpo temple.
At Shizian there are deities which, according to other authorities, are not Buddhist.
They are a Daoist goddess of childbirth and the Daoist god Yu Huang Da Di (The
Jade Emperor) and his wife. There were also some painted rocks on the altar, the
significance of which I did not learn12. The nun distanced herself from these and
many of the smaller deities by saying that she was not responsible for them and that
the local people had brought them. However, she claimed that they were not 'meat
eating' and that they were all Buddhist. Whether she knew that strictly speaking this
was not so and was trying to cover herself against possible official criticism, I do not
know. This mixture of deities, like other 'superstitious' activities, were perceived by
the people in West Hunan as uniquely local traditions, though in fact they are found
in many parts of China.13
It was clear that there was a conflict here between local and official ideas of what
temples should comprise, and the nun at Shizian told us of other divergences
between government regulations and local preferences. When I showed her some
photographs of the temple which I had taken, she said at once that if she'd been there
she would have stopped me from taking them. The heads of the deities in the
photograph were covered with a red cloth, which was draped over the top of them,
and she would have removed them because the local government did not permit them
to be covered.14 She said that she didn't put the red cloths on their heads, but that
people came up from the village and put them there.
The local element of temples such as Shizian was not, of course, evident only to
myself. Custodians and visitors at small Buddhist temples often told me with pride
that they were not like the government run ones. This was for two reasons. They
said that they were not beautiful 'like palaces' as the government funded ones were
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said to be, and that they had been rebuilt because the local people wanted them. The
rebuilding of most of the temples has been achieved with local money, materials and
labour but it has also been possible because of local memories. In the case of
Pingshanpo, a temple had existed in that area before the Cultural Revolution. It had
been rebuilt by local people in response to a dream in which a former monk had
appeared to one of the villagers and told him that if he rebuilt the temple, not on its
former site, but a little further up the hill, many people would visit it. This temple,
then, was more closely connected with local memory and less connected with the
government than was the Clear Lake Temple.
A Class outing to Shizian Temple
I have suggested that the temples described in this chapter represent an alternative to
the centralised and organising authority of the Chinese state, an alternative which is
based on places and memories associated specifically with the Jishou area.
However, these temples do not appeal only to the old, the rural or the people of
Jishou. They also provide a place of entertainment for young, urban, educated
people, often including those from other areas. The feelings of young educated
people about temples are often ambiguous. Many find the combination of local
religion and the minority area intriguing and are fascinated by the unfamiliar setting
and its minority connotations. However, to dismiss the activities as simply
entertainment would be to underestimate the degree to which they too are turning to
a local form of authority, even though it is often not their locality.
In the spring of 1996 some students from Jishou University made a class outing to
Shizian. Spring and autumn outings were a feature of student life at Jishou
University. They told me that it was traditional for all students to do this, a practice
which has its origins in Confucianism. In fact, I found that students in other parts of
Hunan did not make these outings. Their popularity in Jishou was probably a result
of the combination of lack of other places of leisure, such as boating parks, and the
variety of natural scenery.
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First they collected firewood and cooked a picnic by the side of a river at the foot of
the cliff where the temple is situated. After lunch, some of the students stayed
behind to play cards while I joined the others in climbing the hill to the temple,
passing the shrines to Earth Gods and guardian spirits on the way. The students were
talking about having their fortunes told and, though almost all of them said they were
just doing it for fun, they seemed quite excited.
Including a visit to a temple in a class trip was not controversial, since people,
especially those in work-units, are encouraged to regard temples as places of leisure.
I have mentioned the Buddhist temple where visitors played mah-jong. Another site,
a territorial temple in the nearby town of Fenghuang, had reopened as a tourist site
and included a room of distorting mirrors beside the shrines. This appropriation of
temples for secular activity can be seen as a milder form of the anti-superstition
campaigns of the eighties when
local party organisations often attempt to extirpate "superstitious" practices in campaigns that
are ritualised, appropriating the sites of popular ritual and converting them to purposes that it
defined as "healthy" (Anagnost 1994: 222).
However, as I shall show, the interest of the educated person is not always as secular
as it appears since many have an ambivalent attitude towards religion.
The layout at Shizian is, as I have mentioned, less ordered than at the Clear Lake
Temple, and features rows of small deities in front of the main ones. Inside the
temple, the main shrine is Buddhist. There's also a shrine to Guanyin, the Buddhist
goddess of mercy and centre of women's activities, as well as to Bodhisattvas. There
are also several non-Buddhist deities brought by visitors to the temple. The shrine
opens onto a small walled courtyard in the middle of which a small shrine with a
guardian spirit deity faced the main altar. Behind him, is the back of the courtyard,
which is covered and contains some chairs, a hearth and a cooking pot. This is
where the nun and others associated with the temple sit when not occupied in other
parts of the temple.
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One of the students greeted the nun and told her that we would like to draw lots.
Each student had to donate a small amount of money and kneel down in front of the
altar. The nun then gave him or her a bamboo jar holding bamboo spills and rang a
bell to attract the attention of the pusa (i.e. Buddha). The student then shook the jar
and selected a spill, usually the one sticking out furthest. Each spill has two numbers
carved on it which are references to quotations, which are then looked up in a
handbook. These, again, are interpreted in another part of the handbook (cf Ahern
1981: 47). But, before consulting the books, the nun throws two divination blocks
down in front of the altar and, according to the way they fall, she knows whether the
deity approves this choice or not.
The language in the book is poetic and vague and often has to be interpreted to fit
one's life, though some of it is definite enough. I was told that I would go to the
south and make lots of money, quite an appropriate prediction in an area where so
many people move to Guangzhou to look for temporary work. After me a student
who had the English name 'Ada,' a cheerful and unsophisticated young woman from
a peasant family, went to draw lots. Each time she drew the spill the nun threw the
two wooden blocks down and said 'bu xing' (it won't do), though this had not
happened in any of the previous cases. When she did pick a spill which, according to
the divination blocks, was right for her, it indicated that she would have problems
with her marriage, that she might have trouble finding a husband or she might
separate from him later. When Ada heard this she looked rather pale and shaken. She
explained that she'd had her fortune told before and drawn exactly the same spill.
The nun said reassuringly that everything would be all right if she prayed to
Guanyin, and offered her money, but Ada seemed uncertain what to do. She went
and sat with some of her friends and didn't say much except to repeat several times
that she hadn't believed in these things before but now she was beginning to. One of
the other students consoled her by saying that the same thing had happened to him in
his home town. He'd been told his fortune was bad and he'd gone back and prayed
several times and everything had been all right. Ada was not obviously convinced.
For a week or two she seemed subdued in class, but soon returned to her usual
liveliness. When we were back at the university I never asked her whether she had
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prayed to Guanyin or not, since I suspected she would not want to discuss it in this
environment. Sometime later I noticed that she was wearing more feminine clothes
and was, apparently, trying to modify her loud voice.
Ada may have raised the question of her future love-life out of a real concern, a
worry about making the transition from peasant girl to educated woman, or it may
have been just to amuse herself, for 'something to do.' But it was clear that the
experience had raised some important matters for her, despite the light-hearted
manner in which it had been undertaken. It is interesting that the students chose to
raise these questions of their future in this particular environment, so different from
their usual institutional setting. Usually, when asked directly, students would say
that they did not believe, though they might say that their parents did, but this
incident suggested that the outcome of their interaction with the deity did matter to
some of them. There was a tension here between the students' education and the
authority of the temple.
Historically and today, the educated have viewed local, non-institutional forms of
religion as an embarrassment, or as downright heterodox. As discussed in the
previous chapter, education in China is concerned with the inculcation of modern and
patriotic values which are fundamentally opposed to such activities. The following
quotation from 'Education in Contemporary China' illustrates well the moral and
political dimension of education in a system so closely connected to the state.
Whether the schools can cultivate morally and intellectually qualified students who support
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, love the socialist motherland, and serve the
people whole-heatedly is of vital importance to the future and destiny of China' (Central
Educational Science Unit 1990: 398).
This approach is not untypical, as Lewin and Little (1993) demonstrate in their
summary of recent curriculum reform in primary and secondary education. Many of
the reforms are progressive, taking a student and task based approach to education,
but nonetheless, they are combined with close links to the Communist Party. They
write of;
balancing the emphasis on basic knowledge, basic skills, and ideology and moral education.
These aspects should be combined harmoniously in teaching and textbooks,....
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Education in patriotism, productive labour, law and collectivism were to be enhanced'
(Lewin & Little 1993: 12).
This transmission of a homogenising elite culture, a culture which is unsympathetic
to local forms of religion, through education, has long been practised in China. Most
famously it can be seen in the tradition of the acquisition of Mandarin Chinese and
Confucian learning in order to gain office through the state examination system, and
in Late Imperial China, 'because there was a unified curriculum, one could assume
homogeneity in elite values regardless of locality' (Rawski 1985: 16).
Today, some aspects of life in educational institutions are specifically anti-religious.
Students all become members of the Youth League, a junior version of the Party, and
as such, like Party members, are not supposed to believe in religion. Similarly, some
religious expressions such as funerals organised by local Daoists, are not permitted in
educational work-units because they will be a bad influence on the students there.
Despite this, and though I was frequently told that only old women went to the
temple, a common comment from young people on temple visits was that they were
surprised to see so many other young people.
Students and young people are, of course, influenced by other factors, apart from
their formal education, and some students would visit temples as 'something to do,' a
leisure experience which made a break from their everyday life. Trips such as the
one I described were common, but I also occasionally came across students from
Jishou University attending temple festivals, though I believe this was considered
rather daring. At the evening performances which accompanied the fourth year
graduation, one of the graduating students greeted the assembled students with the
words, 'what a big temple festival!' (zemne da de miao hui), which was considered
very funny. A few students took Buddhism very seriously, and I have mentioned the
three students swearing sisterhood at Pingshanpo. Other young people went because
they had questions they wanted to resolve. I have suggested this may have been part
of Ada's motivation for drawing lots. On another day, at the same temple, I met two
young professional people from Jishou. They were rather evasive about where they
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worked, and said that they'd come partly to 'play' and partly on a serious matter.
Later I saw them earnestly drawing lots before the deity.
Conclusions
Siu suggests that there are two ways of approaching current religious and ritual
activities in China. One is to regard them as traditional activities which have re-
emerged or been revived more or less untouched by the years of socialism. The
other is that they are 'reconstituations of tradition' with 'a different cast of
performers' (Siu 1989: 122-3). The former approach is illustrated by the work of
Potter and Potter, who find a 'resurgence of...ritual life' in which 'the symbolic
structures which express the old social order have re-emerged' (1990: 336). Yang
takes a rather similar approach to the re-emergence of tradition when she suggests
that people in Wenzhou are returning to a previous tradition in order to counter the
disruption caused by China's sudden involvement with modernity (Yang 1996). Siu
herself, however, takes the opposing view. She does not regard ritual and religious
activities today as equivalent to those of the past, but describes them instead as
'cultural fragments recycled under new circumstances' (1989: 122,134). She cites as
examples the fact that people in Nanxil :i today do not know how to perform Buddhist
chants and are not familiar with the correct distinctions of dress for relatives at
funerals. The result is a kind of ritual 'flattening', where previous distinctions of
meaning are lost (Siu 189: 130).
Like Siu, I found that the temple activities in Jishou were not continuations of past
tradition. This is seen on the birthday of the Earth God, which has changed from
being a household and neighbourhood activity to being a single large festival to
which anyone is welcome. Buddhist temples, too, have changed, with less emphasis
on Buddhist texts and chants and more on the drawing of lots. As in Nanxi, many
people in Jishou know little about how ritual procedures were carried out in the past.
The ritual 'flattening' which Siu perceives in dress at funeral processions is reflected
in the similarities between festivals at Buddhist, Earth God temples and, as I will
show in the next chapter, there is also a similarity with the territorial deity temples.
It is also true that many people do not distinguish between kinds of temples. An
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example of this is an incident which occurred on our return from the birthday of the
Celestial Gate Earth God. Mrs Fang had said to me that she would give some
perfumed sticks to Mrs Shui because she prayed to her deity, Guanyin, at home.
With the perfumed sticks she would also be able to kai (open the eyes of) the
Celestial Gate Earth God on the first and fifteenth day of each month. I pointed out
that Mrs Shui might not want them. She hadn't come with us that day because she
only prayed to the Buddhist deities. But Mrs Fang just said, 'Guanyin, Earth Gods,
aren't they all the same?' I also found that some people spoke of Buddhist temples as
being ling, a quality usually associated more with territorial cults. I was sometimes
told that the temple to the Celestial Kings, with its fearsome meat-eating gods, was
Buddhist. Another time, I was told that there was another temple to the Celestial
Kings in a village called Ganziping, and when I visited found it to be Buddhist.16
However, to describe these temple activities as fragmentary would be inaccurate.
Although a few people, such as Mrs Gu, are critical of the changes which have tanen
place, many people take part in temple activities, as a means of addressing the
problems resulting from the impact of social reforms. In this it is similar to the
situation in urban Malaysia described by Ong, where forms 'acquire new meanings
and speak to new experiences in changing arenas of social relationships' (1988: 32).
I suggest then that the reappearance of temple activities is neither a continuation of
the structures of the old order nor a fragmentation of them but a flexible recreation of
them in ways which are appropriate to current economic situations. In this they are
similar to the activities at territorial cults described by Feuchtwang, changes which
are 'responses to changes in the nature of economic activities and economic
organisation'(1989: 16).
Siu also suggests that people, particularly young people, in Nanxi take an
individualistic and opportunistic approach to ritual and religion (Siu 1989: 128, 134).
For example, she describes young peoples' activities as having an 'indiscriminate
fervour' and being 'talismanic' or 'random' in nature. Their activities are worlds
apart from those of the old nuns who know the 'correct' procedures. I suggest that in
making this distinction, Siu assumes too clear a contrast between the 'tradition' of
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the past and the individualism of ritual observances today. Temples in Jishou today
are not so much sites of individualistic activities as places where people
communicate their problems and anxieties, and make contact with other people, often
seeking an alternative to the deterioration they perceived in other areas of society.
Moreover, it seems likely that the unorthodox nature of many temple activities is not
so much a result of the rupture which took place with the Cultural Revolution as part
of a longer term interaction between state and locality. As I have mentioned,
Buddhist temples were originally set up in West Hunan as part of a programme of
education and civilisation in West Hunan which was linked to the late Qing
programme of civilisation through education. But they became associated with
particular localities and local deities long before the institution of the Socialist state.
Indeed, Buddhist temples have something in common with the territorial cults I
describe in the next chapter. Most of the temples I have described have been rebuilt
according to local memories of how they used to be, or as a result of dreams.
Associated as they are with particular sites and particular areas, they are places
which local people often describe as ours (womende) or local (bendi), or belonging to
the laobaixing (the ordinary people). In this they have more similarities than one
would expect with the territorial cults discussed as the beginning of this chapter and
with the smaller Earth God cult described in this chapter. If we look at the
distinction Feuchtwang makes between Targe temples of Buddhist or Daoist
learning, pilgrimage and tourism' and 'smaller temples without government support,
financed instead by local donations' (1989: 14), most of the Buddhist temples I have
described show more similarities with the latter category than the former.
1 The wordpusa was used to describe the images in temples and the figures which they represent.
Pusa can be translated as 'Boddhisattva,' but since the word was used to refer to all kinds of figures,
ranging from military deities to Buddha, I use the more general term 'deity' to translate it. An
exception to this are the Tudi Gong which I translate as Earth Gods, since this term is in common
usage.
2 In some areas, territorial deities are associated with Daoism and Daoist rites are an important part of
the ritual calendar (Dean 1993: 3, Feuchtwang 1992:150f., 1992b: 94-7). However, during my stay in
West Hunan, I only once found Daoist practices associated with the local territorial cult, and when I
asked whether Daoists had been present at the temple before 1949 I was always told that they had not.
Although there was a statue of Yu Huang Da Di (The Jade Emperor), head of the Daoist pantheon, at
the temple, the Celestial Kings were always addressed first and at greater length.
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3 The material I cite here covers a range of periods, from the Song dynasty,(Hansen 1987, 1990) and
Late Imperial and Republican times, (Yang 1961) to 20th century Taiwan and mainland China (Jordan
1972, Baity 1975, Feuchtwang 1989, 1992). Despite the different time periods, the temple cults they
discuss show considerable similarities.
4 These include figures such as Zun Wang (Feuchtwang 1989: 17) and Chen Wu (Yang 1961: 153,
Seaman 1978: 109).
5
Hengshan, also known as Nanyue, is one of a number of sacred mountains in China.
6
For a discussion on beliefs concerning the polluting properties of menstrual blood, see Ahern (1978)
7
A discussion of these events is found in Chapter Nine.
8 The examples in the section are taken both from Buddhist temples and from the temple of the
Celestial Kings, since the same range of complaints were made at each.
9 Like the ordinary Earth God, the Celestial Gate Earth God is married and his wife's birthday falls in
summer on the same day as that of the wife of the ordinary Earth God, though unfortunately, I was not
able to attend this event.
101 use the word shrine here to describe small temples, including those situated within a larger temple
site. Since the word miao was used to describe both small shrines and large temples, this should be
seen as my own description rather than as a translation of an indigenous term.
'' An indication of their slightly anomalous position can be seen in the fact that this is the department
which is also responsible for dealings with people with connections with Taiwan and the relatively
powerless minor political parties such as the Democratic Party (Minzhit dang), which is effectively
subordinate to the Communist Party.
12 The worship of rocks and stones is mentioned by Jordan (1972: 43) and Graham (1961:177f.)
13 See for example, Jordan (1972: 27).
141 did not find out why this was so.
15 On the Pearl River Delta in Guandong.
16 This confusion was not confined to differences between Buddhism and local religion. People I met
at Buddhist temples, including people who worked in them told me that Buddhism and Christianity
were the same, both came from abroad and both preached compassion. I heard of a former Christian
who had become a Buddhist nun.
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Chapter Seven - Local deities: Imperial Officials or Local Bandits?
Introduction
I have suggested that Buddhist temples in the Jishou area are places where people can
address anxieties which arise as a result of social change. To some extent, this is
because they draw on forms of local authority. In this chapter I move on to consider the
three territorial military deities called the Celestial Kings (Tian Wang), to whom a
number of temples in the West Hunan area have been dedicated and who have long been
associated with the Miao. Like the temples described in the previous chapter, activities
at the temple of the Celestial Kings have changed in accordance with changes in their
economic circumstances (cf Feuchtwang 1992: 137). However, where military,
territorial deities such as the Celestial Kings are concerned, a sense of locality becomes
much clearer. The Celestial Kings have their own history, one which reflects a
specifically West Hunan point of view, rather than an official or general Chinese point
of view. They are worshipped on festival dates which are specific to the details of their
lives. Like other such territorial deities, they are concerned with the protection of a
particular area.
The three largest temples are in the towns of Fenghuang and Huayuan and the village of
Yaxi, situated between Jishou and Qianzhou. The temple at Yaxi, said to be the site of
their birth, is the most visited of all the temples in West Hunan. This is because it is
considered to be the most efficacious (ling). The Celestial Kings are dressed as Imperial
officials and are usually shown with imposing, even fearsome faces. Like other Chinese
military deities they 'sit augustly, with their legs apart and hands on their knees, gazing
majestically out at their supplicants' (cf Weller 1994a: 52). The eldest brother is usually
shown with a white face, the second with red face and the third, a black face. As well as
being called the Celestial Kings (Tian Wang), these deities are variously referred to as
the Three Kings (San Wang), the Three Great Kings (San Da Wang) and Lords
(Wangye). Local people say that the Celestial Kings are protective deities,
distinguishable from Buddhist and Daoist deities by the fact that they eat meat and can
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do harm to, or even kill, people. This is demonstrated in the story of their life which, as
it is told in the Jishou area, states that they killed seven thousand people who were
threatening the area.
Though to my knowledge the Celestial Kings are not found elsewhere, some of their
attributes are shared with deities from other parts of China. There are accounts of other
meat-eating deities in China and Taiwan who are known by titles which imply a kingly
or heroic status, some of whom are also found in groups of three (Dean 1993: 101-2,
Seaman 1978: 109, Katz 1987, 1995, Diamond 1969: 85f.).' Many of these are reputed
to be able to suppress plagues and exorcise spirits, capabilities not, to my knowledge,
particularly attributed to the Celestial Kings.
One of the most visually striking features of the Celestial Kings, their different coloured
faces, is also seen in other deities. The closest similarity appears to be with three deities
described by Diamond though here there is no account of why their faces are coloured
(1969: 85f.). Diamond was informed that they were Buddhist deities, but they were
regarded as plague-suppressing meat-eating deities, suggesting that they were not
originally Buddhist. Some of the plague suppressing deities described by Katz also have
coloured faces, and in one case this is said to be a result of drinking poisoned water in
order to save others from the plague (Katz 1995: 102 f.).2 The deaths of the Celestial
Kings as a result of drinking poison will be discussed below.
The popularity of the temple at Yaxi can be seen, not just in the numbers of people
visiting, but in the persistence with which people have built it up. The original temple
building was closed in the 1950s and the images of the deities were destroyed by PLA
soldiers. The temple building itself was allowed to remain in use as a storehouse for
some years, but later destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, and a baijiu (rice-spirits)
factory was built on part of the site. During the early 1980s, however, a small version of
the temple, built by local people, was re-opened there. It was crudely built of rocks, and
people brought small benches from their own homes to furnish it. Later, the temple was
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destroyed by the members of the Public Security Bureau, and this process was repeated
several times until the early 1990s, by which time a version of the temple, which I refer
to as the unofficial temple, was allowed to stand.
At the time when I began my field-work the unofficial temple, built from breeze blocks
and covered with a corrugated iron roof, was the centre of activities at the temple site. A
shelter, rather than a building, one side of it open to the elements, it had a makeshift look
about it. Inside, the altar was also made of breeze blocks and the figures of the deities
were quite small and crudely carved out of wood. The Celestial Kings shared a shrine
with their mother and were flanked by two smaller deities, who were described to me as
their servants.3 In front of them were candles, incense and offerings of food. Usually
the incense sticks were put briefly in front of the deities, but later burnt on one of the
piles of ashes outside because the smoke in the small shrines was blackening the statues
of the deities. The floor of the shrine was made of mud, the interior was covered with
soot from the incense, and there was a pervasive smell of the alcohol which people
threw on the ground as an offering to the deities.
Although described as 'The Temple of the Celestial Kings' there were several other
shrines and other deities present. A side shrine to the left held Guanyin, a Daoist
goddess of childbearing, and the Daoist god Yu Huang Da Di (The Jade Emperor). On
the right there was another shrine with a figure who was described to me once as Dong
Wang and, at another time, as Confucius. In front of the unofficial shrine there were
also makeshift huts and stalls, where local people sold goods and told fortunes. The rest
of the courtyard was unpaved and areas of it were taken up with heaps of smouldering
incense, spirit 'money' and other offerings to the gods such as straw shoes. The whole
site was dominated by the walls of a famous local rice spirits factory, and had the
unfinished look of a building site.
People visited the temple at Yaxi throughout the year, and it is said to be a sign of the
unusual power of the Celestial Kings that they are efficacious (ling) every day of the
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year. The Celestial Kings were also believed to respond to the prayers of people from
all parts of West Hunan and beyond. The women who worked at the temple told me that
visitors had come from as far afield as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. Once when I
was at the temple, I met a competent, successful looking woman who said that she was
here on business from Hubei. She said that where she was from there weren't any
temples, so when she came to Jishou on business she came to pray as well.
This description indicates that the rebuilding of the temple is a result of local people's
memories and beliefs. Local government, as I have mentioned, encourages the revival
of temples only in the form of officially recognised religious traditions, or 'healthy'
cultural activities. In fact, although the main focus of activity at this time was around
the unofficial shrine, there was also an official presence. The whole site was now being
overseen by the Jishou Minority Affairs Bureau because the temple had now been
classified as an example of Minority Culture. Employees of the Minority Affairs Bureau
were overseeing the building of a much bigger and more impressive temple behind the
unofficial shrine. Craftsmen inside were building huge cement statues of the three
deities. There was also a small building where people who worked for the Minority
Affairs Bureau collected donations for the completion of the new temple. The conflict
which ensued between local points of view and local government is described in Chapter
Nine.
Similarities between the Temple of the Celestial Kings and other Temples
As described in the previous chapter, deities at territorial temples differ from those at
Buddhist temples. They are figures who have histories as living beings and, in many
cases, they have a threatening aspect. Local people often describe the Celestial Kings as
'meat eating' deities, implying a contrast made in other parts of China by 'the
juxtaposition of compassion, and sweet meatless foods, with stern military guardianship
and meat' (Feuchtwang 1992: 57). Despite this, many people in West Hunan have
difficulty distinguishing between Buddhist temples and temples to meat eating deities,
and I found that many of the activities which took place at the temple of the Celestial
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Kings were similar to those which took place at the Buddhist temples. The revival of the
temple of the Celestial Kings is part of the process which I have described in the
previous chapter, whereby people attend temples in order to address problems resulting
from the impact of social reforms on their lives.
Most activities at the temple of the Celestial Kings took place in the middle shrine of the
unofficial temple, which housed the Celestial Kings and their mother, though the other
shrines were also included. Visitors brought food, usually meat, dofu and fruit, and
alcohol for the deities, laid it in front of them and made their requests. As at Buddhist
temples, the most common requests were for children or grandchildren, often more
specifically for sons or grandsons, for well-being both physical and emotional and for
success in business or exams. Again, as at Buddhist temples, people drew lots in order
to come to a decision about matters for which the outcome was uncertain. For example,
people who are leaving the area to do business come to ask if their fortune will be good
or not. Like the Buddhist temples, it was also a place where women would meet one
another.4
As I have discussed, many of the women who go to temples to pray, have problems in
their home and family lives. At the temple of the Celestial Kings the same situation was
apparent, not just in the visitors but also in the people who worked there. There was no
designated custodian at the temple, but a number of women, living in Yaxi village, made
a living there by telling fortunes, selling offerings and interceding with the deities on
other people's behalf. I will refer to them as incense sellers, though this is only part of
what they did. Many of them had little family support at all. For example, one of them,
Miss Luo, was a single parent with a daughter and two sons. She lived in the village of
Yaxi in a small house, has no land of her own and was putting her children through
school. As far as I knew, her only income was from her work at the temple. Another,
Miss Tian, was also single, perhaps as a result of a deformed hand. The most needy was
Old Mrs Yang (Lao Yang), an old widow who could speak Chinese and Kho Xiong. She
lived in Yaxi and said this was where she came from. When I first met her, she told me
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that her children had left home and she came to the temple to find money because if she
didn't do so she would be hungry. (It later emerged that, in fact, she was childless.) At
this time she did indeed look thin and rather desperate. However, she became more and
more closely involved with the temple and each time I saw her she looked a little better
fed and more cheerful. Sometimes, if she stayed at home because of illness Miss Tian
looked after her, and even when she was well, the others would sometimes bring her
food.
Some of the women who worked at the temple were reputed to be able to contact spirits,
a 'superstitious' activity, not encouraged by the authorities. Old Mrs Yang was a xian
nicing (spirit medium, lit., fairy woman), though she was too frail now to practice.
Another woman, who wore her hair in long plaits and lived alone in the hut where she
stored her goods, was referred to half-jokingly as a shen xian (an immortal). She was
notable for the emotional way in which she called on the deities, but she did not
associate with me and I found out little about her. In fact, I only found out these details
about contact with spirits by accident. It was not the spirit world which was discussed
between them but a need to make money.
The temple can therefore be seen as a place of refuge for women who do not have the
security of family support. Here there are parallels with the Buddhist temples in the Ta-
ch'i area of Taiwan where, according to Sangren, Buddhism is inclusive of socially
marginal people and 'physically and mentally disabled people ... commonly find a place
as custodians and assistants in Buddhist temples' (1983: 19-20). There are also
similarities to the pre-1949 Yaxi temple which, local people remembered, had provided
food for old people and shelter for beggars and the homeless.
The majority of visitors to the temple were middle aged or old women but, in addition,
people of all ages and backgrounds attended, often when they were facing a change or a
dilemma in their lives. For example, I once walked back from the temple with a couple
of women in their early thirties. One, called Shi,5 said she was a business person, she
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went to the north to buy fruit and brought it to West Hunan to sell. She said that she and
her friend came every month to pray, to ensure that their business went well. She
believed that it was a Buddhist temple and said that everyone in the area believed in
Buddhism, though she observed that she and her friend were young compared with most
people who prayed at the temple. June was a busy month, since it was the time when
students came to pray for success in their exams. At this time, Junior Middle School
students were preparing for the exams which would determine whether they would go to
the Senior Middle School or Vocational School of their choice, and Senior Middle
School students were preparing for the College Entrance exam. But the busiest times
were festival days, when several thousand people attend the temple in the course of a
day. Some were dressed in city clothes, others were dressed like peasants, and among
the peasants one could make distinctions among the embroidered tunics of women from
highland, Kho Xiong speaking villages.
As with other temples, a number of changes had taken place since pre-revolutionary
times, changes which reflected changing economic and social circumstances. Many of
the people to whom I spoke were aware of these differences, either because they
remembered the pre-1949 period or because they had heard about it. According to them,
the content of many requests made to the Celestial Kings has changed. Before 1949, one
of the most common requests was for rain (Shi 1986: 539). However, with the creation
of small local reservoirs, their rain-making function is no longer called upon, a change
which has been noted in other parts of China (cf Feuchtwang 1989: 16, 1992: 137).
Before 1949, the Celestial Kings were also called upon as judges in cases of dispute
between ordinary people, or even to decide who should be punished for being involved
in rebellion (Kinkley 1977: 39, Ling & Ruey 1963: 240). Although their function as
judges was seen in the case of the man who was bullied by the Liu family, which I
describe below, this is no longer a major function, presumably because, despite people's
complaints about order in West Hunan, the local government takes responsibility in
these matters.
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There is also less emphasis than before on their underworld connections. Mrs Gu talked
about how, before 1949, there had been a shrine to Yanwang, the God of Death, on the
temple site in which there was a model of a person being burned in a furnace of hell. In
those days, she said, no-one would have gone to the temple of the Celestial Kings just to
have a look, as they do today, because they were afraid of the deities and the harm they
might do. Like the temples described in the previous chapter, the temple of the Celestial
Kings at Yaxi provides a more enjoyable, recreational experience today than accounts of
the past would suggest. Like the Buddhist temples described in the previous chapter,
this indicates that rather than being a re-emergence of or return to the traditions of the
past, the temple represented a form of flexible recreation of the past in ways which are
appropriate today.
The Celestial Kings and the Locality
Although the concerns which people bring to the temple of the Celestial Kings are
similar to those brought to the Buddhist temples, the Celestial Kings differ from
Buddhist deities in important ways. Rather than being concerned with morality and
virtue, the Celestial Kings are portrayed as officials of a military demeanour who are
protectors of this part of West Hunan. Interactions which people have with the deities
therefore are not based on recognition of their virtue but on ^wasf-personal relations
based on shared locality and the exchange of favours.
At the time when I first begin visiting the temple, the close connection between the
temple and this particular locality was indicated by the incense sellers, who made use of
their local knowledge of the temple to make a livelihood. Not everyone who came to the
temple had contact with the incense sellers, particularly on festival days when the temple
was very busy. But on ordinary days most people had some interaction with them, even
if it was only to buy a bunch of incense sticks for one yuan.6 Incense apart, the most
commonly bought items were red wax candles and spirit money which is sold as bundles
of very crude, straw coloured paper cut into note sized pieces.7 Sometimes people also
bought crescent shaped biscuits, pieces of red cloth and woven straw sandals, made in a
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typical local style which was still worn by some poorer people.8 These offerings were
usually bought to accompany important prayers, according to the instructions of the
incense sellers.
The incense sellers often stressed the strong connections between the temple and locality
and they claimed to be knowledgeable about the best way to approach the deities. When
introducing the temple, they told me that Yaxi was the Celestial Kings' laojia (ancestral
home) and they also told me on several occasions that the deities were there to protect
the area and keep it peaceful. They often drew a contrast between this temple and
Buddhist or Daoist temples, by saying that the Celestial Kings were local to this area and
ate meat, whereas other deities came from elsewhere and were vegetarian. They also
told me repeatedly that the Yaxi temple was not like the famous temples in Changsha or
Shaolinshan, since the money for it had not come from the state (guojia).9 Instead, the
ordinary people (laobaixing, lit., 'old hundred surnames') had donated the money to
build up the temple again.
It was through their professed knowledge and understanding of the deities that the
incense sellers were able to make money at the temple. For example, once while I was
there a woman came to pray for her three children who were all taking exams. She
worked in the Minorities Cinema, a state owned cinema in Jishou which also acted as a
theatre. Her home town however, was in Yongshun, seventy kilometres to the north of
Jishou. She had brought some food of her own, fruit and dofu, and some baijiu (rice
spirits). She was intercepted by Miss Luo, the single parent with three children and in
the events which ensued she exchanged her knowledge of the deities for the money she
needed, or, at least, she persuaded her clients that this was so.
Miss Luo was a little younger than the others and dressed in a slightly more
sophisticated fashion. She had her own clientele of people who would ask specially for
her when they came to the temple. In public she always spoke of the deities with
reverence and she had a particularly light and smiling way of addressing them and of
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conducting her business with people. In private, however, she showed more faith in
Buddhism than in the Celestial Kings.
Miss Luo did not have a large stock of goods that day, so she encouraged the visitor to
go to another Yaxi woman who was a friend of hers. Here, at Miss Luo's suggestion,
she bought incense, candles, some of the biscuits, and a strip of red cloth for one of her
children to wear during the exam. There was some dispute over exactly which offerings
to buy, with the visitor arguing that 'We Yongshun people don't do it like that,' and
Miss Luo replying that the deities would not receive her offerings if they made them in
her Yongshun way.
When they went together to the temple, Miss Luo asked for the details of the exams the
children were taking and which school they wanted to get into and then put out the
offerings and prayed for them each in turn. They burnt incense and a candle in front of
all the deities in the temple. This was the usual practice but it varied whether people
went to the minor deities or the Celestial Kings first. However, the prayers to the
Celestial Kings and, sometimes, their mother are always the longest. During the prayers
the food was put in front of them and the incense seller threw the baijiu. The straw shoes
were burnt for the Celestial Kings. In this case Miss Luo described the children in turn
and the exams they were taking. She also held the red cloth and circled it around the
candle flame, appealing on behalf of the student who was trying to get into the District
Minority School, the best local Senior Middle School. The student would then wear this
cloth in the exam. However, she could not do this for the others because they were in
Yongshun. Miss Luo was perhaps the most adept of the incense sellers at convincing
people to buy more offerings for the deities than they would otherwise have done.
Sometimes, as I have described with the woman from Yongshun, this was based on the
premise that, as a local person, she understands the procedure better. Sometimes she
appeared to me to take advantage of peoples' ignorance.
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Once I visited the temple with a friend of mine, Miss Tang, an opera singer from the
countryside and also, coincidentally, from Yongshun county. She was not familiar with
the temple and she had no close connections in Jishou since she and the rest of the
troupe were passing through, moving from place to place. She wanted to draw lots to
have her fortune told. Miss Luo and some of the other incense sellers gathered round
and she explained to them, with some embarrassment, that she was not in good spirits
and she was concerned about finding a husband. They gave her the bamboo container to
shake and at this point she was unlucky and drew a number which corresponded to a
very bad fortune. Miss Tuo, recognising the number on the spill at once, said that that if
one had a bad fortune it was better to buy some offerings and worship the deities - was
she sure she wanted to go ahead with it and read her fortune? Miss Tang agreed to read
it, looked upset, and then seemed uncertain what to do next. Miss Luo and her friends
tried to draw me in by saying that I knew how ling the temple here was and I'd seen how
many people worshipped there. For a while, Miss Tang sat there, almost in tears, not
responding to their advice that she buy some offerings. I suggested we go to take a look
at the temple first, which we did, and Miss Tang was impressed by the size of the new
images of the Celestial Kings in the official temple, still being worked on by the
craftsmen. All the time we were doing this Miss Luo was following us around, looking
at Miss Tang enquiringly and making her feel uncomfortable.
I could see that she felt pressurised to make an offering but, thinking that she would only
be unhappy if she left without resolving the situation, I suggested that she get some
offerings of incense and some spirit money, saying that I would pay for it and that this
would be a good opportunity for me to get some photos of the event for my own use.
While she was buying the offerings, far fewer than she should have had for the sixteen
yuan she was charged, the other incense sellers crowded around her almost
intimidatingly. When I offered to pay the money they said unanimously that I couldn't
do so. This, they explained seriously, was her business and I couldn't do it for her.
First, they sent her by herself to pray to the other gods, which she did, also taking it very
seriously. Miss Luo gave her a piece of cloth which she had circled over the lamp and
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put over her head and made her step over, something I'd never seen done before. The
invocation to the Celestial Kings, for health and a good marriage, was much briefer than
usual. In short, she had been cheated. However, Miss Tang did not see it in this way.
Later, I said that I was sorry I had encouraged her to come when it had worked out like
this and she said no, her fate was bad, it was nothing to do with me. Instead, she'd
received something good from coming there. It seemed that she had been convinced by
the incense sellers' understanding of the deities and had resolved her dilemma through
this.
One reason why the incense sellers could convince people of their understanding of the
deities and make money from it was that, like the Celestial Gate Locality God, the
Celestial Kings are treated as if they were local officials and their responsiveness is
attributed to the nature of one's contact with them. In contrast to the Buddhist deities,
they were more likely to respond to people who gave them larger gifts or who came
from the local area. Thus, the best people to intercede with them were the local people
who sold incense at the temple, just as in other aspects of life, people might call upon
people with whom they have tong xiang relationships, to help them.
Like the deities Hansen (1987: 71-2) describes, the Celestial Kings were treated as both
very powerful and rather human. This was demonstrated by the way that the incense
sellers would call on them in a confident but conversational tone. If someone was
speaking to them on my behalf, they would always introduce me, emphasising that I was
a teacher at Jishou University and a foreigner in a way that seemed suggest both that
they should feel honoured to have this visit and that they might not understand about
foreigners without being told.
Often, like real life officials, if they did not give a satisfactory answer, they could be
won round with more gifts and by flattery, a point which has been made satirically in the
Chinese press (Anagnost 1994: 242). For example, once when I was at the temple site,
two women arrived and one of the incense sellers sold them some offerings and took
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them to the unofficial temple to pray. However, the way the divining blocks fell
indicated that the deities were not agreeing to their requests. The incense seller
suggested that they buy some straw shoes, which were duly bought and burnt, but the
divining blocks still didn't fall auspiciously. In an attempt to get the Celestial Kings to
respond to their request she told them, having checked with the people praying first, that
they would be attending the Celestial Kings' temple festival the following week. She
also told them that there was a Yingguo ren (British person) watching the proceedings.
However, although people treated the deities almost as if they were real people with
whom they had built up a relationship, it was apparent from their facial expressions,
their kingly titles and official dress that these were threatening figures and that they had
the capacity to do harm. An indication of this was that many people came to thank them
for having granted a previous request, an activity known as performing huan luo yuan
(redeeming a vow to the gods).10 This follows the same procedure as other interactions
with the deities. The person concerned makes offerings of food, alcohol, incense and
spirit money and bows or kow-tows in front of the altar. If a previous request has been
granted and huan luo yuan is not performed, it is believed that the deities may become
angry and do one harm. For example, I once came across a young couple and their child
who, following a minor road accident, recalled that they had not thanked the Celestial
Kings for granting their earlier request for a son and had come to the temple,
accompanied by their son, to do so.
Sometimes, in their capacity to punish, the Celestial Kings are used almost literally to
replace actual officials. For example, one day a man from a village in Fenghuang
county came to the temple. He said that two people from the Liu family had beaten him,
bullied him and forced him to leave his village. He'd been to the Prefectural
Government in Jishou, but they'd been unable to help. One of the incense sellers said
that even the government were afraid of the Liu family and they were unable to do
anything. The man wrote down a petition to the gods in which he asked them to punish
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the two Lius by killing them which he later read out to the third king and burned in front
of him.
The deities were also treated as though they were responsible for running the temple site.
Although the incense sellers mediated between people and the deities, they did not
consider themselves responsible for what happened at the temple, as I learned when I
started asking the meaning of some items which had appeared at the temple site. For
example, there were some black painted boards in front of the images of the Celestial
Kings with writing on them. I was told by one of the incense sellers that these boards
had been written by a xian niang (female spirit medium) from Fenghuang, a Miao
woman. This stated that since life was becoming more and more disordered and bandit¬
like (tufeide) people should come to the temple and burn chests of paper money. She
said that, originally, there had been two boards, but that now one couldn't be seen (kan
bu jiari). Another woman who had joined us told me that things like this had appeared
before in the temple. The two of them spoke of these as things which came and went in
ways that they could not account for. This had the effect of both disclaiming
responsibility and implying that such occurrences might not necessarily be happening
through human agency. When I asked if I could look at the boards more closely I was
not referred to someone in charge of the temple but told, with great seriousness, that I
should pray to the deities and ask them for permission. Despite the presence of people
working for the Minority Affairs Bureau, it seemed that the Celestial Kings were
considered to be in charge of the temple.
As an alternative to everyday life in China and as a place of refuge, the temple of the
Celestial Kings is similar to the Buddhist temples. The visit of the man who was being
bullied by the Liu family suggests that sometimes people turn to figures from the past,
such as the Celestial Kings, as a direct alternative to secular government. The temple
was also a place where people remarked on what they perceived to be the disorder in
society today. This is seen in the spirit medium's boards, mentioned above, which
described the situation today as bandit-like (tufeide) and the same word was used by old
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Mrs Yang to describe the situation today. However, their appeal does not lie in their
moral or virtuous nature since they have the capacity to do harm. Rather, they have a
form of alternative authority, based on the fact that they are protectors of the locality.
At the temple of the Celestial Kings, the 'production' of a form of locality is more
marked than at the Buddhist temples. As I have mentioned, the deities are believed to be
protectors specifically of the West Hunan area and are more responsive to people from
the locality and this connection will become clearer with the discussion of the histories
of the Celestial Kings in the following section. This does not imply, however, that the
deities are a symbol of an actual bounded community to which visitors at the temple
belong. Although they are appealed to by Jishou people, who see them as protectors of
their own locality, there are also visitors from elsewhere, who defer to the incense
sellers' knowledge of the deities. Conversely, only a proportion of the inhabitants of the
surrounding area attend the temple. Many people in Jishou show no interest in such
activities, regarding them as only suitable for old people. Nor, of course, does the area
they protect correspond with a politically defined area with aspirations to secession.11
Rather, the Celestial Kings represent a response to or a comment on the authority of the
state.
In discussing 'local' communities, Mitchell makes the point that such a community can
exist as a form of memory, rather than as an actuality, and in doing so represents a
response to 'the interventions of modernism' and a 'perceived decline in morality'
(1998: 92-3). The example he gives is of the memories of a neighbourhood in Valletta.
I suggest that the locality which the Celestial Kings protect is also a symbolic
community which has become meaningful because of the effects of change. This would
also account for the fact that visitors to the temple include people whose interests have
not been best met by the recent economic reforms, or who are facing periods of anxiety
as a result. But the production of this sense of locality is the result of an interaction with
the state which has continued over a long period of time, as I discuss in the following
sections.
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Territorial Deities and the Chinese State
One way of looking at the connection between territorial cults and the state is to look at
the way in which, during Imperial times, such cults were co-opted into the state cult and
became the responsibility of local officials. This was the case with the Celestial Kings
and many of the activities which took place there were organised by the officials.
Superficially, cults such as that of the Celestial Kings appear to be parallel to the official
or state cult which existed in Imperial times. For example, like the deities of the state
cult, they are treated as officials and wear official dress. Unlike the territorial cults, the
temples of the state cult were standardised throughout China and fell under the
responsibility of local officials. Each city had state cult temples to Wen (learning) and
Wu (martial arts), to the City God (Chenghuang Miao) and the Dragon God (Long
Miao). The rites at the official cult were also standardised and they can be seen as
12
forming an other-world version of the state's bureaucracy. Today, although the
buildings of some of state cult temples have been renovated as museums, in general they
attract few worshippers.
In fact the lines between state and territorial cults were often blurred. City Gods might
be regarded as deifications of actual people who had formerly lived in that particular
area and, conversely, many territorial deities were given official titles by the emperor
and co-opted into the official cult (cf Feuchtwang 1978: 128, Watson 1985, Hansen
1990). Official recognition of local deities meant that they were given special titles and
listed in the local gazetteers 'in the sections entitled "Ssu-tien" (sacrificial statutes)'
(Feuchtwang 1978: 104).
The past involvement of officials with the temple of the Celestial Kings is indicated both
in the written records and in people's memories, since as recently as Republican times,
the temple of the Celestial Kings was attended both by officials and by ordinary people.
Mrs Gu, and others, told me that in those days even officials were in awe of the deities
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and there was a special stone at which they had to dismount from their horses before
passing the temple. Another old Jishou resident told me that if they did not do this, the
deities would show their displeasure by causing a gale to blow. Local officials also had a
part to play in the arranging of temple activities. The sixth day of the sixth lunar month
is said to be the day when the Celestial Kings died and on the days leading up to this
date, a fast was observed. Mrs Gu remembers that one of the custodians from the temple
would go from house to house collecting money. Those who did not have money could
give rice or corn which would be sold at the market, to make money. If you were too
poor to give anything, she said, it didn't matter, but if you weren't you'd be too
frightened not to contribute. When the fast was due, people at the temple and at the
yamen (the residence of the officials) used to throw divining blocks, to find out when
exactly it was to begin and, although the answers of the two older Celestial Kings were
important, it was the response of the youngest which was the most important. The
custodians also threw divining blocks and a decision was reached between them. A
notice was then put up in the temple giving the dates of the fast and everyone observed
it. Mrs Gu also remembers visiting the temple at spring and autumn festivals which
indicates that the worship of the Celestial Kings had become an officially standardised
activity, 'a remembrance which became a regular spring and autumn duty' (Feuchtwang
1978: 112).
In contrast to this ordered past, at the time when I began visiting the temple there was no
official custodian there and activities on festival days, as on ordinary days, consisted of
individuals making requests or thanking the deities. It is tempting to regard activities at
the temple today as something which having deteriorated from a more ordered past and
as individual actions built on fragments of memory (cf Siu 1989). However, it seems
likely that these differences between past and present are, in part, a result of the fact that
officials no longer played a part in the running of the temple. The activities which take
place today represent not so much a deterioration as a continuation of one aspect of past
activities, that which was not concerned with official observances.
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Officially registered temples in Imperial China did not lose their reputation among the
local people for being ling, that is, for being responsive to all kinds of appeals. Even
when territorial deities had been co-opted, different ways of addressing them could be
distinguished. They were treated either as official representatives of the state or as
responsive, ling individuals. According to Feuchtwang, the former kind of activity was
distinguished by 'memorialism, officials, tablets,' and the latter by 'magic, ritual,
priests' (Feuchtwang 1992: 71). For example, Hansen writes that 'the register of
sacrifices is just a formality when compared to the reality of a given deity's power'
(1987: 117, see also Feuchtwang 1992: 103) and it appears that ordinary local people
continued to interact on an individual basis with the Celestial Kings. Evidence for this is
found in Shi who writes that during the period of the 'Miao' rebellions, some of the
rebels appealed to the Celestial Kings at Yaxi before they attacked Qianzhou, implying a
different interpretation of their role from that ofprotector of the area from rebels (Shi
1986: 59). Festivals in the past were also occasions for making individual requests of
the deities. Older people told me that, apart from the sacrifice of animals, the pre-1949
festivals were similar in their lack of organised ritual activity to festivals today. Thus,
while today personal requests to the deities for wealth and success may indicate a
growing individualism (cf Weller 1994b: 149, Feuchtwang 1989 16-17), it should not be
assumed that they represent a complete break from the past. Rather, they are
reformulations of those aspects of the temple activities of the past which were concerned
with ordinary peoples' concerns rather than with officials.
Histories
In discussing observances at the temple, I have suggested that official and unofficial
activities represented two different kinds of approach and have found little evidence of
an interaction between them. A history of interaction between state and local versions is
more apparent in the stories of the Celestial Kings, though initially these too appear to
be quite distinct. One, which is written in the gazetteers of the Qing dynasty but today
known only by academics and other educated people, depicts them as Imperial soldiers.
This story is based on a clear distinction between Han and minority and the need to
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protect a central Chinese from state from minority unrest. The other, which could be
described as 'dissenting', is told by local people and represents the Celestial Kings as
protectors of the locality. It is not concerned with ethnic differences. This distinction is
reminiscent of the differences between local and official attitudes to identity, which I
discussed in Chapter Five.
The local gazetteers are agreed that the correct version of the story of the Celestial Kings
depicts them as soldiers who put down a rebellion by killing seven thousand Miao
people and I assume that this, as a written text, represents a version of their story which
was current among educated people (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 402, 403,404, 671-2).13
The following story is from a gazetteer of the Qianzhou area recorded in 1878, but based
on earlier sources;
In "A History of Yuanzhou" concerning Yunsui [Huayuan], it mentions that a man named
Yanglai in Chengzhou and his other two brothers were all the valiant generals in the Song
dynasty. At that time the Miao were harassing the region and the three brothers commanded an
army to suppress them. They knew that the Miao were greedy so they killed some pigs and cattle
and had the meat cooked in the forest. When the Miao were vying with each other to eat most
food the three attacked them unawares and completely defeated them, capturing nine streams and
eighteen caves. After the campaign, only the remnants of the Miao with the surnames of Wu,
Long, Liao, Shi and Ma were left. Later, the three turned back to claim a reward and were envied
by some other officials, who gave them a poisonous wine which killed them on the Day of the
Slight Heat. Today the Miao still take the day as a serious festival and now their graves are in
Tuokou, Qianyang [Qianzhou] (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 402).
A similar version of the story of the Celestial Kings was recounted to me by a local
academic who worked on the West Hunan Miao, and others who knew of the temple
only through political education during the Cultural Revolution, suggesting that it is still
the officially recognised version. This story shows the Miao as a separate, primitive and
rebellious people and a threat to the harmony of Imperial control. It shares features with
the accounts of the Miao as primitive which are found in the 18th century Miao albums
(cf Diamond 1994) and, in its depiction of the Miao as 'Other' to the Chinese state, it
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finds echoes in more recent representations of the Miao. The assumption that the Miao
are different and rebellious is also the basis of the institution of the tun system.
What puzzled me was, if this was the story of the Celestial Kings, why did Miao people
worship there? Sources on the area stress that in the past the Miao worshipped at the
temple of the Celestial Kings (Ling & Ruey 1963: 240), and from the local gazetteer
quoted above, we learn that 'even Panhu, the ancestor of the Miao, who was also
rewarded by the emperor, didn't receive as much respect as these deities do' (Hunan
Difang Zhi 1991: 403).14 Worship of the deities also took place in Miao villages in this
century (Ling & Ruey 1963: 240, Zhou, Zhang & Xie 1992: 338f. Shi 1986: 481) and, as
I have mentioned, images of the deities were taken out to the villages by Miao ritual
practitioners (laoshi) in the hopes that they would bring rain (Shi 1986: 539-40). Today,
although lowland people are the more regular worshippers, people from distant, highland
Kho Xiong speaking villages also make offerings at the temple. For example, Miss Shi
told me that, though she did not believe in the deities herself, because she was studying
in Jishou, members of her village gave her offerings to take to the temple on their behalf.
It seems implausible that deities who, in life, had killed so many Miao rebels would be
worshipped by their descendants.15
One explanation given by official sources for the worship of the Celestial Kings by the
Miao is that it was imposed on the Miao people by Imperial officials, who created the
deities to frighten them into submission. This appears to be a politically motivated
explanation which fits well with a Chinese socialist view of the evils of the feudalist
system. It is the explanation which children were taught during the Cultural Revolution
and it still has some currency today. For example, I was told that local people in
Fenghuang objected to a branch temple to the Celestial Kings being built in their town
on the grounds that it commemorated the suppression of the Miao. It seems quite
plausible that in Imperial times, the official history of the Celestial Kings was an attempt
to inculcate a respect for the Chinese state. As I have mentioned, the use of ritual
observances was an important part of the civilising project of the Qing Dynasty.
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However, this explanation does not account for the continuing popularity of the temple
among local people, both Chinese and Kho Xiong speaking, today. Another explanation
was given to me by a local academic. When I asked him why Miao people worshipped
the Celestial Kings, he laughed and said 'everyone asks that,' and went on to suggest
that they were effectively worshipping the God of War. This, too, suggests that they
worshipped deities because they were in awe of their power.
However, only a handful of the people I asked agreed with the official story that the
Celestial Kings had killed minority people. One of these was Mrs Gu, who was at first
unsure who they had killed, and then said she thought they were minority people (shao
shu minzu) probably the Man16 but she distanced these from the Miao today by saying
that they were 'people who used to live in the area.' When asked, people from the Jishou
area gave slightly different answers to the question of who it was who had attacked the
area, but very few suggested that it was the Miao. Usually they are referred to simply as
enemies (di ren). Most people, when asked who the enemies in the story were, said that
they did not know, or that they were people from another place (waidi ren), sometimes
they were said to be from the neighbouring province of Guizhou. Here the point of view
is not one of a central Chinese state in opposition to barbarians but of people from West
Hunan, their nationality not specified, in opposition to people from elsewhere. This
suggests that the story of the Celestial Kings is taken to represent a shared sense of
locality, as I have described in Chapter Five.
The following is typical of local versions of the story, in which the Celestial Kings are
presented as both military figures and protectors of the area and was told to me by Miss
Luo, who sold incense at the temple.
The mother of the Celestial Kings, Mu Yi17 lived in a part of Yaxi called Yangjiazhai
(literally, Yang family zhai) and at that time they owned the fields where the new campus
of Jishou University has now been built so they were very wealthy, rather like you
foreigners. At that time there was a drought in the area and the rice seedlings couldn't
survive because of lack of water, so her father said that he would give his daughter, Mu
Yi, to anyone who could make it rain. Mu Yi went to the well at Longqiuba to wash
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clothes and her bracelet fell in and the further she put her hand in the further away it
seemed to be. As she reached in to pick it up, the Dragon King snatched her down into
the water. When night fell, her parents were worried about her and they went down to the
well and found that only her clothes were there. Mu Yi married the Dragon King and
stayed in the well for what in our time was only three days but in their time was three years
and, when she came back, she had three sons with her. The Dragon King turned into
human form and came with her and the family went to live with Mu Yi's parents. The
three sons had to change back into dragon form if water touched them. Every day
Mu Yi got water from the well and washed them while her parents were out on the
mountains in the fields.18 Her parents wondered why they were washing in secret and one
day they came back to have a look and saw the youngest brother in the form of a dragon.
When this happened, the Dragon King went back to the well at once, but the three sons
were unable to return to dragon form again because they had been discovered. Then, Mu
Yi's parents died and her brother came and destroyed her house and so the following
years were very hard for Mu Yi and her three sons, since she had to bring three children
up by herself.19 But the three brothers [i.e. her sons] were very strong. At that time there
was a grove of bamboo near where they lived and they dug up the roots with their bare
hands to make fields. After this there was a war.20 The oldest brother was eighteen, the
next fifteen and the youngest was twelve. Their mother did not want them to go to war
but could not stop them. During the war, the three brothers killed seven thousand enemies,
to protect West Hunan. When they went to tell the emperor of this they were afraid at
first to tell him the truth because they thought it might make him jealous or afraid of their
power so they told him that thirty six people had killed the seven thousand. Later they
told him the truth and, because the emperor was afraid of them he gave them some
poisoned alcohol, telling them not to drink it until they got home. If they drank it before
then it would poison them. But on the way home they stopped at Luxi and they were
thirsty so the first brother drank a little and he died. The second brother saw this but he
thought that he was stronger than the first brother so he drank some of the alcohol. He
drank more than the first brother and his face turned dark red and he died. The third
brother thought that he was stronger than the first brother and the second brother so he
drank even more of the alcohol and he died, his face turning black.
The horses found their way to Yaxi where they knocked on the mother's door with their hooves
and bowed their heads three times in a kowtow so she knew her sons were dead. She asked them
to tell her where they were, so they took her there. When she got to Luxi, the water in the river
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flowed backwards to Yaxi and the water at Yaxi rose. This is why there is a rhyme about Yaxi,
' Yaxi you yi ge dao liu gou, Liu shui wang qian zou' (Yaxi has a reverse flowing ditch, the
flowing water [in it] goes backwards).
This story is unusually detailed, but the main points, comprising their birth to a local
woman and a dragon, their killing of seven thousand people who were threatening the
area, their report to the emperor and their subsequent death as a result of drinking the
emperor's poisoned alcohol, were well known to older people in the Jishou area, and to
people of all ages in Yaxi.
The beginning of this story, in which Yang visits the stream, is similar to those found in
some of the official stories in the gazetteers, though some of these give different
versions, in which the mother of the Celestial Kings is impregnated through contact with
a piece of bamboo or rays of light (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 352, 403). Stories of
dragons as rain bringing deities are common in South China and have been evident since
at least the Tang dynasty as have stories of young women who become impregnated
while washing clothes and give birth to dragons or fish. These stories are often
considered to be derived from pre-Han cultures (Eberhard 1968: 38 f., 232 f., 242 f.,
Schaefer 1967: 255). These and the later details of water flowing backwards to Yaxi
indicate the temple's association with the control of the elements, as seen in its former
rain-bringing function.
As well as stating that the Celestial Kings defended the locality against its enemies,
rather than protecting the Imperial state against minority rebellion, this differs from the
official version in that their deaths are clearly blamed on the emperor and the oral
versions I heard without exception made this point. This is in contrast to the versions
told in the gazetteers, which attribute the blame for this to the emperor's courtiers, who
either give the poisoned alcohol to the Celestial Kings themselves or persuade the
emperor to do so (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 402, 404, 671). Distrust of the emperor is
not an unusual feature of oral tradition and similar themes are found in the stories of
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Cantonese peasants. Watson describes how, while local officials may be turned into
heroes, the emperor is portrayed as 'the villain of the piece and 'remote,
21
unapproachable, and extremely jealous of his power' (1991: 171, 173). This jealously
is overtly stated in the oral version of the story of the Celestial Kings. Despite this,
however, they are ultimately uncontrollable, since they refuse to stay in the
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underworld.
The continued popularity of the oral version of the story of the Celestial Kings, with its
emphasis on the locality and its distrust of the central state, suggests that it continues to
be meaningful today. The story expresses an identification with a locality, which is at
risk from outsiders. It does not comment on whether the people of the locality are Miao
or Han, nor, usually, on the identity of the enemies, the important thing is that they come
from outside. The fact that the Celestial Kings report their deeds to the emperor
suggests that they are responsible to him and, by extension, that West Hunan is not seen
as being in any way independent from the rest of China. But, as defenders of West
Hunan, as well as Imperial soldiers, the Celestial Kings are at risk from the emperor,
because the strength of a locality, even one administered by the Chinese state, is a threat
to the Imperial order.
I will argue that this story is a form of social memory. Social memory can be
distinguished from the inferential approach of historical reconstruction (Connerton 1989:
13). Where historical reconstructions are intended to determine what actually took place
at a past time, social memory is often concerned with 'how this type of memory bears on
contemporary aspects of social life or social relations' (Collard 1991: 89). Work on
social memory (e.g. Connerton 1989, Fentress & Wickham 1992, Collard 1991)
indicates that accounts of the past are influenced both by the experience of the
individual and by what is shared by the people around, since 'the narrative of one's life
is part of an interconnecting set of narratives; it is embedded in the story of those groups
from which individuals derive their identity' (Connerton 1989: 21). As Collard shows,
regarding accounts of the Ottoman period and the more recent German occupation and
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post war periods by Greek villagers, social memory takes the form of personal
biography, but it also forms a 'collective memory in that it is shared by a group of
people who share a history and over which there is some consensus (Collard 1991: 90).
This 'memory' may include events which occurred before one's lifetime but of which
one can give an account which is influenced by the views of that event held by others
around. In the case of Mrs Luo, her own personal story becomes interwoven with the
stories of the Celestial Kings. When she dwells on the story of Yang, a single parent
without family support, she invested the story with great feeling, reflecting her own
dilemma. But in telling this story she is also expressing a point of view about the West
Hunan and one which is shared with other people who tell the same story. The story of
leaders who protected the locality but were killed by the emperor suggests that West
Hunan is an area which, though unarguably part of China, is ill-served by the central
state. The continued retelling of the story and worship of the Celestial Kings implies a
continuing criticism of the Chinese state and reinterpretation of its meanings.
Bandits and heroes
Confirmation that the story of the Celestial Kings is relevant to people's experiences
today is found in the fact that similar themes are found in the stories of the 'bandits'
(,tufei) of the Late Qing and Republican eras, and in stories of earlier heroic figures of
the Qing dynasty. These stories, too, tell of heroic figures who defend their area and,
sometimes, have an allegiance to the central state as well. Like the stories of the
Celestial Kings, these stories are maintained, despite the fact that official accounts of
these figures are very different.
People who defy the laws of the country by making a living from robbing others, often
with the support of local peasantry, have been widespread in China, particularly in
forested, mountainous and border areas and these are often pejoratively described by
official sources as bandits {tufei) (Billingsley 1988: 17f). My use of the term does not
necessarily have this pejorative sense since many of the so-called bandits were regarded
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in West Hunan as local leaders. Accounts of Chinese bandit groups which developed
into full scale rebellion are common, particularly from the Ming dynasty onwards,
contributing to the 'unusual frequency' of peasant rebellions in China (Billingsley 1988:
3-4, Wakeman 1977: 201). Banditry was often a first step for those who became
involved in the 'Miao' rebellions in Guizhou (Jenks 1994: 54, 68-9). Many bandit
groups and peasant rebellions were closely linked with religious sectarianism and
according to local missionary sources this was also the case in early 20th century West
Hunan (Perry 1976, Wakeman 1977: 205f. Vance 1930: 190-1). The bandit leader He
Long (see below) was also a ritual practitioner (Kinkley 1977: 92).
Banditry was prevalent in West Hunan during the late Qing when the tun system ensured
a high degree of militarisation. During the Republican era, when banditry was
particularly widespread in China and became 'one of the commonest peasant reactions
to oppression and hardship' (Billingsley 1988: 2), West Hunan became particularly
famous as the home of bandits. As in the rest of China, many of these were soldier
bandits (Billingsley 1988: 27). West Hunan had become a virtually independent warlord
state, and Shen Congwen calculated that by 1918 there were 100,000 armed soldiers in
the area, though he adds that this is probably an over-estimate (Kinkley 1977: 61). The
large numbers of weapons and defecting soldiers added to the level of banditry since it
was from defecting soldiers and raids on convoys that weapons were obtained (Kinkley
1977: 56). For example, there are accounts from Shen Congwen of bandits robbing
water transport (an important form of transport at the time) and sometimes overpowering
boatloads of soldiers (Kinkley 1977: 117). The terrain of West Hunan must also have
been a contributory factor since the mountains and the large number of caves meant that
people and weapons could be easily hidden and the tun blockhouses themselves could
easily become rebel strongholds (Shi 1986: 206).
During the Republican Period in West Hunan, it was often hard to distinguish between
bandits and the local militia, since the violence of the bandits was matched by that of the
soldiers, many of whom deserted to become bandits themselves (Vance 1925: 213,
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Kinkley 1977: 93-4). Sometimes soldiers and bandits were reported to be 'in league'
with each other and some former bandits joined the militia and were assigned to protect
the area they had formerly controlled as bandit leaders (Kinkley 1977: 119f, Murray
1925: 389). When local bandits came into contact with Communist forces, some of
them, such as He Long, joined the Communist Party.
The most famous story of outlaws, Shuihu Zhuan (The Water Margin), which has been
widely popular for centuries, depicts these figures as an egalitarian band, protesting
against Imperial policies and robbing the rich to help the poor. Some bandits may have
been champions of the peasantry, or at least those in their immediate locality, in the
manner of'social bandits' described in Europe and elsewhere (Hobsbawm 1963: 14).
However, Wakeman's study shows that peasants themselves often regarded their leaders
'with ambivalence' since through their leadership they were likely to be transformed
into landlords and rebel and bandit leaders were likely to reproduce 'the very structures
they ostensibly opposed' (1977: 203-5 see also Billingsley 1988: 150f.). In West
Hunan, there were bandit leaders, some of them former army leaders, who impressed
locals and foreign missionaries alike by their behaviour (Murray 1925: 390, Frank 1938:
479, Kinkley 1977: 92), but often, as I will show below, one's view on such leaders
depended on whether they were local to one's own area. In West Hunan, local leaders
command loyalty from people in their vicinity, especially those with the same surname,
and hostility from those from other areas. Liang Zhaohui pointed out that maybe you
can never say who is really is a bandit (in the pejorative sense) because who you see as a
bandit depends on where you come from.
Official and Local Images of Banditry
My concern here is not so much with historical events as with the stories of the bandits
which I take as aspects of social memory. As with the stories of the Celestial Kings,
there is a clear difference between written accounts and those told by local people.
Previous to its promotion as a place of beautiful landscape and colourful minorities,
West Hunan was most famous for its bandit stories. After 1949, the Peoples' Liberation
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Army suppressed resistance in the area, much of which was Guomingdang supported,
and all local leaders were labelled and vilified as bandits, representatives of the old
society which the Communists were eager to overthrow (Ceng & Hou 1993: 138 f.).
The subject was particularly made use of in government produced materials during the
Cultural Revolution in order to illustrate the evils of feudalism. I was told that stories
about bandits were the only interesting lessons for a child at school during this period.
During the 1980s, a film and a television programme were made on the subject of the
bandits of West Hunan and they too present the bandits as anti-Communist, violent and
superstitious. Even today, students say that they were afraid to come to Jishou at first, in
case they found bandits there.
The most famous of the West Hunan bandits was Long Yunfei. The official story, as
told to Alley who travelled through the area during the late 1960s, claims that Long
'typified all that was worst in a rotten society' (1974: 23). He was said to have
terrorised and killed people in the area, especially the people who worked for him
directly and was later killed by PLA soldiers. Most famous is the treatment of his tailor.
According to the official story Long 'had him stripped, nailed to a young forked tree
with big nails and slowly had him skinned alive, each bit of skinning being done at half
hour intervals' (Alley 1974: 24). Visitors to Shanjiang, Long Yunfei's ancestral village,
can still see the tree where this event is said to have taken place. Under it is a concrete
platform on which people gathered during the Cultural Revolution, to learn about the
feudal evils of landlords and bandits.
However, the official stories of bandits are often contested. Local people deny that all of
the bandits were criminals, saying that some of them protected their local area and I was
soon told that the official story of Long Yunfei as recounted above was wrong. Long
Yunfei had never harmed the local people nor skinned his tailor and in his time the
Shanjiang area had been peaceful. This point was made more forcibly during a trip to
Shanjiang which I, with another foreign teacher and a group of Chinese school teachers
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made soon after my arrival in Jishou. We were accompanied by Mrs Long, a native of
Shanjiang, a Kho Xiong speaker and a distant relative of Long Yunfei himself.
The day began with a visit to view a Miao market in nearby Laershan, a trip which did
not give great pleasure to our urban Miao hosts. Their fashionable, urban clothes,
especially the women's high heels, drew quite as much attention as did the presence of
two foreigners. Despite the fact that Mrs Long spoke the local Miao dialect she was
treated with distrust. Young people by the sides of the road, who were chatting and
playing tapes of locally recorded songs in Kho Xiong, stopped and switched the music
off until we had passed.
The trip to Long Yunfei's house was, however, a great success. In the afternoon Mrs
Long's uncle, a middle aged man, took us over to the old part of the village where his
house was still standing, in ruins and unused. It was larger than the other houses,
surrounded by a defensive wall with watch towers and gunlocks. He showed us around
the old living accommodation and the stables and we went through an arch into a
courtyard. Here there were signs that some of the rooms were still in use but it was
getting dark and there was no-one else around. After a while another member of the
Long family, who had seen us go into the house, came over to join us and the two men
talked to us about Long Yunfei.
The teachers were curious and asked a lot of questions. They were particularly
impressed when they learned that our guide had been one of Long's bodyguards and
they wanted to hear all about how he had died. We were told that he had been about
sixty at the time and had wanted to escape to Taiwan. His nephew however, had shot
down a plane and had a number of effective weapons so he had persuaded Long to stay
and try to fight the PLA soldiers who were encircling them. When it became clear that
they could not win, Long had committed suicide and his son was taken to Fenghuang
and beheaded. The bodyguard claimed that he himself had left Long Yunfei when he
decided to fight the PLA.
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'What did he look like?' somebody asked. The guide replied that he had been rather
short and rather fat, 'like him' he said, pointing at one of the teachers who had gone
outside for a few minutes and was walking back towards us under the arch. Everyone
looked at him and laughed a bit nervously as if he really was Long Yunfei. People went
on to ask whether or not he was a good person and the members of the Long family said
that he was. He had kept order well, they said, and there was no unrest in the area when
he was in control of it. But they added that, since he had to provide for his men he had
to plunder other (waidi) places. As we walked back to Miss Long's house, the teachers
were concerned to explain to us again that Long had been the most important bandit in
the area and that the stories which were told about his cruelty were not true.
Other stories indicate that, since 1949, bandits have at times been regarded with
admiration and the actions of the PLA have been criticised. After their suppression by
the PLA in the 1950s, some former 'bandits' served their country and developed a
reputation locally for bravery. For example, Liang Zhaohui had heard of an ex-bandit,
the father of one of his classmates, who had been absorbed into the PLA and sent to the
war in Korea. There he fought the Americans so heroically that, being rather deaf, he
did not notice the call to retreat and narrowly escaped with this life. Others were less
easy to co-opt. Another story told of some former bandits who were taken for training in
Yuanning where many of them were massacred, probably because they were trying to
escape. Apparently this story was well known in the area and had led to widespread,
though muted, criticism of the local government.
A number of other stories of bandits who are warmly remembered as local protectors are
recorded in the oral histories collected by two PLA soldiers, Ceng and Hou, in their
book 'Suppressing the Bandits of Greater West Hunan' (1993). Unlike more academic
works on history, this book was much borrowed from Jishou University library and it
was the only book on the area which I found on the stalls of private booksellers.24
Similar stories were told about the early twentieth century Liang Guangxing who was
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said to have protected the local area by making peace with a very war-like bandit who
lived in Guzhang area, a little to the north. Liang Guangxing was from Majingao and, as
with the Longs of Shanjiang village, members of the present day Liang surname group
there claim that he was not a bandit and that he never killed anyone, though if pressed on
this they conceded that some of his subordinates may have done. As with Long Yunfei,
this suggests particular loyalty among members of the same surname group.
The themes which these stories share with the stories of the Celestial Kings are the
defence of locality, the ambiguous relationship with the state militia and, in many cases,
their ultimate death at the hands of the official security forces. However, the area which
they defend is not West Hunan but smaller areas within West Hunan.
Implicit in stories of this kind is the forgetting of other aspects of West Hunan's past.
Though people spoke of bandits, the institution of the Gan army or the tun system was
never mentioned and fortifications which still remain from the tun system are described
as bandits' homes and fortresses. This was the case, not just with those who
'remembered' the bandits favourably, but also with people from other areas who would
assume that there had been no schools or other institutions in the area before 1949, just
bandits.
Several writers have noted the emphasis given to local bandits or rebellious leaders, to
the exclusion of apparently more important historical events, in oral histories of Europe.
Both Connerton (1989: 20) and Fentress and Wickham cite Carlo Levi, who observed
that in southern Italy during the 1930s,
[t]he peasants of Gagliano were indifferent to the conquest of Abyssinia, and they neither
remembered the World War nor spoke of its dead, but one war was close to their hearts and
constantly on their tongues; it was already a fable, a legend, a myth, an epic story. This was the
war of the brigands (Levi 1948: 137, Fentress & Wickham 1992: 87).
Collard describes how Greek villagers recall the Ottoman empire as a time 'of freedom
fighters (and brigands), of national resistance, of patriotism and heroic deeds' rather than
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of oppression (1991: 96). Fentress and Wickham describe how in the 1960s, French
rural people in Protestant areas of Cevennes, could tell detailed stories of the Camisards,
an early 18th century Protestant rebel movement, but said very little about the French
revolution (1992: 93-5). The continuing relevance of the stories of the Camisards was
seen in the fact that during the resistance '"nouns de guerre such as Roland and Castanet
were common, and so were eighteenth century songs, reused Camisard hiding places,
and even remembered military tactics' (Fentress & Wickham 1992: 94).
Fentress and Wickham suggest two reasons for this, one being that the 'Great Events' of
the past are designated as such by people external to most local societies' (1992: 96).
The other is that shared memories such as these 'tend to be remembered in the first place
because of their power to legitimise the present, and tend to be interpreted in ways that
very closely parallel (often competing) present conceptions of the world' (Fentress &
Wickham 1992: 88). Given the close contact with which West Hunan people came into
contact with the tun system, it appears that the latter argument is more relevant to West
Hunan and I suggest that 'memories' of the bandits and the Celestial Kings indicate a
continuing identification with a locality, which is interposed within the Chinese state but
regards the central state with distrust.
Territorial deities and Bandits
Similarity between bandit stories and local deity stories are not unusual in China. There
is an association of temples with martial arts bands, etc. (Feuchtwang 1992: 83. Jordan
1972: 48-9). Both bandits and deities are in some ways superhuman individuals, outside
the control of the state. Like bandits, military deities are said to be in command of spirit
soldiers and this was said of Celestial Kings earlier in the century and also during the
period of my fieldwork (Jordan 1972: 50-51, Shi 1986: 481). Writers on Chinese
religion have drawn explicit parallels between military deities and bandits. For example,
Seaman (who translates Wangye as god-king) writes,
These are spirits that are worshipped as gods though they are thought not to have been
appointed by the Jade Emperor. They are specifically likened to the semi-independent
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'country-kings' (Kuo-Wang) of historical China, who, although formally acknowledging the
suzerainty of the Chinese Emperor, actually ran their own territories as they saw fit. It is thus
not unexpected that many of these 'god-kings' are thought to have been terrible pirates or
powerful robber chieftains (Seaman 1978: 55).
A similar point is made by Weller who describes military deities in Guangxi province
who 'acted like the local strongmen who sometimes usurped state authority and ran their
own little empires where the state grew weak' (1996: 253) and Katz (1987: 203) points
out that the term wangye which is so often used to describe such deities, is also
commonly used to refer to bandit leaders.
The story of the r/was z-historical figure of Luo Daren, also of Yaxi village, shows
striking similarities with that of the Celestial Kings. In both stories the protagonists
were closely connected with water. When the Celestial Kings died, the water in Yaxi
flowed backwards, when Luo Daren died, a well in Yaxi churned up silt. When the
father of the Celestial Kings came to earth he turned back into a dragon if touched by
water and once this was known, he had to return to the well. When Luo Daren washed
(according to the local story) he turned into a fish and when this was seen by his servant
it resulted in Luo Daren's death.
The deification of the Celestial Kings, with their similarities to bandits and associations
with the same themes of locality and tension with the Imperial state, is part of this
process whereby the past is brought into the present. Thus, when people call upon the
ling of the Celestial Kings today, for all sorts of highly individualistic reasons, they are
concerned with a shared memory of locality. For some this may not be their own
locality since, as I have mentioned, many people come from elsewhere to pray at the
temple, many people may not know the story of the deities, but they are ultimately
involved because they are deferring to the ling quality of the deities and it is on this story
that their ling is based.
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Interaction between local and official versions
In contrast to this, in the official stories local mobilisation is portrayed as rebellion and,
in the case of the story of the Celestial Kings, is equated with minorities. These official
versions of the stories of territorial deities have been described as imposing 'a kind of
unity on regional and local-level cults' (Watson 1985: 293) and as 'superscribing'
(Duara: 1988), suggesting that they are means of controlling the local versions of the
stories of the deities. In this section I look at the background to this and consider the
interaction between official and oral versions of the stories.
I have suggested above that one of the reasons why activities at the temple at Yaxi today
appear to differ from those of the past, is that past activities were to some degree shaped
by an official involvement which no longer exists. In the Qing dynasty, as part of a
general trend which occurred all over China (cf Feuchtwang 1978: 128, Watson 1985,
Hansen 1990), the Celestial Kings were recognised by the emperor. Recognition of
local deities meant that they were given special titles and listed in the local gazetteers 'in
the sections entitled "Ssu-tien" (sacrificial statutes)' (Feuchtwang 1978: 104).
According to the gazetteers, the registration of the Celestial Kings was a reward for the
continued protection they were believed to have given the lowland area during Miao
rebellions of the Qing dynasty (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 404, 672). This shows that they
were taken to be anti-Miao. For example, in one gazetteer account, it is said that during
the Qianlong reign (the period of the greatest 'Miao' rebellions), 'the gods made
heavenly lights appear' which blocked the roads between the rebels and refugees and
when people took refuge in the temple, rebels who attempted to enter 'died suddenly
with blood spouting from their mouths' (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 405). The deities
were also reported to have helped the General Fu Nai himself, appearing beside him and
frightening off the rebels. The titles they were given were 'Xuan Wei Zhu Sun' meaning
that they 'demonstrated impressive power and assisted righteousness' and the second,
'Ling Ying, Bao An, Xian You, Hu Guo', meaning 'efficacious response, protecting the
peace, showing blessings and protecting the country' (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 672).
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All of this suggests that they are different because urban and/or educated people had
more to fear from local rebellion and less to fear from the emperor's anger. Evidence
that the gentry and/or urban people were more inclined to worship official figures is seen
in the following story. Mrs Gu, always a good source on the pre-1949 gentry, talks of
people in the old Imperial city of Qianzhou looking to the memory of the Imperial ruler
Fu Nai, rather than local military deities, when they were under attack. Fu Nai was the
official sent to West Hunan at the end of the eighteenth century to put down the
rebellions and establish the tun system. When the city of Qianzhou was attacked by an
army from Sichuan, people made shrines to Fu Nai and prayed to him, first for
protection and later out of thanks because he had built the walls which were protecting
them. The warlord army from Sichuan tried to blow up the walls with gunpowder-filled
coffins but they made little impact and some of them did not explode at all. This was
attributed to Fu Nai's protection
This implies that different stories of the deities and different ways of worshipping them
were associated with different social backgrounds. However, it seems very likely that
there was some connection between the two, since oral and written traditions are rarely
completely separable (Fentress & Wickham 1992: 97) and the local stories of the
Celestial Kings share features with those found in the gazetteers. It is unclear whether
the cult of a local protective military leader was then co-opted by the state and
transformed into an official cult to the Celestial Kings, in their form as subduers of the
Miao rebellion, or whether an official cult to three military deities was imposed on the
area, perhaps in honour of historical figures, and locally meaningful stories of protective
leaders accrued to it.
Cases of the first type of interaction have been described in other parts of China, most
famously the cult of Tian Hou (also known as Ma Tsu), as described by Watson (1985).
Watson writes that, in the original, local accounts, Ma Tsu was 'an unusual woman who
did not fit any of the stereotyped roles set aside for women in Chinese peasant society'
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since as a child she never cried, as a woman she remained unmarried and childless, and
she died when only twenty seven (1985: 295). Versions from Hong Kong go further and
say that she was one of the low caste boat people (often referred to as Tanka) of south
China, and a medium who committed suicide rather than marry (1985: 297). After the
cult had been officially approved, however, and the deity given the official title of Tian
Hou (Empress of Heaven), written versions of the story were produced which ignored
her early death and unmarried status and 'stress her "worthy" social origins in the family
of a virtuous official of low rank' (1985: 297). In popular versions her main role as a
deity is to protect fishermen at sea but in official versions she is credited with, 'the
suppression of pirates and other "opportunists" (reading between the lines this can only
mean boat people) who take advantage of disorder along the coast' (1985: 298). This
was part of a process of imposing an elite culture onto local difference by 'imposing a
kind of unity on regional and local level cults' (Watson 1985: 293). Since the cult of the
Celestial Kings was officially approved, it is possible that this too was a process of the
co-option of a local cult into an official cult.
However, there are accounts of a reverse process taking place in West Hunan, that is, of
official cults which were taken up and given different meanings by local people. We
know that some deities were introduced into the area from outside since Lombard-
Salmon writes of Han settlers in nearby East Guizhou bringing their own deities to the
area (1977: 264). The best recorded case of a deity who was introduced into West
Hunan by the incoming Han is Ma Yuan (Lombard Salmon 1977: 265, Sutton 1989, von
Glahn 1983). Unlike the Celestial Kings, Ma Yuan is a relatively well known historical
figure who died in 49 AD while attempting to bring the West Hunan area into the sphere
of Imperial control. From the Ming dynasty onwards, temples were built to him in
recently subdued minority areas such as Guangzhou, Guangxi and Hainan (Sutton 1989,
Yang 1961: 173, von Glahn 1983: 354). In his deified form, he was worshipped as the
civiliser of barbarians and was also attributed power over floods. Sutton (1989) suggests
that the introduction of the cult of Ma Yuan was in, effect, an imposition of Han culture
on the indigenous people. He quotes from local sources which say that the local
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'savages' worshipped Ma Yuan and suggests that 'Ma played his role in transforming
the minorities with Han culture' (Sutton 1989: 102).26 However, von Glahn (1983: 354)
suggests that rather than commemorating the subduing of the region, the adoption of this
cult by local people occurred because they transformed it into a cult of a giant serpent,
believed to live in local streams.
A similar case is described by Lombard Salmon, who writes of a West Hunan temple,
established in memory of a local hero 'Duke Yang', on account of his meritorious deeds.
This, too, was given local meanings, becoming a cult where local minority people
prayed for protection from drought, flood and other calamities (1977: 151). It seems
possible, therefore, that like these deities, the Celestial Kings were introduced as a result
of the Han subjugation of the area, but were reinterpreted by local people to have other
meanings. These examples would also accord with the process I have been describing
whereby the administration introduced Buddhism into the area in order to civilise it and
these temples are now considered characteristically local (bendi). It is also possible that
both the above processes have taken place in an ongoing interaction, what Katz
describes as a process of'reverberation' (1995: 114).
So far I have concentrated on differences between local and official versions since, like
Watson (1985) I found these differences apparent. Duara makes a similar point to
Watson's when he discusses the 'superscription' of the cult of Guandi by the state, but
his emphasis is less on 'the radically discontinuous nature of myths' and more on the
'commonality' behind the different stories which gives them their 'legitimating power'
27
(Duara 1988: 778-9). Since the official version of the myth is no longer expressed at
the temple, it would be difficult to find out how far the different versions were regarded
as continuous or discontinuous. From the lack of mention of the official version today,
it seems possible that local people feel it has no relevance to them.
Whatever the interaction which has taken place in the past between official and oral
versions of the story of the Celestial Kings, the result has been stories of deities who are
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seen to be particularly ling. In this the temple to the Celestial Kings is a strong contrast
to that of the historical figure Ma Yuan, which was formerly part of the state cult and
today is barely considered to be a temple at all. The temple to Ma Yuan had been
restored and is now used as an old peoples' activity centre and a theatre for local opera
performances. It is rarely used for religious purposes and I never heard it described as
ling. When I asked people who were attending the opera about it, I was told that,
although there were some deities there, it was not really a temple.
To describe the temple of the Celestial Kings as a local temple is not to suggest that the
power of the state has somehow failed to reach the area. Despite its reputation as a
remote area, West Hunan has been closely administered by the state since Late Imperial
times. Today Jishou is also a consumer of imported goods, fashions and media images
from the rest of China and the world. I have drawn a distinction between official and the
non-official observances which took place at the temple in Imperial and Republican
times, but activities at the temple are also characterised by a process of interaction
between representatives of the state and other, ordinary people of West Hunan. This
interaction has continued over centuries and it is unclear whether the Celestial Kings
were originally indigenous figures who were co-opted by the Chinese state or official
figures to whom local meanings were attributed. What is apparent is that the images of
the locality which persist at the temple and in the related stories of bandits are the result
of a process of interaction with the state but they are also critical of the state. They
express the view that West Hunan is a marginal place, better served by indigenous
leaders than officials of the state. Nevertheless, these stories are not ones of outright
resistance or secession since often the 'bandit' leaders of the locality, like the Celestial
Kings themselves, continued to be responsible to the Chinese state. These images
remain appropriate today since, as I have said, many West Hunan people continue to feel
that their interests are not well served by recent social and economic changes. Further
more, their criticisms are sometimes levelled directly at the local government, as I will
discuss in Chapter Nine.
198
1 Another possible parallel which can be drawn is with the Three Officers (San Guari), deities of the
Daoist pantheon, who, like the Celestial Kings, were also guardians of the underworld. According to
Strickman (1979) these deities occupy the very lowest rung of the Daoist pantheon, where the Daoist
deities meet and control the figures of popular religion and they embody 'the radical opposition between
the practice of pure Tao and worship of the sanguinary gods of popular religion' (180). However, as I
mentioned, there was little reference to Daoism at the temple of the Celestial Kings.
2 Another possibility is that the darker faces of the second and third brothers indicate their greater
efficaciousness (ling) since deities who are particularly efficacious receive large numbers of offerings, the
smoke from which colours their faces black. This is the reason Sangren gives for the fact that in Taiwan
the Buddhist deity Ma Tsu is often represented as having a black face (1991: 72).
3 For a fuller discussion of Mu Yi, the mother of the Celestial Kings, see Chapter Nine
4 The kinds of problems they discussed were very similar to those discussed at Buddhist temples and I
have combined the two in my discussion of women's concerns in the previous chapter.
5 When I asked her name she explained it was 'shao shu minzu de Shi' i.e. minority nationality Shi.
6
About 10 pence.
7 This was made locally from the off cuts and leaves of bamboo plants.
8 The sandals were never seen at Buddhist temples.
9
In Changsha, as in most Chinese cities, a number of temples have been renovated and opened as tourist
sites. The Shaolin temple, in Henan, is one of the most famous in China.
10 For a detailed account of huan luo yuan Chapter Nine.
11 This is contrast to the past when the temple was more literally the of a focus of an actually existing
community. Mrs Gu said that, before 1949, everyone, rich and poor, ordinary people and officials, would
worship at the temple.
12 For a full account of the state cult see Feuchtwang (1978, 1992) and Zito (1987). The involvement of
Daoist priests does not seem to have been a major factor at the temple of the Celestial Kings, but see
Chapter Nine.
131 discuss another version from the gazetteers in Chapter Nine.
14 The description of Panhu as ancestor of the Miao is a common misconception. For a discussion of this,
see Lemoine (1982: 12).
15
However, I discuss this possibility further in Chapter Nine.
16 A term for the minority people of the south in ancient times, often translated as southern barbarians.
17 The characters for Mu Yi are formed from the two parts of the character for her surname, Yang. In fact
Miss Luo did not use her name, since this would have been disrespectful, and simply referred to her as
'she' but I have inserted her name into the story for the sake of clarity.
181 asked what happened when the dragon father washed and she said that he too would have turned back
into a dragon, but he didn't wash.
19 Miss Luo, a single parent herself, said this with especial feeling.
20 Miss Luo's story was unusual in that she said that the Celestial Kings went to fight the Yang ren, that is,
the foreigners. In this she was perhaps influenced by the story of the locally born heroic figure, Luo
Daren, who is discussed later in this chapter.
21 It is also indicated in the story of Dong Wang, the deity at one of the side shrines in the temple of the
Celestial Kings, who I was told, revolted against the emperor after the emperor carried off his wife.
22
Tapp (1996) and Faure (1988) also discuss stories, told by minority people, which depict heroic figures
who come into conflict with the emperor.
23 This was the village where I attended the Si Yue Ba festival (see Chapter Four).
24 Not all bandits are remembered so favourably. It is undoubtedly true that many bandits committed
violent acts, as the accounts of Western missionaries in the area testify (Vance 1930: 190, Murray 1925:
390). Miss Shi, a young woman from the highland, Miao speaking village of Liuboshan told me that there
had been bandits in her area before the 1950s but that they were just people from the next village with
guns who would come to your homes and steal from you. No-one would bother to rule and protect their
area, as Long Yunfei had done in Shanjiang, because it was so poor.
25
According to Shi, much of whose work is based on local oral history, these deities also protected the
locality from attack by non-minority outside forces, in particular the Taiping rebels (Shi 1986: 252).
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26 Sutton also quotes a seventeenth century poem which includes the lines
'To this day when the savage girls dance'
they still sing the Han marching songs.'
27 Duara considers stories about Guandi. Known throughout China as the god of war and a symbol of
loyalty, he was originally, according to The Romance ofthe Three Kingdoms 'an outlaw - a righteous
outlaw who killed an exploitative magistrate - but an outlaw nonetheless.' In elite versions, however, his
story is retold as someone who has 'assisted in the well-being and long peace in the empire' and an
example of Confucian virtue (Duara 1988: 784).
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Official temple, unofficial temple and museum: Yaxi 1996
The Celestial Kings at the unofficial temple: Yaxi 1996
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Incense seller and client at the unofficial temple: Yaxi 1996
Long Yunfei's house: Sanjiang
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Chapter Eight - Questions of Ethnicity
I have so far made little mention of social differentiation expressed in terms of
differences of ethnicity or nationality, although such matters arose when describing
the work of the Cultural Department (Wenhua Ju) and the Minority Affairs Bureau
('Min Wei'). In part this is because the people I talked to, particularly those living in
the lowland areas, generally used a vocabulary of local and non-local practices and
people. Images of difference are often those presented by local government. An
example of this is the New Year activities at Aizhai which the local Cultural
Department makes distinctively 'Miao' through the arrangement of drum dancing
competitions and Kho Xiong language singing. Until recently, however, these
occasions, marked by dragon dancing and lion dancing, were very similar to those of
Chinese speakers nearby.
To suggest that there is no differentiation between Chinese speakers and Kho Xiong
speakers or even between people of Chinese speaking descent and those of Kho Xiong
speaking descent would, however, be inaccurate. Given this and the fact that West
Hunan is officially designated a Tujia and Miao Autonomous Prefecture, a
discussion of ethnicity as a dimension of identity would appear to be relevant to my
material.
The Term Ethnicity
I begin with a brief review of the uses of the term 'ethnicity'. In social anthropology,
reference to ethnic group as such, rather than culture or society can be dated to the
publication in 1969 of the collection of essays entitled Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries edited by Frederick Barth. These studies drew attention to the
situationalist nature of ethnicity, that is, that ethnic groups are formed by the
maintenance of ethnic boundaries through social interaction rather than given
through objective and essential features of particular cultures. This contrasts with
earlier work, such as that by Shils (1957) which had suggested that ethnic groups
were based on quantifiable cultural differences and differences in origins. This
primordial approach, attributing ethnic identities to awareness of historical origins,
203
was also expressed by Geertz (1993: 255). As Barth writes, in constructing a
boundary, '[t]he features which are taken into account are not the sum of 'objective'
differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as significant' (Barth
1969: 14). Ethnicity, when defined in this way, does not refer to static or pre¬
determined groups. By Barth's definition, ethnic divisions can be expressed on
different levels and units such as "'community", "culture," language group,
corporation, association or population are all potentially ethnic groups' (1969: 34).
And people's ethnic identification of themselves and others may be brought into play
differently in different situations. As Handleman writes, 'the same person can be
categorized according to different criteria of relevance in different situations' (1977:
192, see also Okamura 1981: 460, Nagata 1974: 340).
A slightly different actor centred approach to ethnic group formation was the work of
the instrumentalist school. Writers such as A. Cohen (1969) and Despres (1975)
considered the role played by competition between people in order to gain access to
privileges and scarce resources. Writing of this in the context of urban Nigeria, A.
Cohen is critical of primordial approaches to ethnicity, stressing that the formation of
ethnic groups is not the result of 'conservatism.' Instead, he shows how ethnic group
identity became more clearly defined and cohesive as people attempted to gain a
monopoly over a particular trade. Brass takes a similar approach to the formation of
ethnicity, seeing it as 'a competition for state power and state resources' (1985: 30-1,
see also Despres 1975).
Despite this shift to an actor centred perspective and a situationalist or
instrumentalist approach, the notion of the existence of social groups with
objectively identifiable cultural traits still lingered in the background. After all, from
what was the actor supposed to select the ethnically significant facts? As R. Cohen
writes, the use of terms like 'terms like "group", "category", "boundary" connote an
actual entity, and Barth's concern with maintenance tends to reify it all the more'
(1978: 386). Another problem which arises is the question of how far the notion of
ethnic groups is descriptive of something distinguishable from groups based on, for
example, religion, language or locality. Furthermore, if anthropologists do make this
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distinction between ethnicity and other forms of identity, how far are they reflecting
the complexities of the situation? Fardon makes this point when he writes that,
ethnic discriminations are elements of more general classifications which identify relations of
similarity and difference within social universes Since ethnicity gobbled up these
distinctions and regurgitated them as variants of a single type of 'ethnic' difference, it seems
that many notes on the scale of difference have become muted if not lost (1987:171)
and the sensitivity of ethnicity as an intellectual tool has also been called into
question by Banks (1996: 9). The limitations of the notion of 'ethnic' groups in
representing indigenous views had already been indicated by Leach in the context of
Highland Burma (1964: 105) and more recently by Linnekin and Poyer (1990) with
respect to Oceania.
Further developments in the direction initiated by situationalists such as Barth have
emphasised the purposes and intentions of the actors in constructing and projecting
identities, an approach which is concerned with the construction of 'imagined
communities' (Anderson 1983). The reality of any collectivities which might appear
in consequence is now largely symbolic and there is a corresponding theoretical shift
away from ethnic groups or societies to questions concerning identity (see especially
A. P. Cohen 1994). Because of its emphasis on the symbolic rather than the actually
existing group, such an approach is effective at taking into account the heterogeneity
within communities, the 'very different and competing notions about the origin,
history, culture and boundaries of the group' (Vermeulen and Gover 1997: 15). As
A P Cohen puts it 'because ethnicity is expressed symbolically, it is possible for this
internal diversity to be preserved, even while it is masked by common symbolic
forms' (1994: 62).
Fardon writes that he treats universalising definitions of ethnicity with suspicion
(1996: 118) and in this thesis, I follow Linnekin and Poyer's search for a 'theory of
cultural identity' relevant to their ethnographic area (1990: 5). In the following
chapter I refer to writers who are concerned specifically with the people who lived
within or at the periphery of the Chinese sphere of influence, but had not fully taken
up the way of life associated with their wet-rice cultivating, hierarchical, Chinese
speaking, often literate neighbours (Leach 1984, Lehman 1967, Tapp 1989).
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In examining how far the notion of ethnicity is relevant to my study of Jishou, I
begin by looking at identity cards. I ask whether being registered as Han or Miao is
an indication of a perception of belonging to a particular ethnic group. I then
consider the features which local people, both Chinese and Kho Xiong speakers,
describe as being characteristically Miao or Kho Xiong and as characteristically Han
and look at the circumstances in which they are categorised as such.1
Official Classifications
In China everyone is officially registered by nationality, which appears on their
identity card (hukou), and it is on this that official statistics on minority groups are
based. Although these official classifications do not necessarily reflect the views of
the population in general, one needs to consider the possibility that this classifying
project may in itself have contributed to the development of ethnic groups today in
West Hunan.
The influence of classification, in particular colonial classification, on ethnogenesis
has been widely discussed (Vermeulen and Gover 1997, Eriksen 1996: 87, Lenz
1997). Colonial classification often took the form of rigid all or nothing categories.
For example, concerning the categorisation of Malaysians by means of censuses, the
British were intolerant of'multiple, politically 'transvestite', blurred or changing
categories' because 'the fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that
everyone has one - and only one - clear place' (Anderson 1983: 166). Often the
categories of the colonialists were quite at odds with indigenous views. As Lentz
writes,
the dominant characteristics of pre-Colonialist Africa were mobility, overlapping networks,
multiple group membership, and the flexible, context-dependant drawing of boundaries. The
concept of 'tribe' and the idea that each person belongs to one and only one 'tribe' is a
colonial import (1997: 31).
To suggest that the people on whom these classifications were imposed passively
accepted them as self ascriptions would be an oversimplification. Often the adoption
of 'ethnic' classifications originally devised by the state has been a more complex
and instrumental action aimed at taking advantage of the benefits made available by
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the state for recognised groups (Lenz 1997: 42, Morin & d'Anglure 1997: 173f). In
addition to this, once such 'ethnic' identities have been crystallised and particular
groups formed among certain people, others may follow suit as a defensive measure
(Fardon 1996: 139).
Gladney has suggested that the classification of minority nationalities in China has
led to self identification along ethnic lines. For example, he argues that in the case of
minorities of Southwest China such as the Bai and Yi 'the label the state has
assigned, no matter how ill-suited, has led to the crystallisation and expression of
identities within the designated group along pan-ethnic lines' (1991: 304, see also
Harrell 1989: 196). Despite the term's derogatory connotations in the past, educated
people in West Flunan today do describe themselves as 'Miao'. Schein writes that
'although a striking degree of cultural diversity obtains within this group, the
subgroups are said to recognise each other as co-ethnics' (1986: 77). However, as I
have mentioned, in West Hunan, the use of the term Miao does not imply an
increased awareness of a wider Miao ethnic group. Although many people who can
speak Kho Xiong, know something of the people of East Guizhou with whom they
share this language, with the exception of Miao cadres and scholars, few people I
met knew much, or anything, about the Hmou and Hmong speaking people further to
the west, who are also classified by scholars as Miao. In addition to this, as I shall
discuss, in Jishou and nearby villages local people were often unaware of one
another's official nationality.
As evidence for the rise in ethnic consciousness in China, Gladney cites the large
numbers of people changing their nationality (1991: 304) and in particular the Tujia
of Sichuan (1991: 304-5). Over the past twenty years people all over China have
changed their official nationality from Han to a local minority. However, changes of
nationality in West Hunan were almost always a strategic change based on a wish to
gain advantages for oneself and one's family, since, as in the rest of China, minority
people in West Hunan have since the early 1980s been favoured with a lower pass
mark for entering university and a less strict birth control policy. This situation is not
peculiar to this area (cf Tapp 1995: 207 - 8).
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In West Hunan, some of the people who changed their official nationality could
make a good case for having minority ancestry, that is, ancestors who had at some
time in the past come from Kho Xiong or Tujia speaking areas. For example, Mrs
Gu knew that her father had been of the Bai minority, descended from a group of Bai
who had migrated from Yunnan. As urban, Chinese speaking gentry people, she and
her relatives had taken no interest in his Bai nationality and she told me that they
considered themselves to be indistinguishable from Han people. However, when
special privileges for minority people were introduced in the 1980s Mrs Gu applied
to have her nationality changed. Since her husband, Old Liang, is registered as Miao
this made no difference to her sons, who were already classified as Miao and
therefore eligible for these benefits. However, some of her brothers had moved away
from the area by this time and she wanted proof that her nephews and nieces were
eligible for minority status so that they could take advantage of the benefits which go
with this. Similarly, Wang Kaiying, Liang Zhaohui's wife, had been brought up as a
Han person and her parents had died when she was quite young. She had since found
out from relatives that her parents had been Tujia people who had adopted Han
behaviour on moving to town. Because of this, when benefits were introduced, she
had changed her nationality to Tujia. Neither she nor Mrs Gu discussed their
minority nationality with neighbours and friends.
Other people changed nationality despite the fact that they had no minority relatives,
living or dead. For example, a young relative by marriage not only changed her
nationality but also her name to suggest that she was part of Mrs Gu's Bai nationality
cognatic kin group. And in the early 1980s some Han students in Jishou went to find
host families in the countryside who would adopt them on a temporary basis. They
then registered as Miao people so that they could claim minority nationality before
taking the college entrance examination. Changes of this kind are becoming more
difficult and require either a good relationship with someone in local government or
money with which to pay bribes.
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In order to mitigate the stigma that might be attached to changing to a minority
nationality, many changed from Han to Tujia rather than from Han to Miao. This is
because Tujia people are considered by the Han to be more sinicised and advanced
than Miao people (Ma 1989: 403). The popularity of changing to Tujia nationality
can be seen from the fact that statistics show that the number of Tujia in the area has
increased dramatically in the area over the past ten years. Miss Tian said that the
people in her village of Ganziping3 had been there so long that, though some said
they were from Shanxi, no-one really knew where their ancestral home (laojia) was.
She said that though they were Han, many of them had gone to the local government
and had their nationality changed to Tujia.
Though the labelling of some ethnic groups, such as the Hui (Gladney 1991: 96f.),
has led to the development of an ethnic consciousness, I suggest that the argument
that the numbers of people changing nationality in itself indicates a surge in ethnic
consciousness is questionable. No-one who changed nationality, as far as I am aware,
learned a minority language or took part in any other practices which might associate
them with minority groups. This is not to claim that people made no connection
between ancestry and the right to benefits. People with 'minority' ancestry
sometimes became angry when others with no minority family connections changed
nationality. This was the case when the former deputy head of the Jishou City
Minority Nationalities School changed his nationality to Miao in order to make him
eligible to take on the position of head since it was generally believed that he was
descended from a wealthy Han gentry family.
In general conversation, however, people in the Jishou area rarely discussed their
own or each others' nationality. Even people who showed pride in or loyalty to their
rural Kho Xiong speaking origins when talking to me or their families, did not
discuss this with others. I found that when the subject came up, as it did because I
was interested in it, people were often not aware of the ethnic status of neighbours or
close friends. For example, Old Liang's wife's best friend did not know that he was
registered as Miao until I mentioned it once when she was there. This kind of
situation was not restricted to urban, educated people. In the village of Yaxi where
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there are descendants of Kho Xiong speaking and Chinese speaking people, I once
asked a woman if her mother in law was from a minority nationality and was told
that she did not know, maybe she was Han, maybe 'gujia' (ancient family, i.e.
minority) I'd have to look at her hukou (residence permit) to find out.4 This is quite
different from the situation in Inner Mongolia as described by Jankowiak, where
urban Mongolian and Han are aware of distinguishable identities and prefer the
company of their own ethnic group (1993: 42-4).
Jankowiak reports that urban Mongolian parents consider it is important for children
to learn about Mongolian history and one informant is reported as saying that 'if one
taught children the "importance of their own ethnicity, then they would know who
they were when they grew up'" (1993: 45). By contrast, people in West Hunan,
urban and rural, know little about the history of the Kho Xiong, apart from the origin
stories (see below).5 This suggests that official identification as 'Miao' or 'Tujia'
does not necessarily indicate a sense of having a particularly salient perception of
'Miao' or 'Tujia' identity. Although superficially it appears to be evidence for the
instrumentalist paradigm of ethnicity, in fact, where many lowland people were
concerned, the official registration of nationality did not appear to be reinforcing any
sense of ethnic identity. Often, peoples daily lives expressed neither a sense of
shared identity with other people registered as minority nor a sense of difference
from Han. An exception to this was found among the scholars and cadres, who were
familiar with written materials on the Miao. Included among these, is a small group
of Miao scholars in Jishou who had been influenced by contact with American
Hmong nationalists and I discuss this below.
The Influence of American Hmong Nationalists
Miao scholars in Jishou came into contact with American Hmong at the International
Miao (Hmong) Culture Symposium and Economic Trade Co-operative Conference
(Guoji Miaozu Wenhua Yanjiujuhui, Jingji Maoyi Xiezuohui) which was held in
Jishou in 1994.6 Local Miao people who came into contact with them, mostly
academics, students, performers and other urban, educated people, were particularly
impressed by the success of these Hmong in America in the fields of business and the
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military. A number of these people were also impressed by the American Hmong
people's pride in their nationality and their hopes for the future of Miao people.
The conference included the reading of conference papers, an introduction to the
history and culture of the West Hunan Miao, performances of Miao singing, dancing,
drama and a 'sacrifice' of water buffalo which was arranged on the playing fields of
one of the middle schools, though, in deference to the feelings of urban Chinese and
overseas visitors, the water buffalo were not actually killed. However, the whole
event was regarded locally as a financial enterprise. Students who had attended the
conference as Chinese/English interpreters, and people I knew in the Tourism
Department, spoke of the event mainly as an attempt to attract investment into the
area. Included in the programme were 'economic and trade talks' and a brochure
was produced which advertised a number of potential investment projects ranging
from building a hydroelectric power station to the production of pickled mustard.
Despite this, no investment was forthcoming and the conference was therefore said
by many to have failed. Moreover, it later became clear to me that it was considered
to have been unsuccessful in political terms. This was on the grounds that it had
attempted to elevate the Miao nationality and had made no mention of the Tujia. I
was also told the real reason it failed was because it had emerged during the course
of the conference that the American Hmong had a long term project to set up a Miao
'homeland' in China. This was of course regarded as a highly subversive project and
local delegates were refused permission to attend further conferences in the United
States (cf Schein 1998).7
Schein writes of some American Hmong turning Chinese Miao peasants into 'a
leisure activity' by means of videos which they make in China (Schein 1998: 167).
This may well have taken place in Hunan. What was more apparent to me, however,
was the influence which the American Hmong had on peoples' views on their own
ethnicity. Scholars, and other urban people who had been in contact with the Hmong
delegates, stressed that although the Miao as a group lag behind the Han Chinese in
economics, they have their own traditions in areas such as medicine, music and
wushu (martial arts) which are well developed and equal to those of the Han. In
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contrast to other urban Miao, some of these scholars incorporated aspects of Miao
culture into their urban lives. For example, Hua Laohu, a leading Miao scholar in
Jishou, told me that his single storied house, built around a courtyard, had been
designed according to the Miao style, and that all his children lived with him and
worked for him which, he claimed, was also the Miao way. Hua Laohu is
undertaking a project to find a cure for bilharzia according to Miao traditions of
medicine and is also involved in teaching other Miao people about the history of
their nationality. This is in contrast to the apparent indifference to minority ancestry
described in the previous section.
However, although the Americans' influence engendered a pride in being Miao, it
did not encourage awareness of the local differences among Miao people. For
example, the American Hmong were shocked at being referred to by the term 'Miao',
which they considered to be derogatory, and insisted that Miao people should
properly be referred to as 'Hmong' apparently unaware of the terms Hmou and Kho
Xiong. Though local Miao scholars knew that rural, Xiong speaking people refer to
themselves as 'Kho Xiong' they too did not appear to value this term and, after the
conference, several people who had had contact with the Americans took to referring
to themselves and other local Miao people as 'Hmong.' Because it was endorsed by
some American Hmong with their evident wealth and pride in their nationality, it
was a more attractive label than was the term used by villagers, even though the
latter was arguably their own term.
These views and hopes for the future of Miao people from abroad made an obvious
contrast with local images of the Miao as primitive and 'Other', but they influenced
only a small number of people in Jishou. Others I spoke to, even those of Miao
descent, said that the American Hmong were unrealistic and that Miao were sure to
continue to become more like the Chinese. It appears that Miao cadres and ordinary
people have very different perceptions of their identities. However, the possibility
that the Hmong nationalist movement will exert a greater influence in the future
cannot be ruled out.
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Highland, Kho Xiong speaking people
It appears then that in everyday life, ethnic distinctions do not necessarily follow the
categorisations which are recorded on people's identity cards. However, though
closer examination proves that the situation is more complex, initially there did
appear to be a perception of broad differences between highland Kho Xiong speaking
people and lowland Chinese speakers.
In the highland areas to the north, west and south of Jishou, and in contrast to the
lowland areas which immediately surround the city, a large proportion of people
speak dialects of Kho Xiong.8 Another feature, which is clearly visible, is that
women in or from the highlands often wear distinctive embroidered tunics, quite
different from the peasant dress of most parts of China. It was in highland villages
such as these that I witnessed the Liang family's visit to the grave and the Si Yue Ba
festival. I will refer to the people who live in the highland areas as 'Kho Xiong' or
'Kho Xiong speaking' rather than 'Miao', since this is the indigenous term, and the
term 'Miao' may be used more widely to include Chinese speaking people with Kho
Xiong ancestry. Since the main focus of my work is on the lowlands, it is beyond the
scope of this thesis to present a full account of the highland Kho Xiong speaking
people and this description i#s not intended to be exhaustive.9
One of the most obvious ways in which highland areas differ from the lowlands is
that they are poorer. In the past, highland people did not grow rice, something
considered by the Han and, today, by the Kho Xiong themselves, to be a sign of great
poverty. Today most villages have enough rice terraces to grow it as a staple but
there is little flat land for grazing, and collecting animal fodder from the mountains is
time-consuming. This task is often carried out by children and is a reason given why
so many children in the highland areas do not attend school. Infrastructure and
transport in these areas is also undeveloped with the result that attending secondary
school or going to market may involve many hours of walking. In contrast to the
improvements which have been made in most other parts of Hunan, and in the
lowland part of West Hunan, electricity supplies are erratic and many villages do not
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have running water, though in part this is alleviated by the easy access to water from
natural springs and wells.
Writers on the 'Miao' of West Hunan have put considerable emphasis on their
religious practices. Ling and Ruey in their chapter on 'Magic and Religion' describe
sixteen elements of'Miao religion,' including welcoming the dragon, sacrificing pigs
and sacrificing water buffalo, and twenty four of 'The Guest Religion', that is,
religious practices they consider to have been borrowed from the Han Chinese (Ling
& Ruey 1963). The 'Guest Religion' includes Daoist elements as well as locality
cults such as Earth Gods and the Celestial Kings.10 However, most of these are, as
far as I could learn, rarely practised. Some aspects of belief in the highland areas
today are commonly remarked upon today; these are the fact that some Kho Xiong
people go to laoshi for some ritual purposes and that some believe in a wide range of
spirits, often associated with natural features, such as water, rocks and trees. These
were mentioned to me by young highland people who claimed to know little of other
aspects of belief, and were generally known about only by older people. For
example, Old Liang told me that some people from his village bred fish in one of
their ponds and later sold the fishing rights to someone from a different area. They
drained the pool to make it easier to catch them but all the fish disappeared,
reappearing only when the pool was filled again. This was attributed to a spirit in the
pool being unwilling to give up the fish. And an old man from another Kho Xiong
speaking area told me of a tree which was regarded as an Earth God. However, these
matters are not part of day-to-day conversation, much more commonly remarked
upon by both highland and lowland people was the difference in language between
the two areas.
Kho Xiong is a first language for most people in the highland areas, many of whom
do not speak fluent Chinese. In the highland areas Kho Xiong is the main language
in most of the villages, though when I write of Kho Xiong speaking villages, I do not
mean to suggest that no Chinese is spoken. Words of Chinese origin have been
adopted into the language and often, whole phrases of Chinese are also used. Kho
Xiong is one of three languages spoken by the people officially classified as Miao. It
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has close affinities with another minority language of south China, Yao, but little
structural similarity with Chinese (Ramsay 1987: 230). The Miao languages, Kho
Xiong, Hmou and Hmong, had no written form before the 19lh century. But, by the
early twentieth century Kho Xiong speaking scholars had devised a way of writing
Kho Xiong by using Chinese characters, matching the sounds of the characters in the
local form ofputonghua (Mandarin), to the language. In the early twentieth century
an alphabet was developed by missionaries in Guizhou (Enwall 1995: 83, 89f), but
the written forms in general use today are those which were designed after 1949.
Primary school children in many highland areas of West Hunan are educated in Kho
Xiong for the first year and thereafter in Chinese. However, in some areas a pilot
bilingual education programme has been set up, funded by money from the Hunan
Provincial Government, in which Kho Xiong is the medium of education for the first
three years, followed by bilingual classes for the succeeding years.
I was told that, in a Chinese speaking environment such as Jishou, Kho Xiong
speakers were particularly likely to trust others who could speak the language, since,
as Miss Shi said, they felt bijiao tuanjie (relatively united). In markets the Kho
Xiong speakers often do not trust Chinese speakers, fearing being cheated, a situation
which has been reported since Han people first entered the Miao areas (Shi 1986:
40). Liang Zhaohui told me that if he spoke to Kho Xiong speaking people in
Chinese, telling them that he was Miao they would not be impressed but if he spoke
to them in Kho Xiong he would be trusted. Miss Shi told me that if non-Kho Xiong
speaking people settle in 'Miao' villages and refuse to learn the language they are
disliked. But if they learn the language, as the primary school teacher in her village
had done, they are accepted. Language in itself does not always guarantee acceptance
but it is an important factor.
Another way in which Han Chinese and lowland people in general distinguish the
people who live in Kho Xiong speaking villages from themselves is in conduct of
family and sexual relationships. The stories of pre-marital sexual freedom which so
fascinate the urban Han seem to be based on actual practices and, in contrast to Han
Chinese norms, it is often not important to the Kho Xiong that a woman is virgin at
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the time of marriage. Though I did not hear of young people making appointments
to sing love songs as they did in the past, market days in highland areas are still a
time for flirtation and banter between young men and women. And, when I visited a
village outside Laershan, I was told that it is quite common for a young unmarried
girl to move in with the family of her boyfriend, though this met with disapproving
comments from the local Han Chinese person who told me of it. Furthermore, if a
Kho Xiong woman is pregnant at the time of her marriage and the father of the child
is not the woman's husband to be, this is not necessarily a cause for disapproval.
Liang Zhaohui told me that when he lived in the countryside as a child, a young
adolescent girl had begun to associate with some older girls and used to join them
and the young men in singing love songs. Because of her youth and inexperience she
became pregnant, and later got engaged to a young man who was not the father of the
child. Liang's mother, Gu, had asked the young man how he could marry a girl who
was pregnant by another man and he had said that it was not a problem because now
he could 'reap the harvest without having to sow the seed.' Finally, again in contrast
to the usual Han Chinese practice, property is not necessarily inherited by the oldest
son, it may often be inherited by a younger son, because he is more likely to be living
at home when his parents get old, a practice which was also described earlier this
century (Shi 1986: 170). These are broad cultural differences which are perceived by
Han and other lowland people to distinguish the Kho Xiong speaking highland
people from themselves.
However, the Kho Xiong are not such a simple, homogenous group. Discussion with
Kho Xiong speaking people often leads to remarks about the differences between
different highland villages and even neighbouring villages, rather than to an
affirmation of a Kho Xiong, let alone Miao, group identity. Moreover, even
language is cited as a source of difference among highland people. There are two
mutually incomprehensible dialects of Kho Xiong, and the written form, based on the
Baojing dialect in the north of the prefecture, does not correspond well to the
southern, Fenghuang area dialect. In conversation with me, Kho Xiong speakers
more often talked about the differences between dialects than the similarities. In
every area, I was told, people spoke slightly differently. Such remarks would lead on
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to talking about how the embroidery on women's costumes also differed from one
area to another, with minor differences between areas and a major difference
between north and south, corresponding to the difference between Baojing and
Fenghuang dialects.
It does appear, however that for those living in the highland villages, leaving the area
leads to a greater sense of oneself as Miao. I have already described a sense of
solidarity with other Kho Xiong speaking people. I also found that, despite the
poverty of the highland regions, people who have lived in the town do return to live
in their natal village, saying that they prefer it there. For example, Miss Shi told me
that her mother regretted the time she has spent working as a ticket seller in Zhuzhou
station in east Flunan11 and I have spoken to young men who have worked as migrant
labourers in east China who say that they prefer their villages. This is also the case
with young people who have left the highland areas to study. So, for example, a
young graduate named Long Zhufeng asked to be posted to the school where she had
been a pupil rather than to the school in the Han village of Ganziping, saying that she
wanted to be with Miao people. And Miss Shi maintained that when she finished her
studies she wanted to go back to Liuboshan to help the people there.
There is evidence that lowland people express difference between themselves and
highland people in the terms which they use to describe essentialised attributes of a
highland type, a typification which may be construed as ethnic and derogatory. The
term 'Miao' itself is still used as a term of abuse, with connotations of 'primitive'.
To the Han, to have a 'Miao temper' means to get angry quickly and be unable to
hide it and 'Miao appetite' means to eat greedily without caring what it tastes like,
both in contrast to the Han Chinese pride in keqi (politeness, correct behaviour) and
cuisine. I quickly learned that to ask someone if they were Miao could be taken as
an insult and I occasionally heard Han people describe other Han as 'Miao' meaning
that they are uncouth. At the same time, Kho Xiong people sometimes describe Han
people as untrustworthy and dirty. Miss Shi told me that when she was at school in
Fenghuang, an old city about 50 kilometres south of Jishou, Han children called them
'Miao zi' (Little Miaos) and the Miao students responded by calling them pigs or
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dogs. Shi writes that many Han violate the norms of behaviour in a rural Miao home
and are regarded as vulgar (Shi 1986: 134).
Lowland Chinese speaking people who moved to live in the highland areas regarded
the Kho Xiong as lacking refinement and organisation. A Han woman who had lived
in the Miao highland town of Laershan for about ten years told me that the Miao
people were lazy compared with the Han and that she had no wish to learn Kho
Xiong since it was not a proper language, because it had no written form. She also
believed that there had been no temples or schools in the area before the Communists
came to power since the place had just been run by bandits. This was in
contradiction to what I had learned from local people in a matter of days.
Similar views were found in lowland areas where villages of Han and Kho Xiong
ancestry were interspersed, such as Majingao and Ganziping. Ganziping, a few
kilometres south of Jishou, is the site of one of the earliest Han Chinese settlements
in the area. Later, it and surrounding villages were administered as min under the tun
system and the villages on the other, steeper side of the river were classified by the
administration as Miao. Though the villagers are not now easily distinguished by
costume or language these differences are still assumed to exist. People in
Ganziping were particularly prejudiced against Miao people judging by the jokes
which were being told by teachers in the primary school staffroom. For example,
they were laughing about a young teacher, not himself present, who was so clever
that he could speak Miao, English and Chinese - it was just a pity that his Chinese
wasn't very good! When I was asked if we ate rice in Britain I said that we did
sometimes but that we also often ate potatoes. It was a conversation I must have had
well over a hundred times during my fieldwork but this time it led to a rather derisive
aside that maybe we wore turbans round our heads too, like Miao people.
I knew that there were people of Kho Xiong descent living in Ganziping, since while
I was there I saw a list of women illiterates in the village and found a number of
them to have Kho Xiong surnames such as Long and Wu. However, my friend in the
village denied this absolutely, saying it was impossible that there could be Miao
people in her village. Questioned about the names she said they must have come
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from somewhere else, perhaps Majingao. She was presumably unable to accept that
people she lived so closely with were from that 'Other' category across the river, the
Miao.
Other stereotyped views were found in the Majingao area, another area where Han
Chinese have settled the lowlands and Kho Xiong speakers live in the hills, though
here the differences of language and dress are more apparent. For example, I was
told that in Majingao Miao parents tell their children, 'Don't cry or the Han people
will take you away,' and the Han parents tell their children, 'Don't cry or the Miao
people will kill you,' and as a result the children grew up thinking they were very
different from each other. Such evidence suggests that the traits characterised as
Miao are generally attributed to the people in the highland areas. Lowland and urban
people of Kho Xiong descent are usually not perceived as Miao or Kho Xiong, even
though they may be officially registered as Miao. I was told countless times that I
could learn nothing about the Miao in and around Jishou, and that the villages
nearby, though they used to be Miao were now no different. Perhaps the only trait
which is often attributed both to the Kho Xiong and to their Chinese speaking
descendants is that of character or temper, since they are considered to have a
straightforwardness of temperament. This view is held both by urban people and by
rural Kho Xiong. For example, I was told that Jishou people liked to employ young
people from Kho Xiong speaking villages because they could trust them with money.
I also found that, when I was introduced to people in a Kho Xiong speaking village,
it was explained in my favour that the British were not like the Han people since they
say what they think. City people of Kho Xiong ancestry claimed that they retained
this temperament. For example, I was told of people who could not rise in the Party
because they were Miao and too honest to flatter the other cadres. One such person
was Old Liang who joined the Communist Party in the early eighties but was too
ready to point out self-seeking behaviour and inconstancies among other cadres. It
was also said of the Prefectural Party Secretary, who was imprisoned on a suspended
death sentence for corruption, that he refused to divulge the names of other people
who were involved because 'he had some Miao temper' and was loyal to them as
other Miao people. It seems that this is also a trait which, like the learning of Kho
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Xiong language, can make people who are classified as Han acceptable to the Kho
Xiong. I learned that the precondition for learning about secret Kho Xiong hunting
practices was one of temperament rather than birth. Liang Zhaohui told me that a lot of
skill is involved in hunting and the Kho Xiong attribute their knowledge of animals to a
master who is not human. It is believed that as a result of this, some people know
exactly when animals will come and which path they take and can set traps for them.
Sometimes this is done by tracking, sometimes by the smell, sometimes there is no easy
explanation. However, he said that Kho Xiong people will only teach others the secret
of this if they think they are honest. I tried to get a clearer definition of this and he said
some people think the Han are cunning or that they harbour some evil thoughts, but if a
Han person can convince them that he is honest he will learn the secrets of hunting.
Conclusions
I suggest that the material I have been discussing indicates the working out of a notion
of asymmetry at a number of different levels. I have already discussed the asymmetry
by which educated people throughout China make a distinction between the educated
wen centre and increasingly tu peripheries. This is a contrast between civilised and
uncivilised, literate and illiterate, sophisticated and natural. The same kind of
asymmetry is also worked out on a smaller scale. In West Hunan this is between
incomers and locals and between educated and uneducated, urban and rural, highland
and lowland. Nonetheless, this is not simply the working out of an attitude of
superiority. As I discussed in Chapter Three, people from other parts of China regard
West Hunan both as primitive and as a place of untainted traditional customs, the
equivalent perhaps of an earlier Han way of life. Qualities of honesty and
straightforwardness are stressed by non-locals speaking of West Hunan people, as by
lowlanders speaking of highlanders. Moreover, as I discuss in the following chapter,
lowland people regard highland people, not just as backward but also as people who
have access to efficacious ritual practices.
It is clear that ascriptions and self ascriptions of difference on the basis of language
and cultural practices are made in West Hunan and that these fall within those
activities which are described by anthropologists as the expression of ethnic
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difference. Such distinctions are made between lowland and highland and also,
sometimes, within the context of the lowlands themselves. Here some villagers
characterise themselves as Han and contrast themselves with the Miao, and vice versa.
There are in fact a number of possible ways in which ethnic distinctions are made
and these vary, depending on whom one asks. While scholars and cadres may talk
of a pan-Miao identity, other West Hunan people make distinctions between
highland and lowland. In addition to this, highland people are aware of differences
between the Kho Xiong villages themselves, as well as the differences between
themselves and the lowland people. Finally, as described in Chapter Five, non-locals
regard the whole population of West Hunan, themselves excepted, as minority.
In this respect, a comparison can be drawn between the situation around Jishou and
that described by Honig in Shanghai. Honig writes that she set out looking for a
group of people in Shanghai whose identity is based on, and named after, a common
origin in a place called Subei. She continues, '[w]hen I began to probe, however, I
discovered that Subei was not an objective, clearly defined place, but rather
represented a belief in the homogeneity of a particular region.' This region 'could be
defined by geography, language or economics - but each of these produced very
different, if not contradictory, definitions.' As a result of this, rather than assuming
that she could produce 'a straight history of the Subei people', she examined 'the
process through which the category Subei people was constructed and the function it
played' (Honig 1992: xii).
It might be asked why I have put so little emphasis on ethnic difference in earlier
chapters. The answer to this is that I have found that, despite our awareness of the
situational nature of ethnicity, a foregrounding of ethnic difference still leads us to
lose sight of the relativity of identities and interactions. Fardon points out that 'it is
difficult to avoid use of an ethnic term even in order to deny the homogeneity of
those covered by that term' (1996: 134). Similarly, I have found that when I have
presented this material to a Western anthropological audience and described
practices in terms of 'Miao' and 'Han' ways of life, the result has been an
overemphasis on the image of bounded ethnic groups. My aim has been to bring out
\
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the shifting, context dependant perceptions of ethnic difference made by people in West
Hunan, without implying that they have the 'all or nothing' qualities of the
classifications made by official discourse.
Moreover, though I have discussed them in some depth here, ethnic distinctions are
often not foregrounded in day to day life. In the following chapter I argue that, rather
than seeing themselves and others primarily in terms of ethnic difference, West
Hunan people see themselves as people with a shared history of ethnic interaction. I
continue the theme taken up in Chapter Five, looking at the interactions which have
continued to take place in West Hunan between the people now classified as Miao and
Han and suggesting that the shared history of this interaction is important to West
Hunan people's sense of identity.
' This includes a reconsideration of some material that I have already discussed.
2
Figures in the Xiangxi Minzu Renkou Fenbu Biao (n.d.) show the percentages of the Han, Miao,
Tujia and Bai in Jishou city to be as follows;
1990 1982 1964
Han 26.77 37.89 44.60
Miao 39.41 39.94 41.06
Tujia 30.57 22.00 14.26
Bai 0.32 - -
Total population 230,614 179,783 110,981
3
Ganziping, as 1 discuss in Chapter Five, was one of the earliest areas to be settled by incoming Han
during the Ming dynasty.
4 A similar situation, in Taiwan, is discussed by Brown (1996).
5
Having been introduced to Shi Qigui's book as a result of contact with me, Old Liang said that he
wanted to write down the history of the Kho Xiong people, as described by Shi, in the form of a Miao
song and record it so that his relatives could learn about it.
6 The Hmong are the largest and most westerly subgroup of the Miao and most of the American
Hmong are people who migrated to the United States from South East Asia as refugees, after
becoming involved in American military operations in Laos.
7 The political sensitivity of the conference was brought home to me when, on three separate
occasions I was told that someone who had attended the conference would be able to give me copies
of the paper, but, on each occasion, by the time 1 visited the people concerned the papers were found
to have been 'lost'.
8 The use of the word lowland here is rather different from the way it has been employed by other
writers on the area who use it to describe the eastern part of West Hunan around the Yuan valley, now
in Huaihua Prefecture. I am using it to describe the relatively prosperous land in the Dong and Tuo
river valleys, around Jishou, Fenghuang, Yaxi, Qianzhou and Majingao.
91 have described the difficulties I experienced gaining access to rural areas in Chapter One.
10 This clear distinction between Han and Miao is of course misleading. As an example of this, I
discuss the question of whether the Celestial Kings can be seen as Han or Miao in the following
chapter.
1 It is only recently that people in China have been allowed some choice in their place of work. Miss
Shi's parents were more politically involved than most villagers and both were posted to Zhuzhou.
Her father is today a local rural cadre.
222
Chapter Nine - Multivocal Interpretations of the Celestial Kings
In Chapter Seven I showed how practices and stories concerned with the temple of
the Celestial Kings differed depending on whether they were associated with officials
and written texts or with the people of West Hunan more generally. Before 1949,
temple observances by officials included the standardised rituals associated with the
state cult, such as spring and autumn festivals. This reflected the concern of officials
with promoting a unified and standardised form of culture throughout China. The
official story of the temple carries similar implications. The Celestial Kings are
Imperial soldiers and are contrasted with the primitive Miao who rebel against the
Chinese state. Most visitors, however, associated the temple less with China, in the
broader sense, than with things closer to home. They were concerned only with the
festivals specific to these particular local deities and with addressing their own
personal concerns. I also showed that official and local interpretations were different
but interacting and that only the local views and observances have persisted until
today.
In this chapter I look in more detail at current local views of the Celestial Kings and
their stories. Today, of course, government employees are no longer involved in
worship at the temple, at least not in their official capacity. But local stories of the
deities continue to express a point of view which is often challenging to that of
official policy and sometimes leads to outright conflict. In particular, I suggest that
they have a shifting and multi-vocal quality which contrasts with official distinctions.
In making this point, I draw attention to a contrast between dialogic, ambiguous local
views and the more rigid and hierarchical nature of official classifications which is
reminiscent of the work of Bakhtin (1994). In the first half of this chapter I show
how these deities and other aspects of local culture are not defined specifically as
Miao or Han.
Origin Stories and Ritual Practitioners
In the previous chapter and in Chapter Five I have made the point that despite the
differences which are distinguished locally between Miao and Han, highland and
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lowland, there is also a considerable amount of interaction. This is a feature of South
China and Southeast Asia more generally. Writers on this area indicate that, although
peoples on the periphery of the Chinese sphere of influence employ terms of ethnic
difference such as Karen, Hmong, Shan, Kachin, there are intricate patterns of
interaction with the peoples so described. This is indicated in the ease with which
people change ethnic identity. For example, Tooker writes of people in northern
Thailand who change from defining themselves as Chinese to Akha, a highland
minority group (1992: 800). Most famously, Leach (1964) writes of how the Shan, rice
cultivating Buddhists influenced by the Chinese trade routes which formerly crossed
northern Burma, showed cultural differences from the Kachin who were mountain
dwelling shifting cultivators, but could not be understood in isolation from each other.
He writes that Shan and Kachin share markets 'and in the ordinary affairs of life they
are much mixed up together', some individuals claiming allegiance to both Shan and
Kachin (1964: 2-3, 49, 60). Leach points out the difficulty of looking at one group of
people without taking into account their interactions with others, a point which is taken
up by Lehman who argues that 'the structures of their social systems and cultures can
be shown to be largely means of adapting to and symbolizing their essential symbiosis
with civilisation', that is their 'political and economic relations with the Burma-Shan
civilisation (1967: 53-4). Similarly, Tapp shows that many of the stories of the White
Hmong of Thailand are concerned with their relationship with the Chinese, to whom
they claim they have lost their writing systems and the chance to occupy the most
auspicious burial sites (Tapp 1989: 147f).
As I explained in Chapter One, the assimilation of southern cultures into Chinese
society, which took place from the Han dynasty onwards, was an interactive process.
Wiens (1967) suggests that the culturally mixed nature of the resulting southern Han
culture accounts for its 'impact power and inner energy.' Thus, he claims;
we have a simple explanation of the speed with which [Han culture] spread over and
assimilated the adjacent peoples, whereby elements of the peripheral folk culture have been
retained in this new culture, and whereby this culture has evolved out of parts of the local
cultures which themselves are results of intermixtures. The peripheral folk experienced the
new culture not as an alien culture, but as a further extension of its own ancient culture (Wiens
1967:45).
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Rather than talking about exclusive ethnic groups or categories, related only in terms
of mutual opposition, we should perhaps think in terms of a Southern culture which
shared some broad similarities, but parts of which were less influenced by wen (i.e.
literate, Chinese speaking) culture than others. These came to be classified as
minority. The people thus classified had a different relationship with the Chinese
state and its administrative hierarchy than did those who had been more thoroughly
assimilated. These historical connections between the populations now classified
minority and Han would account for the ease with which people change nationality
and the fact that today and in the past there have been similarities between minority
culture and the 'superstitious' practices of the Han such as dragon worship and gu
magic.
In the following sections I enlarge on the point that I made in Chapter Five. Whereas
a perception of separate groups based on ethnicity or nationality takes precedence in
official discourse, many West Hunan people do not talk solely in these terms. Local
people consider the heterogeneity of the area, and the different histories of its
relations with the state, to be not just indications of boundaries between different
groups, but also as part of a shared history of interaction. I begin by looking at this
in the context of surname stories.
The membership of a surname group has been described as one of the most important
forms of'we-group identification' for the Han Chinese (Ebrey 1996: 21). In West
Hunan I found that it was significant also for people who claimed minority
nationality. There are five surnames in West Hunan which are particularly
associated with Miao: Wu, Long, Ma, Liao and Shi. These surnames were given to
the Miao when the area first came under control of the state, as a way of making it
easier for records to be kept. However, the names do not overlap with the original
Miao clans, with the result that some families of the same surname can marry each
other, a practice which is otherwise generally disapproved of in China (Shi 1986: 167
f.,181-2). There are also Miao people with surnames, such as Tian and Liang, which
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are shared with local people who claim Han ancestry, and it is these groups that I will
discuss.
When I asked lowland people about the origins of their surname groups I was told
stories of people coming into the area and adopting minority ways of life. One story
of this kind was told to me by a woman called Tian. She said that the Tian surname
group had come from Yuanning where a cow's horn had been divided into nine parts
and each one had become a brother. The nine brothers then scattered everywhere.
She said that she was Tu (i.e. from the Tujia nationality) but that there were also Han
people called Tian and they too had come from Yuanning. It is also a common name
among Miao people, though she did not say this.
A similar story was told about the Liang surname group. The Liang family jiapu
(family tree)1 records that the Liang surname group had originally lived in Jiangxi
province but that they scattered during the Ming dynasty, some going to Luxi on the
Yuan river and from there further into West Hunan. The branch of the family to
which Old Liang belonged had gone from Luxi to Baojing in the north of West
Hunan, where they had assimilated with the Kho Xiong speaking population (cf Ling
& Ruey 1963: 128). This is supported by the fact that the first two generations in
Baojing have Chinese names and after this they take on typical Kho Xiong names.
Another branch had gone to Majingao just north of Jishou. Of these, some
assimilated with the Kho Xiong and some with the local Han. When Old Liang's
son, Liang Zhaohui, went to Majingao to work, both Kho Xiong and Han welcomed
him as another member of the surname group. In neither of the above cases was
there any suggestion that this change from Han to Miao was strange or remarkable.
These stories suggest that the local lowland views about the origins of Miao, Han and
Tujia were very similar since West Hunan people from these families were said to
have come from further east, often from the province of Jiangxi, via Luxi or
Yuanning, both towns on the Yuan river. They also suggest that a sense of shared
surname group identity has been maintained, despite differences in ethnicity. The
ease with which people change nationality is surprising if we think of minority and Han
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as separate groups with different origins but, as I have already mentioned, there is
evidence that this is not the case.
The same perception of Miao and Han as inter-related cultures would also account for
cultural practices which are found in slightly different forms in the highland and
lowland populations of West Hunan. Luo is an example of a practice which appears
in two rather different forms in West Hunan, regarded as minority and Han. In West
Hunan the term luo, according to Zhang (1994), originally referred to a vow made to
the god of pestilence which was later redeemed. Later, Miao people use the term to
mean calling on the gods, usually many gods at a time, thus it was used to describe
the Kho Xiong practice of stabbing water buffalo, when the gods called upon were
'the gods from lionl dond, lionl qib3 [heaven and hell], from the sun and the moon
and the stars, from wind and rain, etc.' (Zhang 1994: 15). The sacrifice of water
buffalo can also be seen as a form of huan luo yuan since it was done as thanks when
a previous request had been granted (Ling & Ruey 1963: 207).
However, luo has another meaning, it has generally been taken to refer to a luo
ceremony incorporating luo opera, also known as No drama4. This is formalised and
performed in Chinese and has until recent years been popular among the Kho Xiong
speaking people of West Hunan. This also involves invoking various deities. In
West Hunan it invokes not only Lord and Mother Luo, but also a series of other
gods, such as 'calling for the god Xian Feng, calling for the god Kaishan, calling for
the god of fortune telling and blacksmiths' (Zhang 1994: 122). Zhang does not
regard luo opera as Miao culture because it is spoken and sung mainly in Chinese,
but despite this, it was widely adopted by the Kho Xiong, developing into a form led
by laoshi and sung in part in the Kho Xiong language (Zhang 1994: 128-130, Ling &
Ruey 1963: 266 f., Zhou, Zhang & Xie 1992). Luo opera continued to be popular in
West Hunan and Guizhou after it was no longer performed in East China (cf Kinkley
1977: 298f.). Though I did not witness luo opera myself, Zhang writes that it is still
performed, and I was told by Gu that about ten years ago her husband's Kho Xiong
put on a performance for her in their village because she was in bad health.5 It seems
likely that this ready acceptance occurred because it was identified as a more
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formalised version of the already existing idea of luo rather than the imposition of
something exotic from Han culture.
A similar relationship can be argued between laoshi, religious specialists of the Kho
Xiong population, and daoshi, the Daoist specialists of the Chinese speaking
population. Laoshi is a local term for what Chinese scholars describe as wu, usually
translated as sorcerer. The characters for laoshi are variously given as jfc IJ if]
meaning teacher and ^ meaning master or master of ceremonies. There
are several differences between laoshi and daoshi. Laoshi can usually speak Kho
Xiong and they wear different clothes from daoshi since, whereas daoshi wear black
robes and hats, laoshi wear orange robes and ornate head-dresses. Laoshi also have a
wider range of functions, protecting the village from bad luck whereas daoshi in
West Hunan are largely associated with funerals. Like religious practitioners of
minority peoples of West China, the tuan kung, laoshi are associated with intricate
rituals and shamanic practices such as climbing ladders of knives (Osgood 1963: 301
f, Graham 1961: 104). However, these are not exclusively minority practices and,
until the Han dynasty, they were associated with Han daoshi (also known as sai
kong) all over China (De Groot 1910: 1235-6, 1251). In fact, both laoshi and daoshi
are linked to the Daoist tradition and laoshi sometimes use Chinese texts. Everyone I
asked, rural and urban, Kho Xiong and Chinese speaking, said that there were many
similarities between laoshi and daoshi in West Hunan today. Miss Shi added that
some Kho Xiong speakers became daoshi.
Furthermore, it is not unknown for Han people to consult minority ritual specialists.
As I shall mention in the following chapter, laoshi played a role in the inauguration
of a new temple at Yaxi. Graham describes how in Yunnan in the early part of this
century, some Han Chinese became tuan kung (the local equivalent of laoshi) though
this was considered to be unorthodox, and the very poor Han would employ tuan
kung at funerals (Graham 1961: 104). Eliade writes that the Han Chinese used to
employ ritual specialists of the Yi minority to conduct rituals for the prevention of
epidemics (1964: 442-3). Clearly there is considerable overlap between the two
kinds of ritual practitioner. It seems likely that the adoption by the Kho Xiong of
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what might appear from their perspective to be an exotic Han practice is actually a
resort to different, more text based versions of practices with which they are already
familiar as part of their way of life. And, similarly, the adoption of 'minority'
practices and ways of life by Han people can be regarded as a move towards a less
text based version of practices with which they were already familiar. Here again,
the interstitial spaces of the 'border area' of West Hunan challenge the more
orthodox, educated view of Han and minority as separate peoples.
The Celestial Kings and the Kho Xiong/Miao
In the following section I discuss the relevance of ethnic distinctions and ethnic
interactions to the stories of the Celestial Kings. First, I return to the possibility that
minority people may, in the past, have worshipped the Celestial Kings as military
figures who suppressed their ancestors, thus worshipping the greater military power
of the Han in the form of these deities. I follow this by suggesting that the Celestial
Kings are a multi-vocal symbol with resonances of the different histories which are
described within the locality.
Some writers imply that the indigenous people of West Hunan took the works of the
Han to be objects of reverence. Eberhard, for example, writes of people worshipping
the copper stelae which were erected in the area during the Han dynasty to mark the
then boundaries of the empire (1968: 369). However, since this instance is drawn
from written sources by Chinese scholars, it may not indicate the reverence which is
implied. It seems equally possible that such actions were motivated by fear. Shi
(1986), a Kho Xiong speaker, records that imperial officials, who visited the Kho
Xiong areas of West Hunan during Imperial times, were regarded as dangerous
figures who could 'rule both this world and the nether world' and that the
supernatural power of the brass stamp they used for signing documents could kill the
dragons who were believed to live under Kho Xiong houses and bring them luck (Shi
1986: 165). As a result, their visits were followed by purifying rituals which suggest
that they were regarded as a supernatural threat rather than objects of reverence. It is
also possible that the Kho Xiong were concerned to use the perceived efficacy of
Chinese Imperial military figures to their own benefit. For example, when Liang
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Zhaohui consulted a Kho Xiong speaking xian niang (spirit medium) about his
ancestor's grave, she called, among other deities, on Qian Long, the Qing dynasty
emperor who reigned at the time of the bloody suppression of the 'Miao' rebellions.
There are other accounts of indigenous people employing the might of the Imperial
Chinese state. Graham records a Miao song from Yunnan, which describes how
official Imperial seals were used by Miao people to dispel demons from the sick
(Graham 1954: 41). However, I came across no evidence that the Celestial Kings are
worshipped today as symbols of the Imperial state and I never heard worshippers
describe them as people who killed the Kho Xiong.
Another possible reason for the worship of the Celestial Kings by the Kho Xiong is
that they are regarded as Kho Xiong or Miao figures rather than as Han. As I have
mentioned, stories of dragon birth are common in south China and are often
associated with pre-Han culture. A more overt link between the story of the Celestial
Kings and the Miao is found in the Miao origin story recorded in Yunnan by Graham
which is as follows;
In ancient times a young unmarried woman was bathing in a pool. The pool was deep, and
of course she was naked. Suddenly she felt something hard enter her vagina. The water
was not very clear, and she saw nothing and supposed that she had accidentally run into a
wooden snag in the water. She became pregnant and later gave birth to the son of the
Dragon King, who was an ancestor to the Miao (Graham 1954: 27).
This is almost identical to the version of the story found in the gazetteer recorded in
1740, the earliest of the gazetteers collected in Hunan Difang Zhi. In this account,
the stories of the Celestial Kings themselves are said to be connected with the Miao
since the deities are said to be sons of the Bamboo King, a leader of the local
minority people. The story is as follows;
The temple of the Bamboo King is situated in Yaxi, which is five li away from Qianzhou city
in the north and is customarily called 'White Emperor Heavenly Kings Temple'. According
to 'A story of Man and Yi' in the book of the Eastern Han dynasty, "A girl in Yelang [a place
in Guizhou] was playing in the Dun river when three huge pieces of bamboo drifted towards
her feet. She heard the cry of a baby coming from one of them, she cut it open and found a
little boy inside it so she took him back with her to look after. As the boy grew up he
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developed great talent and courage and later he declared himself King of Yelang and took
Zhu [bamboo] as his surname. In the Yuanding, 6th year of the reign of the Emperor Wudi6
the minorities in the Southwest were subjugated and the territory was ruled by the Qiangke
Kingdom. The Bamboo King also came out and surrendered. First he was given an imperial
reward and was still entitled to call himself king but later he was given the death penalty.
The minorities of Yi and Liao all believed the Bamboo King to be not of mortal birth and
respected them greatly, so they petitioned the authorities to offer the official posts to his
descendants. Wuba, governor of Qianke, presented the peoples' petition to the palace and
the emperor made the three sons of the Bamboo King into kings and permitted them to
succeed to their father's position" (Hunan Difang Zhi 1991: 352).
Although the events of the story are said to have taken place in Guizhou, this version
of the story states clearly that the deities in Yaxi are his sons. There are similarities
here with the stories I quoted in Chapter Seven, especially in its themes of
insurrection and the untrustworthiness of the emperor, but the obvious difference is
that the Bamboo King is a hero from a minority nationality. This implies that the
temple is concerned with the independence and military might of the indigenous
people of West Hunan and it is possible that this was the earlier meaning, which was
later transformed when the area came under the control of the Imperial state. Such
implications would of course appear threatening to local officials and it is notable
that later gazetteer accounts dismiss this version as incorrect (Hunan Difang Zhi
1991: 402, 404). Ling and Ruey, however, consider the story of the Bamboo King to
be the 'correct' version of the story of the Yaxi temple and also suggest that the West
Hunan Miao are descendants of the Bamboo King who migrated from Yelang (1963:
26). I have never heard the story of the Bamboo King mentioned, but its possible
past connection with the temple may have accounted for the temple's popularity
among Kho Xiong speaking people.
Although the Bamboo King is not mentioned, the temple of Celestial Kings is still
regarded by some as a temple to a former Kho Xiong leader. Mrs Luo told me that
some people from highlands confuse San Da Wang, (Three Great Kings, another
name for the Celestial Kings) with Shan Dai Wang, the name of a Miao leader from
the Laershan region. She said that a board about the life of Shan Dai Wang was at
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one time left at the temple by a spirit medium who, she said, was a Miao woman.
She said that highland people believed that Shan Dai Wang had unified the Miao
people of Laershan and made them strong, so that nobody could qishi (humilitate)
them. However, I found further information about this figure hard to obtain. On
being urged to drink baijiu (rice spirits) in Old Liang's village, I noticed that his
name was mentioned, but when I asked Old Liang why this was, he looked uneasy
• 7and said that he did not know about these things.
The identification of the Celestial Kings with the Kho Xiong was not limited to
highland people. For a long time, I was aware only of the consistency of local
lowland peoples' stories of the Celestial Kings, that is, that they were protectors of
the locality who had fallen foul of the emperor. However, as I asked more questions
about the cult, I realised that these versions expressed a heterogeneous as well as a
shared culture. I became aware of this when I asked about the origins or surnames of
the deities. When I asked (the information was never given otherwise) I was usually
told that the Celestial Kings were Han. However, I was sometimes told that they
were Miao, or minority, (shaoshu minzu or minzu), or could speak Miao language.
Similarly, I was usually told (if I asked) that they were called Yang or Luo, both
common Han surnames in the village, but I was sometimes told that their surname
was Long. This is appropriate because the character long means dragon, but since
Long is one of five most common surnames of the Kho Xiong, it also implies that the
Celestial Kings were Kho Xiong. I was told, by a woman in the Han village of
Ganziping, that the Celestial Kings were called Long and their mother was called
Wu, another of the old five Kho Xiong surnames. With the exception of the last
case, the people who told me that the deities were Miao were themselves of Kho
Xiong speaking origins, suggesting that their respect for the deities today as officials
does not presuppose that they are regarded as Han Chinese officials.
These two kinds of stories reflect rather different views of the relationship between
the Kho Xiong and Imperial power. In the stories of the Bamboo King and Shan Dai
Wang the deity (since in both cases it is a single figure rather than three) is
associated with protecting the minority or highland people and the stories present an
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opposition between the Kho Xiong and the Chinese state, told from the point of view
of the Kho Xiong. In the other stories I have described, however, the Kho Xiong are
far more implicated with official power. It appears that the Celestial Kings are
officials, who are also Kho Xiong. This may reflect the different degrees of
assimilation in highland and lowland areas and it is relevant that in the stories
recorded by Shi (1986) in the 1940s, the Celestial Kings are portrayed both as
suppressing Miao rebels (who attack the area from Guizhou province, i.e. elsewhere)
and as having elements of Kho Xiong culture. As well as expressing shared locality,
the different ancestries of lowland people are reflected in the stories of the Celestial
Kings.
Similar themes are present in the stories of the bandits and local heroes which I
discussed in Chapter Seven. These were people who were concerned with the
defence of an area rather than the defence of ethnic differences. They often
numbered both Kho Xiong speakers and Chinese speakers among their followers and
one would assume that the Chinese speakers included people of Han and Kho Xiong
ancestry. For example, the hero or bandit, Long Yunfei, was a Kho Xiong person
who had Chinese speaking as well as Kho Xiong speaking followers. However, the
fact that their most loyal followers were often members of the same surname group
as their leader did not necessarily mean this surname group was linguistically or
culturally homogenous. As I have mentioned, the Liang family members in West
Hunan included both Kho Xiong and Chinese speakers and in Majingao they live in
close proximity. The hero Liang Guangxing had followers among all the Liang and
today they all take a pride in his history but the Kho Xiong speakers claim that he is
Kho Xiong and the Chinese speakers that he is Han. The case of the earlier,
eighteenth century hero, Yang Gongbo is similar. Yang Gongbo was said to have
fought against the Japanese in Taiwan and people say that Yang Gongbo could not
die, even when under gunfire. During the Cultural Revolution his grave was dug up
and they found his body undecayed in its official robes. 'Yang', like Liang and Tian,
is a surname group which includes both Kho Xiong speaking and Chinese speaking
o
members. Yang Gongbo is buried just outside Jishou and I was told that in Jishou
he is generally thought to have been a local Han. However, it is claimed by the Yang
233
family from a formerly Kho Xiong speaking village on the outskirts of Jishou, that he
is their ancestor. In addition to this, other members of the Yang clan, from the more
distant Kho Xiong speaking village of Zhaiyang, claim that he was born in their
village. Despite the disparity between these stories, I never heard that they gave rise
to any kind of clash or conflict. A similar acceptance of different versions of the
same story among different but related groups is described by Leach (1964: 89, 98)
and I suggest that through these stories people express both the shared and the
disparate nature of West Hunan culture.
These stories appear to be similar to the situation which Watson describes, where the
powers which people attribute to a deity differ depending on their social status. So,
in Hong Kong, 'every category or class of person had a different representation of
T'ien Hou'. Government officials saw her as 'a symbol of coastal pacification' and
to powerful lineage members she was 'a symbol of territorial control'. Women have
a different view again, in which she is perceived as a fertility goddess and to the boat
people 'the goddess symbolises mastery of the sea - she appealed to them primarily
for her ability to quell storms'(Watson 1985: 317-322).
There is no suggestion, however, that the people who worship at the temple of the
Celestial Kings regard themselves as different factions. Rather than representing this
as indicative of separate ethnic groups I suggest that is more like a hybrid
community, united by a common symbol. Both temples and bandit heroes can be
seen as multi-vocal symbols of a shared identity which bring people together while
allowing them to have their own interpretations. As A P Cohen writes,
symbols ... do more than merely stand for or represent someone else. Indeed, if that was
all they did, they would be redundant. They also allow those who employ them to
supply part of their meaning (1985: 14).
In this respect the relationship between ethnicity and worship at the temple is rather
different from that described at temple cults in the south-eastern Chinese coastal
area. Sangren (1987) and Feuchtwang (1992) have described situations where
adherence to a particular cult was influenced by membership of a particular cultural
group. Thus, Sangren describes how different ethnic groups frequent different
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markets and temple cults (1992: 108) and Feuchtwang writes of how, 'the Taipei
basin is defined into networks of compatriot communities by the division of incense,
subfigures and regional organisations of root temples and their festivals' (1992: 109).
In a similar fashion, Choi shows that on Cheung Chau island, Hong Kong, different
ethnic groups are allowed to participate to different degrees in a yearly temple
festival (Choi 1995). In these cults, as in other cults in East China, including those
without particular relevance to ethnic divisions, particular attention is paid to tracing
the boundary. At the temple of the Celestial Kings, no attention is paid to territorial
boundaries. People from all over West Hunan and of all kinds of ethnic backgrounds
attend, bringing, as we have seen, their different views of what the temple stands for.
Different Views of the Temple of the Celestial Kings Today
I have suggested that in the past, officials have attempted to assert fixed ideas of state
and barbarian, Han and Miao and placed the stories of the Celestial Kings into this
context. In the remainder of this chapter I show that employees of the state continue
to impose fixed meanings on the temple of the Celestial Kings and the people who
visit it counter this with different meanings which allow them to evade the attempts
at control. Since the establishment of the Socialist state, officials are, of course, no
longer involved in worship at the temple and the written version of the story of the
Celestial Kings is no longer discussed there. However, the temple has been
registered as an example of Minority Culture and therefore is the responsibility of the
Minority Affairs Bureau.9 Thus, although, when I first visited it, the temple appeared
to be run by local people based on their memories, there were two forms of authority
in the temple, the other being the Minority Affairs Bureau.
During the first few months of my fieldwork, the Minority Affairs Bureau appeared
to have little direction over the conduct of the people and the temple. Their influence
was only apparent in the new temple building, where craftsmen inside were
rebuilding the deities, and in the office where member of the Minority Affairs
Bureau collected money. Visitors to the temple deferred to the deities themselves or
to the incense sellers' local knowledge, where their conduct in the temple was
concerned. At this time there were just hints of the tensions which were developing
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between the Minority Affairs Bureau and the local people. For example, one day
when I visited the temple, I found that graffiti had been written on the walls saying
'beware of being cheated here.' The person who pointed them out to me spoke quite
approvingly of this graffiti, looking hard at one of the incense sellers, a woman who,
I later found out, had relatives in the Minority Affairs Bureau and was distrusted by
the other incense sellers. These tensions became more apparent at the Flower
Bringing {Dai Hud) Festival in the spring of 1996.
The Flower Bringing Festival 1996
Before 1949, the most important occasion in the ritual calendar had been a fast to
commemorate the death of the Celestial Kings. After the fast, a festival was held at
which animals were sacrificed to the Celestial Kings under the direction of the
custodians at the temple, and performances of local opera were put on. Today, the
Celestial Kings are still the most important deities at the temple and, whatever their
requests, visitors pay most attention to consulting them. However, though the death
of the Celestial Kings is commemorated with offerings and prayers, the most popular
occasion in the ritual calendar is the Flower Bringing {Dai Hud) Festival, which
commemorates the birthday of Mu Yi, the mother of the Celestial Kings. It seems
likely that her current popularity is due to the predominance of women among the
people who worship at the temple.
Mu Yi, the mother of the Celestial Kings is, like her sons, considered to be very ling
and, like the Buddhist deity Guanyin, she is regarded, particularly, as a protector of
women. When recounting the story of the Celestial Kings, people usually include an
account of how Mu Yi was a local woman called Yang. She is always referred to as
'Niangniang', a term of respect which can be translated as 'Lady,' and her story is
clearly related to those of the river and dragon goddesses of south China, which are
described by Eberhard (1968: 38 f.,232 f.) and Schaefer (1967: 219, 255).
Unlike Guanyin but like the Celestial Kings, Mu Yi is believed to be an official,
capable of taking revenge on people who do not show her respect. For example, a
man from the village of Ganziping told me a story about a young boy who, when he
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saw the statue of Mu Yi and how small her feet were, said that when he grew up he
wanted to have feet as small as that. He was struck unconscious by the deity and
when he came round his hands were trembling, and did so for the rest of his life. A
woman whom I met at the temple said that, quite recently, a boy had urinated in the
candle holder in front of the goddess and, although no-one saw this at the time, a
spirit medium met him at a bus stop, and, because of her ability to communicate with
the deities at the temple, she started shouting about what he had done to everyone
around. Mu Yi's official status was also demonstrated when, the day before the
Flower Bringing Festival of 1996, a new image of Mu Yi was brought from
Qianzhou to a shrine behind the new temple to the Celestial Kings. The journey
from Qianzhou had been in the form of a procession, in which she was accompanied
by people with placards bearing the instructions on their conduct towards the deity.
These were worded as they would have been for a living official in Imperial times
'keep silence' (su jing).
Festival days, of which the celebration of Mu Yi's birthday is the most popular, may
attract thousands of people to the temple. On the paths through Yaxi village to the
temple there are more people than usual selling incense, paper money, red candles,
straw sandals and other goods. Some people walk to the temple from Jishou or
Qianzhou, others take the minibus to Yaxi village. Some of these visitors come in
large groups, others in twos and threes, or alone. Many people know each other and
the incense sellers and exchange greetings. If asked, people say that they are going
to bei pusa10 or jing pusa, that is, to show respect to or pray to the deities. When I
was present they also commented on me and, if I was alone or with Chinese people,
they would assume that the foreigner had come to pay her respects to the deities.
On this occasion many people, most of them women, were bringing bunches of
artificial flowers to give to Mu Yi and, on arriving at the temple, we found crowds of
people in front of the unofficial shrine, making offerings and saying prayers. Piles of
smouldering incense, spirit money and artificial flowers lay on the ground, throwing
off a considerable amount of heat. Apart from the offerings of flowers and the large
numbers of people attending, the occasion was little different from an ordinary day at
237
the temple, though people did sit around in front of the museum building and chat
and, in a small scale reconstruction of activities at temple festivals of the past, a few
women sang excerpts from opera, with encouragement and prompting from their
audience.
As I had found on other visits to temples, certain aspects were influenced by people's
memories of the pre-1949 temple. I was visiting the temple in the company of Mrs
Gu and her friend Mrs Cai, both of them retired school-teachers from Jishou Number
One Primary School. Mrs Cai had some problems, though I never learned exactly
what they were. She had never been to the temple of the Celestial Kings before but
had heard that they were very ling. Because the incense sellers were so busy, it was
Mrs Gu who organised things, holding the incense and getting it ready for each deity,
three sticks each as usual, and generally telling her what to do. Mrs Cai put out
boiled meat and a bottle of baijiu in front of the old figures of the Celestial Kings and
Mu Yi, today covered with flowers, got to her knees holding the incense between her
palms and bowed several times, praying silently. After praying to each deity she
threw a cup of baijiu as a libation. Although it was Mrs Cai who was asking the
deities for help, she knew very little about them except that they were ling. She
asked Mrs Gu the names of all the deities, though even she was not sure about the
minor deities in the side shrines, such as the one variously described as Dong Wang
or Confucius.
From the unofficial shrine we went to look at the new figure of Mu Yi, which was in
a new shrine behind the new temple. Women were giving her plastic flowers or
burning them outside the shrine and propped up next to her were the banners from
the procession. While we were there, someone came up and started listing all the
things wrong with the image of Mu Yi, the face too fat, the eyes not well drawn, the
hands too big. Others came and agreed that it was not good, looked like a man and
in the following weeks these features were altered. However, the revival of the
festival was not wholly free from state regulation. The presence of the Minority
Affairs Bureau became clear when I started to take an interest in the spirit mediums
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who were attending the occasion. Before describing this, however, I discuss spirit
mediums more generally.
Spirit Mediums in China
Spirit mediums {xian niang lit. fairy women), were quite numerous in the Jishou area
and were people who were said to be able to communicate with the spirits of the
dead and with the deities. As has been described in other parts of the world (cf.
Lewis 1971: 59f), in West Hunan, a spirit medium's career would begin with an
initial possession, which was involuntary, and took the form of a period of illness.
As a result, the woman concerned would accede to the deity or spirit who possessed
her and would communicate with him or her, and other figures, at regular intervals.
New mediums might seek the advice of another medium and develop their skills so
that they could enter a trance when asked to do so, but they would also be susceptible
to continuing episodes of involuntary possession. All the mediums I knew of were
rural women, and I heard that it was possible, though rare, to find male mediums
{xian gong).
People who need help from a medium often invite them to their homes, though
mediums may also receive people in their own homes or they may set up at a small
temple and receive clients there. Often the mediums refuse payment for their
services and the reason given is that it is through the agency of the possessing sprit,
not themselves, that the activities are carried out. As a result of their possession,
many of them assert that they have also learned skills in healing, in reading people's
pasts and their futures. For this, they do not have to be in a trance, but in order to
communicate with dead relatives or to contact spirits which are thought to be
haunting one's house, a seance must be held. A spirit medium's seance is a highly
theatrical experience. Her possession begins when her foot, and sometimes her
whole body, begins to shake. This is said to be a sign that she has mounted her horse
to take her to the spirit realm. The medium then takes on the voices of deities and of
the dead and her words are interpreted by a companion or by the audience generally.
During the seance, offerings are made to the deity or the deceased with whom she is
communicating. Such sessions may involve emotionally charged communication
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between people and their dead relatives, but, in the cases I have seen, they also
resulted in some kind of resolution, either reassurance that the dead relative is
content, or a decision on a course of action, perhaps involving modifying the
fengshui of the grave. Healing sessions, where the medium is not in a trance, may
also involve emotional outbursts from those concerned. Since a consultation may
attract interested onlookers, it can appear to be a public airing of personal issues
which is in complete contrast to everyday life.
The spirit mediums differ from the male ritual practitioners also found in West
Hunan who are known as daoshi and laoshi, some of whom can also contact spirits.
These are associated with Daoist practices involving chanting, music and ritual
paraphernalia and they are asked to perform rituals at temples, including Buddhist
ones. Whereas spirit mediums begin their careers with an involuntary possession,
this is not necessarily the case with daoshi and laoshi whose positions depend more
on training and knowledge of appropriate rituals and texts. Unlike the ritual
practitioners, mediums wear ordinary clothes and do not refer to texts and, in contrast
to the ritual activities of the daoshi and laoshi, their contact with the deities is very
personal and unpredictable.
Kinkley writes that in West Hunan in the early part of this century, '[m]ale shaman-
priests among the Miao performed only at the prescribed ceremonies,' and contrasts
them with mediums (xian niang) who could communicate with spirits and cure
illness (1977: 293-4). An association between individual, female spirit mediums and
communication with spirits of the dead has been noted in other parts of China. De
Groot writes of women mediums riding spirit horses or tigers to reach the spirit
world and states that women's seances were small affairs conducted from home
rather than at temples (1907: 1324, 1332). Osgood, writing on Yunnan in the 1930s
makes a distinction between the male shaman (tuan kung, equivalent to the West
Hunan laoshi) who employs chanting, dancing and various ritual equipment and
wounds himself, and the female medium whose initial possession was involuntary,
who dressed in ordinary clothes and whose seances were a low key, 'private matter'
(1963: 301 f., 313-4). Elliott describes how communication with dead relatives is
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more likely to be done by a woman medium working from home, or visiting one's
own home (1955: 134-5).
Although female mediums working from home are often possessed by 'third aunt',
another term for Guanyin (see for example Elliott 1955: 137) the spirit mediums of
whom I am writing are not associated with orthodox Buddhist or Daoist temples.
This is not unique to West Hunan, as Osgood indicates when he writes that in the
home of a medium in Yunnan, 'was a roomful of images which were so atypical of
the usual religious figures that they frightened the visitors' (1963: 315). Similarly,
De Groot writes that 'classical books and almanacs' were removed from the room
when female mediums were holding a seance in case they thwarted practice (1907:
1333). Seaman describes a medium, in this case male, who communicated with the
Emperor of the Dark Heavens a Taiwanese military deity of the underworld and, in
contrast to the daoshi, became possessed only 'according to divine whim' (1978:
156-7).
In West Hunan the deities with whom the mediums most often communicated were
the Celestial Kings, but new temples could be set up to other deities if the spirit
mediums declared that the deities had asked for this. For example, on the outskirts of
Jishou, a temple had been set up to Mao Zedong and other deceased leaders of the
Communist Party who were now considered to be deities. This was because they had
communicated this wish to a local medium. It appears then that meduimship, even
more than Daoist rituals, is a heterodox practice, unpredictable, inconsistent and
removed from the influence of written texts or institutional religions.
However, it should not be assumed that this is the form which possession takes all
over China. There are many accounts of mediums who, after the initial involuntary
possession, become involved with groups of mediums associated with particular
temples, though beliefs may differ greatly between each them (Jordan & Overmyer
1986: 6). Such groups may be involved with spirit writing cults which produce and
circulate written texts, and are particularly concerned with morality (Seaman 1978 :
156-9). Other accounts describe groups of young men associated with temples
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whose activities when in a trance may include wounding themselves or performing
exorcisms by using tridents and smashing jars and they also are believed to have the
ability to heal and to communicate with deities (Elliott: 1955: 63 , Jordan 1972: 78-
81, Harvey 1933: 133 f.). I was told that in West Hunan today, though an increasing
number of local women are becoming spirit mediums and they often know each
other, they do not form associations. The boards at the temple indicate that there are
also spirit mediums who write down the messages which the deities communicate to
them but these too do not appear to be members of associations.
Spirit mediums were not talked about openly in Jishou. In part this is because they
come under the classification of 'feudal superstition' (fengjian mixin) (Anagnost
1994: 234) and were therefore potentially at risk of criticism from local government.
However, Jordan, writing of Taiwan in the 1960s, also experienced difficulty
obtaining information on this subject and several writers mention that mediumship in
Taiwan and Singapore is regarded by some with disdain and associated with the poor
and low class, though those involved with spirit writing cults may have higher status
(Elliott 1955: 15, 71, Jordan and Overmyer 1986: 86, Jordan 1972: 69). This
suggests that reluctance to discuss these matters in mainland China may not be
simply a result of government policy.
Many urban people claimed that mediums were insane, though whether this was
because they did not understand what mediums were or because of disapproval or
embarrassment, I did not find out. Once, on the bridge in Jishou, I came across a
spirit medium who had come in from the country with some vegetables to sell. For
reasons I never established, she was singing to the river, not responding to people
who asked her for vegetables. A crowd gathered around to watch and most of the
onlookers whom I asked about her said that she was mad.
One result of the lack of general information about the subject is that spirit mediums
in West Hunan are considered to be a local feature, and some people I spoke to were
quite surprised when I said that I thought other parts of China also had mediums. In
the incident I described above, one woman told me, rather disparagingly, that the
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medium was doing this because she was a Miao woman. She appeared to be using
the word Miao, in the way that many urban people do, to say that the medium was a
local rural person since from her appearance, it was by no means apparent that she
was Miao. Despite this evidence of disapproval, there were a number of urban
people who would make use of them, inviting them to their apartments if they felt
that there was an unquiet spirit there or if they wanted to contact a dead relative.
A similar ambivalence towards mediums was exhibited at the 1996 Flower Bringing
Festival. A number of spirit mediums had attended the festival and some were
telling fortunes. We came across one who was sitting in a shelter on the path to the
temple, where one of the incense sellers has a stall. She wore her hair in a plait down
her back and smoked a cigarette and was surrounded by a large group of fascinated
onlookers. She was reading a young woman's palm and most of the time she was
singing or chanting. She seemed quite lucid and I noticed that she kept asking
checking questions such as 'you're not married are you?' However, her foot was
shaking and Mrs Gu said that that this was because 'she had got onto her spirit horse'
indicating that she was possessed. She said that the medium could tell people about
what had happened in their past, about their parents' lives in the spirit world and
about their future. Sometimes the medium's friends went past on their way to the
temple and they greeted each other warmly.
Later we came across three mediums sitting, surrounded by onlookers, behind Mu
Yi's shrine. Each appeared to be in a trance, one of them holding a soft drink can, but
no sooner had I laid eyes on them than I was hustled away by one of the woman
connected with the Minority Affairs Bureau. They were mad, she said, and bu hao
kan (didn't look nice). She directed me to look at some old women who were
singing excerpts from local opera, saying, 'isn't that better?' This incident was
precipitated by the fact that I was there and it was an unsuitable sight for a foreigner.
But it was also the first indication, for me, of the incipient conflict between the
Minority Affairs Bureau and those who claimed to have a local knowledge of the
temple, particularly the incense sellers and the spirit mediums.
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Control of the temple by the Minority Affairs Bureau
Over the year between the Flower Bringing Festival of 1996 and the one in 1997, the
Minority Affairs Bureau gradually took control of the temple. Although they did not
openly challenge people's ways of interacting with the deities there, by establishing
control over the temple site and the money which came from it they greatly affected
activities at the site.
When I left Jishou in the summer of 1996 the Minority Affairs Bureau was
overseeing the building of a wall around the temple site and I was told that I should
go in and look at the new images of the deities now because when I came back, as I
planned to in the spring of 1997,1 would have to pay. When I did return in 1997 the
wall had indeed been completed and the unofficial shrine removed. The new temple
building had been opened and the unofficial temple, which had previously been the
centre of so much activity, had been moved to the back of the site and walled up.
The old deities were still inside, presumably because the Minority Affairs Bureau
feared the reaction which their destruction might cause. A few sticks of incense
suggested that people were still trying to make offerings to them through the cracks
in the wall.
Other changes had been made. During the time I had been away the Minority Affairs
Bureau had announced that only those who had paid them a fee of 5,000 yuan11
could work inside the temple site. In return, these official incense sellers were
registered, provided with a small shop within the walls and allowed to go into the
new temple to throw the divination blocks and address the deities. Most incense
sellers, including my friends, couldn't afford to do this. One day, I arrived to find
them sitting in the middle of a now open space inside the walls, all very gloomy.
They said that the unofficial incense selling shops inside the temple wall had been
destroyed that day, because the Minority Affairs Bureau wanted the land to build
shops for the official incense sellers. From this day on they did not sit inside the
temple wall and talked of the people who had registered with the Minority Affairs
Bureau as 'the ones inside' (limiande). There was an ongoing antagonism between
the unofficial incense sellers on one hand and the employees of the Minority Affairs
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Bureau and official incense sellers on the other. I was told that while I was away,
two women had come to blows as a result of this.
Officials from the Minority Affairs Bureau did make a special concession for Old
Mrs Yang, the single childless Miao speaking woman who was the most needy of the
women who made their living at the temple. They gave her a cloth tag to wear,
authorising her to work there and, unlike the others, she was allowed to throw
divination blocks inside the new temple. Those incense sellers who were not
allowed into the temple used to pass their clients over to her after they'd sold them
the offerings. But she was very cynical about it all. In an attempt to cheer her up, I
commented on her tag and said she was a gongguan (official) but she replied with
angry humour that she was a gongguan and her work here was to fang da pi (do big
farts).
Though the drop in their income was the biggest threat to the incense sellers'
livelihood, their complaints went beyond their own financial loss. Most of the
complaints were that the Minority Affairs Bureau was taking land that belonged to
the Yaxi people and that they were taking money that belonged to the temple.
Visitors to the temple now had to buy entrance tickets and there were widespread
complaints that, by controlling the temple and the money from it, the Minority
Affairs Bureau was taking money and land which belonged to the temple and the
Yaxi people. It was indeed the case that the Minority Affairs Bureau was using
money from the temple for other purposes. I experienced this myself when, on being
taken out for dinner by senior members of the Minority Affairs Bureau, I was told
that they had plenty of money to spend on the meal because of the income they were
getting from the temple at Yaxi. The matter of land was complicated. Though all
land in China is officially still owned by the government, farmers have had
responsibility for 'their' land since the early eighties and people frequently referred
to the land as 'our' land or 'Yaxi peoples' land'. However, ultimately it is still
owned by the state and could be reclaimed by the state. To protect themselves, many
of the incense sellers had built their huts over a small stream to escape eviction from
illegally occupied land, but there was little people could do in material terms to
retaliate.
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Their anger over the government's appropriation of the temple land reflected a more
general concern. The land at Yaxi was particularly in demand since it comprised
much of the flat land between Jishou and Qianzhou and was therefore a site of urban
expansion. Yaxi had already lost land to the new campus of Jishou University, to the
new road between Jishou and Qianzhou, and to the (rice spirits) baijiu factory. One
day while I was visiting the incense sellers, officials came from Jishou to measure
out another piece of land with a view to building another factory. Though the people
to whom this land had been allotted were given financial compensation, these
actions, like the walling-off of the temple, were resented since, Yaxi people said, 'it
is our land'. Concern over land had already been framed in supernatural terms and I
had heard that a spirit medium was claiming that the building of the new road and the
rice-spirits factory had upset the fengshui of the area. In the past, it was said, Yaxi
used to produce great people, such as Luo Daren, but today the village was doing
poorly.
Local people were also angry because the employees of the Minority Affairs Bureau
had disposed of some of the objects from the unofficial temple which had been
invested with authority by the local people. As I have mentioned, they had closed off
the unofficial temple and I was told that the wife of the man who had done so had
become ill as a result of the deities' anger. They had also thrown away the boards
written on by the spirit medium. The authority of the temple site was also
undermined by the irreverent approach of the employees of the Minority Affairs
Bureau towards the deities. The people who sold tickets at the door did not
themselves believe in the efficacy of the deities and did not address them. They
sometimes laughed at the people praying there and they urged me to take
photographs. This was in contrast to the previous situation at the unofficial temple
where I had been instructed by the incense sellers to ask the deities for permission
before taking photographs.
The apparently material concerns of money and land were also closely connected to
the temple's authority. I was told that fewer 'country people' (xiangxia ren as Yaxi
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people described the highland Miao) came now. In part this was because, though
they had enough money to buy incense, if they had to pay to go into the temple and
again to have the blocks thrown, it was too expensive but it was also because they
believed that if you had to pay an entrance fee it wasn't a real temple. They also said
that it couldn't be a real temple because the people there were always quarrelling. It
was becoming apparent that though the Minority Affairs Bureau was controlling the
site, it couldn't ensure its legitimacy in the eyes of local people.
The Festival of Guanyin and the Flower Bringing Festival of 1997
Though the actions of the Minority Affairs Bureau were widely discussed, it was not
until the day of the festival of Guanyin12, ten days before the 1997 Flower Bringing
Festival, that events changed dramatically. I arrived to find that although some
people were making their way around the side of the rice spirits factory to the temple
as usual, others were climbing the hillside opposite the main gate of the factory
where there was a collection of rocks and boulders. I could see that these were
adorned with red flags and the smoke from firecrackers and offerings. This did not
come as a complete surprise to me since I already knew that one of the spirit
mediums had declared that the Celestial Kings were no longer willing to live in the
• IT
official temple and had moved over into these rocks.
A small shop had recently been set up outside the gate to the baijiu factory, to sell
offerings to the people who were heading up the hillside but there was some dispute
over what was happening. Some people said that there was nothing worth seeing on
the hillside, just some big rocks, and that I should go to the temple as usual. There,
however, I met one of the unofficial incense sellers who urged me go to look at the
rocks though she refused to accompany me, saying that she would get into trouble
with the people from the Minority Affairs Bureau if she did so. She sold me 18 yuan
worth of offerings including biscuits, candles and firecrackers as well as incense. I
went back to the factory gate and climbed up through the orange grove, where a
muddy path was already being worn.
247
At the rocks I came across a number of local people and three of the women who
worked for the Minority Affairs Bureau who were telling them to go down saying
that this wasn't a temple and there were no spirit mediums there. At this point I
though it best to hide behind some orange trees until they left. Since I had a large
bag of offerings with me I thought it would be hard to convince anyone that I was
just an interested bystander. Despite this, people continued to climb up to the rocks,
some of them left cloths and flags and everyone burned incense or other offerings.
They confirmed that the Celestial Kings and their mother no longer lived in the
official temple but in these rocks. Everyone was very cheerful and friendly towards
me and one young woman said that it was 'hen you yisi' (very interesting/enjoyable).
In contrast to the official temple where people complained in hushed voices, people
here were freely discussing the events, making the usual complaints that the official
temple was no good. When I asked someone, 'whose land are we on now?' everyone
replied in chorus that it was 'women laoxiang de' (it belongs to our home village).
A week later a new temple had been half built on the new site on the hill opposite the
official temple. Steps had been cut in the approach to it, the land had been levelled
out and crude breeze block supports were going up. The majority of people working
on it were old women who told me that they were Yaxi people. They were working
hard, they said, to get it ready before the Flower Bringing Festival, a few days later.
I was visiting with a friend and we were shown around the temple and told which
rock represented which deity. The positions of some of the deities had changed and I
could see that it was more convenient that way, with more space in front of the main
altar. We were also told to climb up the steps to the shrine to Guanyin, which was a
rock higher up the hillside and that the scenery was good and we could play (wan)
there. The scenery was especially good on the skyline, she said, but they hadn't
made a path there yet. When we got to the Guanyin rock we found that part of the
pre-1949 temple had been put there and three cigarettes were laid on top of it as if for
an offering.
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By the time of the 1997 Flower Bringing Festival, a few days later, the new
unofficial temple was well established and the Minority Affairs Bureau was making
an effort to defuse the antagonism. The old, unofficial shrine had been re-opened
and the old images of the Celestial Kings had been put in the new temple, next to the
ones which the Minority Affairs Bureau had arranged. There was quite a lot of
activity around the Mu Yi shrine and people were buying flowers but the occasion
lacked enthusiasm. There were people sitting around resting, but there were no
performances of opera this year and, of course, no spirit mediums.
The people at the new temple were interested when I told them about this and they
said that the Minority Affairs Bureau had done this because they knew that the
guanxi over there were not good, and that Mu Yi would not accept their behaviour
and had moved over to the new temple. By contrast the new temple at the rocks was
busy and I was told that more than a thousand people came during the course of that
day. Many people visited both temples. In the afternoon an opening ceremony was
held at the new temple which included a performance of Miao drum dancing given
by people from the Old Peoples' Palace. In the evening the temple was attended by
spirit mediums and the people consulting them. Any money they received was to be
given to the temple and one woman who kept money for herself was quickly asked to
leave by another woman, who told me that this behaviour was wrong. Other people
were sitting around chatting. Later in the evening some ritual practitioners arrived.
They had been asked to perform a ritual to inaugurate the temple, which lasted until
the following morning. They were described by one of the women who had taken it
upon herself to organise the occasion, as daoshi (Daoists) but she did not appear to
take them very seriously since she also described them to me as mad people (feng
feng de). During the course of the ceremony, a list of people who had given money
for the new temple was also read out.
In this way the tensions arising from the Minority Affairs Bureau's control of the
temple site had been resolved. The deities were believed to be at the new temple
because they had expressed a wish to live there, and because the site was on what
was considered to be the Yaxi people's land so that people could worship the deities
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without having to pay money to the local government. As I have mentioned, and in
contrast to affairs at the official temple, it was clear that money given to people at the
temple, such as the spirit mediums, was to be donated to the temple. Again in
contrast to the official temple, people came there to enjoy themselves. Evidence for
this is seen in the fact that, as I have mentioned, the Guanyin festival was considered
hao wan (enjoyable) and we were urged to combine our later visit with enjoying the
view. And, the day after the inauguration, I met old people who had come there for a
chat, and a mother who had brought her child there to play.
Despite its registration as Minority Culture, as far as I knew, the Minority Affairs
Bureau had made no attempt to prescribe activities at the official temple. However,
their presence and their control of the space had discouraged mediums from going
whereas at the new temple, 'superstitious' practices such as consulting mediums and
performing Daoist ritual could be performed. In contrast, people brought
contributions to the new temple on their own initiative, such as the part of the old
temple which, presumably had been hidden somewhere in the village.
Activities at the new temple also indicated the cultural heterogeneity I have been
discussing in previous chapters. As always, women's dress indicated that some of
the visitors were highland Miao, some lowland Miao and others Han, and the same
was the case with the mediums. The delegation from the Old People's Palace, a
government run organisation, brought a display which would more normally be seen
at New Year in Jishou but which was felt to be a contribution to the new temple. The
ritual practitioners, though referred to as daoshi, and Chinese speaking, were dressed
in the bright orange robes and ornate head-dresses which in West Hunan are
associated with the Kho Xiong speaking laoshi.
It was also clear that while to the Minority Affairs Bureau the Celestial Kings was an
example of past culture which was being revived, to the local people they were active
agents with whom they themselves interacted. Though the Minority Affairs Bureau
controlled the site they did not control the deities to whom local people claimed a
particular closeness. This was expressed both through stories of shared locality and
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through their identification with the Celestial Kings. Even people who were not
mediums claimed that when they called on them they felt their presence in their
bodies. Thus, the events which I have described indicate the contrast between the
Minority Affairs Bureau's fixed conception of what constituted a temple and the
more changeable or flexible point of view of the ordinary people. One is reminded
of Bakhtin's distinction between the fixed nature of official festivals and the
unpredictable, shifting nature of carnival (1994).
A major contribution to the unpredictable and open nature of events at the temple
was made by the spirit mediums. Vitebsky writes that shamanism in the former
Soviet Union has been seen as 'politically dissident and anticentrist', their 'local
knowledge' characterised by a fluidity of thinking rather than doctrine (1995: 185).
In Chinese culture too, mediumship has been seen as dissenting, associated as it is
with subcultural identities (Debernadi: 1987: 311) and with rebellion (Weller 1994a:
69 f). The spirit mediums involved in the events I have described did make
statements which were challenging to local government, notably the statement that
the new road had adversely affected the fengshui of the area, but also in their
criticism of the Minority Affairs Bureau's running of the temple. However, it was
through the fluidity of their approach to the deities, in contrast to the Minority
Affairs Bureau's rigidity, that they were able to encourage the people of Yaxi and the
other visitors to the temple not to rebel, but to evade the government control of the
temple by declaring that the deities had moved elsewhere. Both the stories of the
deities and the interpretations of their wishes are thus multi-vocal and shifting. It is
through this that they are not only expressive of the complex and heterogeneous
nature of local identities but also evasive of government control.
1 In view of the prevailing attitude that the Kho Xiong are primitive, it is interesting that the only
family I came across in West Hunan who told me of a document recording their family tree was Old
Liang's family. Most of his relatives spoke Kho Xiong as a first language but their family tree was in
Chinese. When 1 asked Chinese speaking families in Yaxi they said that they did not keep such
documents.
2 Before the railway was built, when transport was by river, Yuanning and Luxi were starting points
for travelling to and from West Hunan because they are on the Yuan river, which is easily navigable
to Changde, a sizeable city in north Hunan. Further west the rivers are navigable only for smaller
boats.
3 The original Kho Xiong was used in the Chinese text. The writing system used here was introduced
in the 1950s and the final letter of each word indicates the tone.
4 For a discussion of the development of No drama from luo or exorcism, see Bodde (1975).
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5 A form of huan luoyuan, (redeeming a vow to the gods) is found in the worship of the Celestial
Kings, as I have mentioned in Chapter Seven. Zhou, Zhang & Xie describe the process of setting up
the altar and the luo verses which are recited to them (1992: 338 f.). I have also heard a woman from
a formerly Kho Xiong speaking village, who acted as custodian at one of the temples which had




This may be a reference to Wu Laoyao who lived in the Laershan district during the Ming dynasty
and 'was the leader of the Miao villages in this part for a long time and dominated the boundary areas
of Hunan and Guizhou provinces' (Zhang 1994: 39).
8 The Yang surname discussed here is written ■ The surname Yang ^ is also found in West
Hunan but only among people who claim Han descent.
9 Since it is not part of an institutional religion, it cannot be registered with the United Front
Department, as the Buddhist temples are.
10
In Mandarin, bai pusa.
11 About £500
12 The festival of Guanyin was celebrated on slightly different days in different temples. Thus, at the
Guanyin festival at Pingshanpo, which was held the next day, the events at Yaxi were a major topic of
conversation and it was also said that, before the temple was built there, it had been just rocks.
13 The worship of rocks has already been mentioned, see Chapter Six, note 12.
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Incense seller at the official temple: Yaxi 1997
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Inaugurating the new temple to the Celestial Kings: Yaxi 1997
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Chapter Ten - Conclusions
It is evident from the material which I have presented in the previous chapter and in
this study as a whole that there is a contrast between the flexible cultural productions
of the ordinary inhabitants of the Jishou area and the more rigid and standardised
official promotions and images of the area. Local cultural productions such as
unofficial temples and the dragon burning festival in Majingao (see Chapter Four)
have qualities which make them an effective means of addressing problems arising in
day to day life including the economic and social uncertainties which follow China's
reform process. Official forms of culture, on the other hand, such as the Si Yue Ba
festival and the scenic park at Dehang are promoted as visually appealing spectacles
and secular leisure opportunities. Often, whereas unofficial cultural forms are
expressive of a sense of locality and of collective memory, official ones serve to
reinforce ideas of broader Chinese culture. Where temples are concerned, local
government in Jishou, as in other parts of China, has attempted to organise them as
examples of institutional religion or as cultural relics, discouraging any connections
which people might make with local memories and landscapes. This is intended to
discourage belief in local forms of efficacy, usually classified as 'superstition', and
may also provide a means of bringing in an income. The view that temples are a
surviving relic from the past is reinforced through state directed educational and
other work units, which discourage religious activity and encourage the use of
temples for leisure activities. I take the categorisation of minorities to be a part of
this official process of the standardisation of culture, since it is a means by which
Chinese culture is made to appear contrastingly homogeneous. By characterising
West Hunan as a minority place, non-local Chinese people can also disassociate
themselves from some of the more unorthodox 'local' practices.
This disparity between the homogenising and secularising approach the government
and the more flexible and responsive one of ordinary people has been described in a
number of contexts. There is the contrast between official festivals as 'healthy'
activities and spectacles and the more efficacious, participatory event of burning the
dragons. The same contrast is seen at temples, particularly the case in the different
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stories told of the Celestial Kings. It is also seen in the conflict between attempts by
local government to organise temples as a means of income, whilst ordinary visitors
are more concerned with the relevance of the deities to their own lives. In more
abstract terms, the same contrast can be seen between the official promotion of West
Hunan as a series of fixed, aesthetically pleasing landscapes, as part of an elite
Chinese way of looking at the world, and the unofficial recreation of ideas of a
locality seen in the association of the deities with the protection of the area. It is
through the continued recreation of flexible 'local' cultural forms, in interaction with
official ones, that ordinary people negotiate their identity.
An emphasis on the effects of the state might appear to be contrary to that of recent
studies of China, particularly those based on the cities of the East coast which stress
the effects of transnational flows of people and media (see for example Gamble
1996, Ong 1997). Jishou, as I have described in Chapter Two, has also been
influenced by the reforms and open door policy, but the effects are less pronounced
than elsewhere. In contrast to East China where contact with relatives and visitors
from overseas is common, it is rare for overseas Chinese to visit Jishou. Whereas
Gamble writes that by 1996 there were 40,000 Internet users in Shanghai (1996:
333), Hunan province at this time was not connected to the Internet. In 1997
provision had been made, but in Jishou there was as yet no public access. Emails
could only be sent if they were written down first and handed in at the main post
office. Many aspects of everyday life still appear to be dominated by local
government or dependant on the goodwill of cadres. Money is brought into the area
through government grants and through state run administrative work units. As I
have described, with few private businesses, aside from family run shops and
restaurants, the state is still the major employer. The images of minorities and
minority festivals convey ideas of a primitive 'Other' and of happily co-exising
minority groups. Both these images appear to be politically motivated and the use of
images of minorities at national level state occasions confirms this. The same
activities, however, provide a source of income, attracting sponsorship from
companies, as in the case of the involvement of a drug company in the New Year
festivals at Aizhai and Majingao and attracting funding for Jishou University. The
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public event of the year which was most sophisticated in its presentation was that
prepared by the Propaganda Department at New Year.
China's reforms have made possible many of the activities I have been describing.
They have brought increased opportunities for leisure and employment, especially to
urban people. They have also made possible the recreation of local temples.
Nevertheless, their effects are regarded negatively by many, particularly the old and
the poor and these effects are not distinguished from the actions of the state. The
situation is seen in terms of an 'inter-penetration of state and society' (Flower &
Leonard 1997: 200). Activities at temples are often a response to the perceived
disorder (luan) which has followed the reforms, or to the dilemmas posed by the new
opportunities for trade and travel which arise. The deities of the past are turned to for
help in ways which imply a lack of confidence in the Public Security Bureau and
other branches of the local government. Visitors to the temples talk nostalgically
about the past, and a respect for past leaders is seen in the status of Chairman Mao as
a new deity. This recreation of temples by ordinary people, therefore, is not so much
the emergence of past forms as their re-use, through which they acquire 'new
meanings and speak to new experiences' (Ong 1988: 32).
I have shown that this recreation of temples is reactive, in that it is a response by
local people to the uncertainties which have followed the reforms. But another form
of interaction arises in the tension between local government attempts to standardise
temples and the determination among their local clientele that they commemorate
figures who were responsible to the Jishou area. This is particularly an issue among
people who are native to the area, since visitors from outside the area are often
unfamiliar with the stories of the deities and are drawn by a temple's reputation for
being ling (efficacious), hao wan (enjoyable) or a combination of the two. It is
through this form of interaction with the state, as well as in response to the perceived
disorder of the post-reform era that activities at the temple recreate a sense of
locality. This is particularly the case with the temple of the Celestial Kings. The
temples which were associated more exclusively with the state-cult such as the
temple to Ma Yuan are almost forgotten. It becomes apparent that temples are not
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just a response to a current situation but also show the continued relevance of a long
process of interactions and the creation of meanings relevant to the people who visit
them.
Often, the idea of 'local' culture is both evasive of and challenging to the actions of
the state. For example, attempts by local government to organise the temple of the
Celestial Kings and to draw income from it received a set back when it became
apparent that the deities could not be controlled in this way. In terms of local belief,
the deities too could react to changing circumstances and could communicate this to
the inhabitants of the area. In a different way, the attempts to educate young people
into a distrust of religious activities and an allegiance to China in its broadest sense,
as in the formal structures of education within which I worked, cannot prevent their
fascination with temples and with the locality. Although, as I have described, this
often appears to be part of the secular leisure activities through which young people
express a sense of discontinuity with the politicisation of the past, many young urban
visitors are attracted by a sense of locality despite the fact that it is not their native
area and are ambivalent, or even reverent in their approach to the deities.
The themes of culture, locality and identity which run through this thesis, are closely
inter-related and, in recent years, all of these terms have been involved in the same
kinds of redefinition. Where once cultures, localities and group identities were
treated as bounded entities, they are now viewed as interactive, heterogeneous and
changing. Culture, for example, is treated as a verb (Street 1993) and a production
(Rosaldo 1989: 93). It is also seen as a process of interaction and change in which
'symbols and ideas never acquired a closed or entirely coherent set of meanings: they
were polyvalent, fluid and hybridised' (Wright 1988: 9). This understanding of
culture is clearly related to the view of 'locality' which sees it as something which is
continually produced through interaction with others, as I have used it in earlier
chapters (cf Appadurai 1995, Knight 1994, Fardon 1995).
A similar approach is taken to identity, as exemplified by Hall who writes that a
former essentialising notion of identity has been replaced by a 'strategic and
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positional one' (1996:3). I take the cultural productions I describe to be expressive
of identities. In assuming a close interconnection between these two I follow
Friedman who illustrates the 'practice of identity' in terms of cultural productions
(1995: 86) and writers who look more specifically at ritual as the performance of
identity. As Crain writes, it is through cultural performances that people 'affirm,
negotiate, and/or challenge particular identities' (Crain 1998: 253).
The fluidity of identities and hybridity of cultures has been discussed largely in the
context of globalisation. For example, Hall writes that,
[w]e need to situate the debates about identity within all those historically specific
developments and practices which have disturbed the relatively 'settled' character of many
populations and cultures, above all in relation to the process of globalisation (Hall 1996: 4).
My material suggests, however, that West Hunan has for centuries been a place of
cultural hybridity. The only sense in which West Hunan has been a place of settled
and bounded cultures had been in the official classifications which have been
imposed upon it. The production of locality as a response to the state's attempts to
separate and standardise, is a process which has been going on over hundreds of
years, as we can see in the 'contested histories' of the temple of the Celestial Kings.
This of course draws attention to the fact that the notion of China as a place of
homogeneous culture, in the past and today, is itself an ideology, rather than an
actuality, and the imposition of Miao/ Han boundaries in lowland West Hunan was a
constant struggle. Moreover, the Chinese state, with which Han Chinese identity has
been so closely associated, cannot be taken to be a monolithic entity. The pervasive
presence of the Communist party has led some to write of a 'totalising' Chinese state.
It seems more probable that this situation does not and has never existed. As Shue
writes, the Chinese state under Mao, 'contained numerous shifting, cross-cutting,
competitive (even hostile) centres of power' (1988: 3).
If the flexible, locally recreated forms of culture which I have described are used to
address current, local concerns, despite the attempts of the state to standardise them,
why are images of minorities not the site of similar interactions? Despite images of
Miao people in the public architecture very few people in Jishou or in the
immediately surrounding area identify themselves as Miao. A large proportion of
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lowlanders claim ancestry from incomers from Jiangxi and many of those who are of
minority descent do not feel it is appropriate to speak about this in the urban
environment. And Kho Xiong is no longer spoken in the surrounding villages as it
once was.
The lack of local interest which Kho Xiong speaking people show in the images of
Dehang and at New Year festivals suggests these images are not considered relevant,
even to the people which they purport to represent. These images are officially
promoted and intended to show images of the Miao to others, as separate and exotic
or separate and contented. They are not indigenously produced images expressive of
the identities of the people themselves and are considerably less popular than the
basket-ball matches which foster inter-village relationships. Drum-dancing, for
example, is represented in a form which is taught by local cultural officials rather
than based on memories of the drum-dancing of the past. There is little room at
festivals for participation by the general population or the presence of ritual
practitioners. Attempts to bring unofficial meanings to these festivals are hampered
by the fact that the festivals are arranged and attended by officials, though counter-
representations of officials may appear briefly as at the lion-dancing at Daxingzhai.
It has not been the aim of this thesis to present a detailed account of the highland
people of this area. I have concentrated on lowland West Hunan and the ways in
which cultural productions there transgress the ideas of bounded groups which the
state tries to promote. In showing that these boundaries do not reflect indigenous
views, I do not, however, want to imply that Kho Xiong speaking people see
themselves as being no different from lowland people. What I suggest is that this
difference is part of a complex series of interactions rather than an all-important,
primordial ethnic distinction. But descriptions and classifications, always made by
the more educated, more urbanised of the less so, continue to assume broad,
essentialised groups. The most recent example of this is of course a result of the
influence of American Hmong.
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Urban Miao, particularly scholars and cadres, identify themselves with a broader
'Miao' category, in line with official classifications. I have suggested that, partly at
least, this is often an instrumental approach since the position of cadre also ensures
that such people are unwilling to participate in what are seen as the 'primitive'
aspects of Miao culture. The American Hmong, however, combine a belief in the
unity of the 'Miao' people with a pride in Miao culture. They insist on the use of
Miao languages and the promulgation of histories which show that the Miao once
had a state which was equal to that of the Han Chinese. At present this has
influenced only a few people in Jishou, but since one of their projects is the
education of village people in Miao history one may expect this influence to spread.
But in effect, this is another form of categorising the people of West Hunan which
does not take account of the identifications of the people themselves. In describing
themselves as 'Hmong' and talking in essentialising terms about Hmong history and
Hmong culture, the scholars who are involved appear to devalue the complex
identifications of the Kho Xiong altogether. In addition to being promoted as a place
of otherness and primordial origins for the Han, West Hunan is now promoted as the
place of origin of the 'Hmong.' Skinner writes that peripheral areas of China,
become exporters not so much of goods as of people usually in the form of soldiers
(1976: 351). In the past this has been true of West Hunan, but today its major export
is its images of people and landscape, images which often bear little resemblance to
the identifications made by the West Hunan people themselves.
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